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The thesis brings together philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific theories 
of affect in developing a dual process account of emotion. 
Philosophers and psychologists who take a cognitivist view claim that emotions in 
humans and other mammalian species require intentionality, arising as the product of 
evaluations which bear upon our survival or wellbeing, whereas neuroscientists con-
clude from their research that emotion has its foundations in subcortical affect mech-
anisms by which behaviours may arise as spontaneous responses to valuable stimuli. 
Parts I and II of the thesis examine these two accounts, which are construed as cogni-
tive-evaluative and primitive emotional processes respectively. It is further proposed 
that both these manifestations of emotion are to be found in mammalian species.  
Given that cognitive-evaluative and primitive emotional states can be demonstrated 
to coexist and function separately in mammalian species, how do we explain cases in 
which the two processes seem to be non-accidentally associated? To exemplify: how 
does it come about that an appraisal that I have been unfairly treated is accompanied 
by aggressive feelings and impulses towards the object of my anger?  
Cognitivists accept that the somatic changes accompanying emotions are associated 
with appraisals but argue that such changes play no role in emotion as an evaluative 
process other than that of marking the appraisal as significant for our wellbeing. In 
contrast, a dual process model of emotion is proposed for the interaction of primitive 
emotions and emotional appraisals whereby the appraisal process arouses a primitive 
emotion through the detection of patterns within complex external contexts which 
have a significance for an individual’s wellbeing. The neurophysiological changes   
associated with the primitive emotion when so aroused, will in turn, invest the ap-
praisal with feelings, sensations characteristic of those neurophysiologies. These 
feelings influence evaluation in ways which are fundamental to the successful per-









A few years ago, I attended a symposium for philosophers, psychologists and neuro-
scientists intended to promote interaction on matters of common concern. At one of 
the seminars a professor of psychology presented the conclusions of a programme of 
research into episodic memory. The gist of his findings was that any episodic 
memory must contain some spatial or temporal reference.  
In the subsequent question and answer session, a professor of philosophy insisted re-
peatedly that he could have episodic memories which contained no such reference. 
His objection, which may have been mischievous, occasioned some amusement in 
the audience. The professor of philosophy did not fully clarify his motives for mak-
ing this statement: he did not identify these memories; nor did he seem to be arguing 
with the findings or their general applicability; rather, he seemed to be asserting that 
it would be possible for humans to construct and retain episodic memories without a 
spatial or temporal reference intentionally, despite the existence of psychological 
principles relating to the spatial and temporal ‘tagging’ of episodic memory. 
The professor of psychology declared that what his opponent was asserting was im-
possible; and there the matter rested. 
I am unable to visualize how an episodic memory could be intentionally constructed 
and retained in the manner proposed. Yet this encounter has remained with me be-
cause it highlighted a problem for any theory of mind: if there are principles which 
motivate and inform our mental processes, to what extent do our conscious cogni-
tions allow us to overwrite or alter them?  
This question is relevant to the study of emotion. The range and complexity of the 
emotions which humans claim to experience is so great that any study of them as 
separately occurring entities must necessarily be extensive and, as William James 
observed, potentially tedious. But while emotions as experienced seem to be ex-
tremely diverse in both nature and function, some shared aspect of their phenome-
nology invites us to acknowledge them as inhabiting, at some level, a common di-
mension of the human psyche. And such an acknowledgement invites us to speculate 
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that emotion could be a coherent category of mental processes subject to principled 
motives. 
Amelie Rorty counsels against any such notion; she visualises the emotional whole 
as composed of three elements of explanation: individual, social and genetic, but ob-
serves:  
“what goes without saying may need to be said: we should not be misled by talk of 
interaction, layers or strands, to suppose that we are dealing with direct variables 
whose causal interaction can be traced. What is independently variable in theory 
need not be independently variable in fact.” (1978 p.157). 
 Rorty is asserting that the experience of emotion is so rich and complex and so 
bound up with our thoughts, that any attempt to unravel it into interacting compo-
nents or principles, even if it were possible, would fail to account for it as a totality. 
According to this view, we need not search for principles which govern emotion be-
cause even if we were to find them, what they are attempting to explain must per-
force be beyond the ability of any interaction of such principles to explain. 
I am not persuaded by Rorty’s assertion; and this is not because I have no regard for 
the importance of human emotion: it is just because I believe that emotion is a core 
aspect of human cognition that I also believe that any account of mind will be im-
poverished by the absence of the sort of explanation which Rorty resists. If we are to 
have a philosophy of mind, we must be prepared to consider the possibility that emo-
tion functions in a manner which can be expressed in terms of philosophical theories 
or psychological processes, rather than analysed as an abundance of distinct yet inex-
tricably complex experiences.   
And I am not alone in taking this view. Behavioural scientists and neuroscientists 
specialising in affect, treat emotion in animals – particularly mammals – as arising in 
response to certain types of stimulus. They believe that emotional states in animals 
are instantiated by neural systems originating in the subcortex and proximate brain 
locations, sometimes characterized as the limbic system, and they provide a good 
deal of evidence to substantiate this claim. Neuroscientists and some psychologists 
working in the field of human emotion believe that these same subcortical systems, 
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(whilst still occasionally responsive to unconditioned stimuli) are elaborated in 
higher brain functions and express themselves as agents in mental activities such as 
complex decision-making (Damasio 1994) Many of these manifestations of emotion 
do not act at a level of mentality which could be described as conscious and indeed, 
psychologists such as Kahneman (2012) take the view that many of the day-to-day 
choices we make are informed by emotionally-driven judgments acting rapidly and 
processed nonconsciously.  
In contrast to the neuroscientific and psychological views of emotion, an important 
field of emotional philosophy is represented by advocates of cognitivism. Cognitiv-
ists make a broad claim that emotion is caused by judgments or evaluations of ob-
jects, events or circumstances as having significance for the wellbeing of the subject. 
There is good evidence for this view; for example, human emotions such as embar-
rassment or guilt cannot arise without the subject’s having some understanding of 
the social context within which he/she exists. However, the claim that emotion arises 
solely as the outcome of appraisal is challenged by psychologists who claim that cer-
tain emotions may arise spontaneously in the presence of certain exciting objects.  
The proponents of both these views accept that the idea of emotion as the product of 
evaluation cannot easily be reconciled with a claim that an emotional state is auto-
matically triggered in the presence of an exciting object. 
This thesis accepts the cognitivist view that emotions may arise from appraisals of 
value in humans and other mammals. But whilst accepting the cognitivist claim, it 
provides an explanation for the spontaneous arousal of emotions by introducing a 
separate category of primitive emotions in which emotional behaviours arise sponta-
neously as responses to stimuli of homeostatic value, and it is argued that both cog-
nitive-evaluative emotional states and primitive emotions occur in mammalian spe-
cies.  
In order to achieve a better understanding of the respective nature and function of 
cognitivist and primitive emotional processes, both accounts must stand upon an 
equivalent philosophical footing. However, in contrast to the extensive body of work 
provided by cognitivists for the explanation of emotions as appraisals, the notion of 
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affect as a set of automatically-arising subcortical processes is not well represented 
as a philosophical concept, and accordingly, the first two parts of this thesis are allo-
cated to the exposition and analysis of cognitivist and neurobiological theories of 
emotion: 
Part I explains, then explores, the cognitivist position that emotion is the outcome of 
evaluation or appraisal. It discusses disputes concerning emotional episodes in which 
affective states appear to manifest without evaluation and concludes that there is a 
strong case to be made for a distinct class of ‘non-evaluative’ emotions.  
The cognitivist view of feelings is examined separately. The cognitivist claim that 
the feelings associated with emotional evaluation are explicable as the products of 
evaluative or judgmental processes is challenged, as is the concomitant claim that 
physiological changes, whilst co-occurring with emotional experiences, play no role 
in emotional evaluations. 
Part II pulls together the results of scientific research into the causes and effects of 
emotions as both neurobiological states and behavioural phenomena with the object 
of translating these explanations into a model for the action of primitive emotions 
which can be usefully compared with cognitivist accounts. To do this, a methodol-
ogy is employed in which research into the action of affect in mammals is progres-
sively expanded from a description of a set of subcortical neural systems into an ac-
count of primitive emotions as autonomous functions, able both to access and co-opt 
perceptive, memory and motor centres. The collective action of these states is argued 
to constitute a core primitive emotional architecture common to all mammalian spe-
cies, and the systematicity of these mental phenomena is contrasted with cognitivist 
accounts of emotion as requiring intentionality.   
But this leaves a question unanswered. If cognitivist and primitive emotional states 
represent two coexisting emotional systems acting independently, both in humans 
and other mammals, why is it that there appear to be cases in which they are non-ac-
cidentally coordinated? If emotional thoughts may be explained as the products of 
evaluation, why is it, for example, that when my child is arbitrarily denied a merited 
opportunity, even as I judge that she has been unfairly treated by the administrative 
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process, these thoughts are bound up with feelings of anger directed against some in-
dividual or group as being responsible for that inequity?   
Cognitivist accounts do not deny that the feelings which accompany emotional eval-
uations mark that mental state as emotional, but in Part III of the thesis I will ad-
vance the hypothesis that primitive emotional systems are triggered by patterns of 
appraisals and exert an influence upon those appraisals when aroused. According to 
this account, the feelings which accompany an emotional appraisal are the effects of 
an underlying primitive emotional state. Over the past two decades, several psycho-
logical theories of this type – designated ‘dual-process’ theories - have been pro-
posed for mental activities as diverse as social cognition, reasoning and memory. 
The claim underpinning the dual process concept is that these faculties may be 
broadly differentiated into two modes of cognition: processes which act autono-
mously and processes which are commonly described as reflective or deliberative.  
To my knowledge, whilst proponents of dual process explanation have offered emo-
tion as a candidate for this form of explanation, no detailed dual process model of 














PART I – Cognitive Evaluative Theories of Emotion 
The first part of this thesis will be devoted to an account of the cognitivist view of 
emotion. However, for reasons which will become apparent, I will use the term ‘cog-
nitive-evaluative’ to describe philosophers who argue that emotions are aroused by 
appraisals or evaluations of external entities as they concern the self. The term ‘cog-
nitive-evaluative’ is awkward but it provides the most appropriate description of this 
account of emotion.   
• Chapter 1 will offer a representative view of the various proposals and theo-
ries which have been offered in support of emotion as a cognitive-evaluative 
phenomenon.  
The subsequent chapters will consider two separate challenges to the cognitive-eval-
uative theory: 
• Chapter 2 will examine claims that emotion may arise in the absence of eval-
uation and will describe the responses of cognitive-evaluative advocates to 
such claims. 
• Chapter 3 will consider the claim that, in its treatment of feelings, the cogni-
tive-evaluative explanation of emotion provides an incomplete account of 
emotion as experienced. 
Throughout this thesis, I will – in common with many philosophers and psycholo-










Chapter 1: The Cognitive-Evaluative Account of Emotion 
1.1   A Brief Overview and History 
Over the past two centuries the concept of emotion has been the subject of a wide 
range of philosophical treatments: in the late nineteenth century James and Lange 
identified emotion with the experience of feelings which occurred as characteristic 
bodily states caused by the detection of some exciting object, but these views were 
challenged in the early to mid-twentieth century by behaviourists who argued that 
those bodily states were merely elements of a process by which an animal responded 
to a stimulus and were in consequence eliminable by behaviourist theory. By the 
1970’s and 1980’s the failure of researchers and behaviourist philosophers to pro-
duce explanations of animal behaviours as predictable responses to stimuli caused 
many philosophers to adopt a cognitivist approach to emotion. 
Describing the general reaction to the unravelling of the behaviourist position, Mar-
tha Nussbaum writes: “Simple models of behaviour [  ], kept proving to be inade-
quate as explanatory and predictive accounts: it came to be recognised that S-R 
models would have to be replaced by S-O-R  (Stimulus/Organism/Response) models 
of a far more complicated sort. This recognition was prompted by experimental re-
sults in the area of learning where it became clear that the animal’s view of its own 
situation, and the stimuli to which it was subjected, were crucial explanatory fac-
tors.” (2001 p.94) 
The view expressed here is ‘cognitive’. It takes the position that mental states in hu-
mans and animals cannot be understood simply as expeditors of invariant responses 
to stimuli. Cognitive advocates argue that the brain is able to instantiate a range of 
processes subsequent to the detection of stimuli - such as remembering, thinking and 
learning – and that behaviours occur as the outcome of these processes, functioning 
separately or collectively, in response to stimuli. Treating the brain in this way ena-
bles cognitive scientists and philosophers to work from a shared perspective with re-
gard to the role of mental states, allowing the term ‘cognitive’ to be claimed uncon-
troversially by either of these groups.  
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The cognitive-evaluative account which I will examine takes as its premise the no-
tion that certain animals, including humans, in making an emotional evaluation be-
have intentionally towards the emotional object, by selecting objects, events or cir-
cumstances in the external world which have value for themselves, and acting to-
wards those objects in a manner which supports the wellbeing or survival of the indi-
vidual.   
Nussbaum compares this view to much earlier cognitivist theories of emotion. Chry-
sippus, a Stoic, (c280-207) argued that only creatures capable of forming proposi-
tion-like entities (lekta) could exhibit emotions. He concluded that non-human ani-
mals, having no linguistic ability, are incapable of emotion. Other Stoic philosophers 
disputed this, arguing from observation that animals display emotionally-driven be-
haviours. They accepted Chrysippus’ proposal that animals were incapable of learn-
ing and judgment exhibited by species with language, and concluded that in conse-
quence, emotions must constitute some separate nonreasoning element of the soul.  
Nussbaum responds: “they share a false premise: that animals are incapable of in-
tentionality, selective attention and appraisal” (2001 p.91) 
Nussbaum’s account of emotion as appraisal provides a separate explanation of emo-
tion as felt; she accepts the co-occurrence of bodily feelings as a characteristic of the 
emotional experience but denies any role for those feelings in her account of the in-
tentional processes which generate emotions: 
 “Do we get further by recognizing qualia, and saying it’s not boiling or trembling 
we’re after, but the sui generis feeling of anger, which has a constancy across sub-
jects, in something like the way that seeing red has constancy? I don’t feel that much 
is contributed by this move. So far as we can see, what has constancy across subjects 
is a pattern of thought, which is of course a type of experience. If we are to be con-
vinced that there is anything further that has constancy across subjects, we need to 
be told something about what this might be.” (2001 p.61) 
Nussbaum is asserting that if I am experiencing an emotion, such a state is explained 
from an appraisal of the circumstances obtaining at the time, rather than the bodily 
accompaniments to the emotion as appraised. She argues that if these physiological 
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effects have some role in emotion, we need first to have an account of how some pat-
tern of physiological arousal is correlated with an emotion which we believe we are 
experiencing.  
But, for Nussbaum, even if a physiological state were to co-occur consistently with 
an emotion, this would not be sufficient in itself to allow us to postulate that those 
bodily changes play some role in the co-occurring emotion. In the absence of such an 
explanation, even if a characteristic physiological change were to be identified, it re-
mains superfluous to the cognitive-evaluative account. 
1.2 The Philosophical Explanation of Emotion as a ‘Cognitive’ Phenomenon  
The term cognitive is not one which is readily accepted by all philosophers to whom 
this view is attributed and before embarking upon any further discussion, I will at-
tempt to explain what will be understood to constitute a cognitive theory for the pur-
poses of this thesis. 
Robert Solomon (2004), who is widely cited as one of the earliest advocates of emo-
tion as ‘judgmental evaluations’ makes this observation: “what exactly is a ‘cogni-
tive’ theory of emotions? The label ‘cognitive theory’ is not mine, and I fought it for 
years not just because it was misleading but because “cognition” is so variously or 
ill-defined.” (2004 p.78). Solomon’s argument here is with the notion of cognitions 
as being descriptive of the judgmental processes which he believes form the basis of 
emotion. I concur with Solomon that the term ‘cognition’ is ill-defined. But I shall 
not adopt Solomon’s view that cognitive theories are defined by the presence or ac-
tion of ‘cognitions’. Rather, I shall take the description ‘cognitive’ to refer to a the-
ory of any mental process, which, acting independently of its stimulus or its out-
come, explains the way in which a stimulus generates a response, be that a behav-
iour, or a disposition in the form of a propensity to act, or an internalised mental out-
come, such as a decision1. 
This account of the ‘cognitive’ view is the one proposed earlier by Nussbaum in 
which a stimulus does not directly predict a response, as it would in a reflex such as 
 
1 See p.29 for a more complete account. 
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an eye-blink in response to a puff of air (i.e. stimulus→response); rather it refers to 
mental events interposed between stimulus and response so that the response can be 
suppressed or modified by some internal process instantiated by the organism (i.e. 
stimulus→organism→response) which is independently explicable. On this reading, 
Solomon’s explanation of emotions as ‘subjective engagements with the world’, 
whatever their form, is a ‘cognitive’ view. In a cognitive relationship, the relation-
ship between stimulus and response is mediated by some intervening process, allow-
ing the interpretation of stimulus to be varied independently of the evoked response. 
In this account the relationship between stimulus and response is explicable as some 
function of the mediating process, whereas in a reflex response the intervening neu-
ral processes may be treated as invariant mechanisms for expediting a response from 
a stimulus. 
At first sight, this appears to be setting the boundaries of cognitive processes loosely, 
but Solomon is not alone amongst cognitive-evaluative advocates in calling for lati-
tude in terms of the evaluative mental processes which constitute the broad spectrum 
of observed mental processes with which affect is associated. Despite this, my inter-
pretation of ‘cognitive’ is constraining inasmuch as it does require that the interven-
ing mental processes described are separately explicable, with the result that any ex-
planation Solomon wishes to provide for the action of emotion, independent of stim-
ulus or response, becomes ‘cognitive’. 
1.3 The Scope of Cognitive-Evaluative Theories of Emotion 
Emotion is commonly held to have a wide-ranging and heterogeneous role in our 
mental lives. We can be sad or depressed without particular reason. These could be 
regarded as ‘stimulus-free’ emotions and hence do not obviously conform to my re-
quirements as ‘cognitive’, since no role for mediation is evident. Or we can have per-
sonalities which are ‘cheerful’ or ‘irascible’; but again, these are qualities attaching 
to the character of a subject’s day-to-day interactions, which colour his/her relation-
ships without reference to any particular stimulus or response. So once again, the 
prospects for explaining such qualities cognitively are poor because they are con-
stantly present, apparently requiring no stimulus, whilst colouring our responses. 
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Solomon has outlined the kind of phenomena he claims as candidates for his account 
of emotion: 
 “Carroll Izard begins by defining [emotions] as “brief responses”. In recent work 
by Joe LeDoux and Jaak Panksepp, and Antonio Damasio, an emotion is sometimes 
presented as if it is more or less over and done in 120 milliseconds, the rest being 
mere aftermath of cerebral embellishment. An emotion, so understood, is a brief, 
preconscious, precognitive, more or less automatic excitation of an affect program. [    
] I am more interested in substantial processes that last a long time – lifelong love, 
for instance. I am interested, in other words, not in these brief “irruptive” reactions 
or responses but in the long-term narratives of Othello [   ]. I am interested in the 
meanings of life, not short-term neurological arousal.” (2004 p.78) 
In this respect, the field of interest of this thesis is more modest than Solomon’s. My 
earlier characterisation of cognitive evaluation restricts me to occurrences of emotion 
with origins which may be identified and outcomes which may be explicated. This 
view of emotion must take into account the sort of short term ‘neurological arousals’ 
dismissed by Solomon, to the extent that they are triggered by stimuli and evoke in-
telligible responses; it will also include the concept of emotion as the product of ap-
praisal, where the object of appraisal is identifiable and the outcome is manifest. But 
the type of extended emotional experiences which interest Solomon, such as lifelong 
love, are much less apt for interpretation as evaluative mechanisms for mediating the 
relationship between stimulus and response. The greater part of this thesis will con-
centrate on relatively brief emotional events in which the role of emotional processes 
in mediating stimulus and response may be examined. However, in Chapter 21 I will 
consider Nussbaum’s account of grief, in the light of theories I have proposed as a 
result of my investigations of more compressed emotional episodes. 
Moving to Solomon’s disinterest in Izard’s ‘brief responses’, I will explain presently 
how cognitive science has demonstrated that emotions may indeed arise as rapidly as 
Solomon describes, but to suggest that an entire emotional episode may occur with 
such brevity is to misrepresent LeDoux’s and Panksepp’s work. Neither does it re-
flect Izard’s more general account of emotion (2009). And even a cursory reading of 
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Damasio’s work will demonstrate that he is describing emotional conditions – or 
more accurately, deficiencies – which are active throughout the lifetimes of his sub-
jects2.  
While Solomon expresses little interest in these ‘more or less automatic’ manifesta-
tions of affect, Lazarus has argued at some length that such events may be dismissed 
as simple reflexes which are non-cognitive (Chapter 2); and Nussbaum takes the 
more nuanced view that a behavioural state, having some of the characteristics of an 
emotion, may arise automatically in a human or an animal. But she argues that such 
states are not emotions themselves, rather they are transformed into emotions by 
some apprehension of the value of the emotional object – a mental act requiring in-
tentionality. 
1.4 The Constituents of Emotional Evaluation 
The philosophical view that an evaluation of circumstances as they relate to oneself 
can cause an emotion is widely held, but it is less clear what an evaluation ought to 
consist of. Solomon observes “Several philosophers join me in defending the theory 
that emotions are evaluative judgments, a view that can be traced back to the Sto-
ics.” (2004 p.79). I have described how Solomon has questioned the notion that 
emotions can result from short-term neurological arousal. But his account of emo-
tions as the outcome of evaluative judgments reveals that he is unwilling to accom-
modate his concept of emotion entirely within more formal theories of mind: 
“I have long argued that emotions as judgments should not be confused with singu-
lar summary judgments (such as might be used to briefly define them or distinguish 
one emotion from another), nor should a judgment be thought of something delibera-
tive, articulate or fully conscious [  ] To say that emotions are intelligent is not to 
say that an emotion is an aspect of intellect, and to insist that emotions are judg-
ments is not to say that emotions are what some philosophers call ‘propositional at-
titudes’” (2004 p.77) 
and: 
 
2 An extract from Damasio’s work is provided in the Appendix. 
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 “I now want to stress even more than I have done before that a judgment is not a 
detached intellectual act but a way of cognitively grappling with the world. It has as 
its very basis and as a background a complex set of aspirations, expectations, evalu-
ations (“appraisals”), needs, demands and desires (which says something about why 
the reigning “belief-desire” analysis of emotions and intentions is so hopelessly im-
poverished)” (2004 p.77) 
Solomon argues that emotions are judgments, and the product of such judgments 
manifest as some intelligible attempt to address the emotional object. But the candi-
date mental processes which subserve evaluative judgments need not be proposi-
tional attitudes, representing the outcomes of explicit beliefs, nor need their arousal 
be the product of consciously-held desires and intentions.  
But this is not sufficient to justify the central role of evaluation in emotion. If ap-
praisals are the mental processes which cause emotions, and if cognitive-evaluative 
advocates are unwilling to describe appraisals in terms of any particular theory of 
mind, they must offer some other criterion, or set of criteria, by which the role of 
emotional appraisals may be characterized. 
Smith and Lazarus offer a possible way forward: they observe that “for an emotion 
to occur, the “facts” as construed by the individual, must further be appraised for 
their implications for personal well-being.[  ]. We suggest that this [  ] type of evalu-
ation provides the emotional ‘heat’ in an encounter, and we refer to it as appraisal 
to distinguish it from colder cognitions that play a more indirect role in emotion 
generation” (1993 p.917).  
They propose (in accordance with their own psychological research) that the attribu-
tions I make, when they pertain to circumstances concerning myself, arise as emo-
tions because they are assessed as relevant to my goals - either challenging or sup-
porting them - and are further appraised, inter alia, with respect to my potential to 
cope, and the need for me to act. Smith and Lazarus, through research, have discov-
ered from a collective analysis of these factors that certain patterns of appraisals 
which they call core relational themes have emotional potency.  
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We sense from our own experience that the appraisal criteria which Lazarus de-
scribes are the right sort to identify the presence of attributes which have implica-
tions for the interests and goals of the experiencing subject. On the face of it, the cir-
cumstance that appraisals refer to matters of subjective well-being rests upon a full 
account - a model - of what constitutes wellbeing and, more specifically, what con-
stitutes an assault upon - or an enhancement of - that wellbeing.  
But this need not be the case: Lazarus describes the relationship between appraisal 
and wellbeing in this way: 
“Cognitive activity is a necessary precondition of emotion because to experience an 
emotion, people must comprehend – whether in the form of an evaluated perception 
or a highly differentiated symbolic process – that their well-being is implicated for 
better or worse.” (1984 p.124)  
and Nussbaum expresses a similar view:  
“I shall argue that emotions always involve the thought of an object combined with a 
thought of that object’s salience or importance; in that sense, they always involve 
appraisal or evaluation. I shall therefore refer to my view as the cognitive-evaluative 
view [ ] But by “cognitive” I mean nothing more than “concerned with receiving 
and processing information.” I do not mean to imply the presence of elaborate cal-
culation, of computation, or even reflexive self-awareness,” (2001 p.22).  
Nussbaum attaches a particular precondition for emotional appraisals which is im-
plied in her description of appraisals as ‘thoughts’: 
“By now nearly all major investigators in the area grant that emotions can and 
should be studied by psychologists and that emotions are richly cognitive phenom-
ena, closely connected with the animal’s way of perceiving and interpreting the 
world [  ] a position in which intentionality is taken seriously and regarded as part 
of what any good theory must include.” (2001 p.94) 
According to this account, the requirement for a general theory, or model, of well-
being I proposed above is rendered unnecessary for humans and other animals, be-
cause each individual - as Lazarus puts it - is able to comprehend the significance of 
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externalities for its own wellbeing. This ‘comprehension’ need not be rational, it is 
only necessary that the subject is able to adopt some response towards the object of 
the emotion, a response which may be construed as serving its wellbeing, and in so 
doing, the subject may be said to display intentionality. 
1.5 The Cognitive-Evaluative Treatment of Feelings 
The full experience of emotion is described by Lazarus as normally consisting of 
three fused components “thoughts, action impulses and somatic disturbances. When 
these components are dissociated we are left with something other than what we 
mean by a true emotional state.” (1982 p.1019). It will be noted that the cognitive-
evaluative view as described thus far accounts for only one of these components - the 
thoughts which comprise our evaluation of the emotion-inducing object. 
Joel Marks addresses the ‘widely-held view’ that emotions are feelings. The feelings 
he describes are bodily states such as the tenseness associated with anger or the re-
laxation which accompanies relief or joy, and he asserts that if we have no experi-
ence of these things, we have not emoted. But the nature of emotion - its identity - 
raises problems. Emotions may take us unawares as the sudden apprehension of feel-
ings of which we have previously been unconscious: the concept of ‘unfelt feeling’ 
is a contradiction; though he speculates that such spontaneous events might be ex-
plained by feelings acting subliminally or subconsciously through our senses alone. 
His response is to separate the feelings we experience during emotions from the cog-
nitions which generate them: “It is not clear how to deal with arguments like these. I 
would simply persist in maintaining that there seem to be clear cases where, for ex-
ample, a person experiences a genuine revelation with regard to his own emotion. 
However that issue goes, there is a second point against the feeling thesis which 
seems to me to be decisive: emotions are intentional phenomena or states (‘inten-
tions’ for short), feelings are not. ‘Intentional’ here is being used in a particularly 
philosophical sense; it has to do with the ‘aboutness or ‘directedness’ of certain 
mental states, e.g., A’s worrying about his financial situation.” (1982 p.228) 
In arguing that emotions are mental process directed towards the objects of emotion, 
Marks, like Nussbaum, proposes that for a state to be emotional, some manifestation 
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of intentionality upon the part of the experiencing subject must be present. Marks is 
expressing the cognitive-evaluative view; he accepts that feelings accompany emo-
tional states, but he claims that emotions are intentional states, whereas feelings are 
not.  
The other feature of emotional experience is what Lazarus has described as an ‘ac-
tion impulse’ – say, the impulse to lash out, or flee. A brief consideration of emo-
tions such as fear and anger will confirm that although these impulses are present, 
we are normally able to control them. The physiology of the suppressed emotional 
impulse could be bundled in with, say, a raised pulse, trembling and blushing, as ‘so-
matic disturbances’. But though we rarely carry through the actions which these im-
pulses prompt us to perform, Lazarus’s characterisation of action impulses as a core 
component of emotion nonetheless seems to bear only one interpretation: that the 
arousal of emotion may be associated with an impulse for action which often consti-
tutes a response to the arousing stimulus other than that offered by appraisal. Such 
impulses represent a comprehensible response to certain classes of stimulus - that is, 
the sort of response which I would often resort to as a child, before I was able to 
control my emotions, or the sort of responses which other species would evoke rou-
tinely in response to certain opportunities, threats or provocations.  
Lazarus has explained this transition away from early emotional impulses: “ [They] 
seem to disappear or at least go underground with an ontogenetic shift to higher 
mental processes, just as they seem to disappear or go underground with the phylo-
genetic accretions of the neocortex that only suppress and regulate but do not banish 
lower functions” (1982 p1021). 
For Nussbaum, bodily feelings mark the presence of emotion but play no part in the 
thoughts and actions which shape an emotional event, but she accounts for the men-
tal perturbations which are commonly associated with feelings by arguing that it is 
the appraisals themselves which cause these disturbances, just because they relate to 
matters of direct concern to ourselves, promoting them to the head of the queue of 
our thoughts and pushing our everyday concerns and reflections into a subsidiary po-
sition. The extent to which they occupy our thoughts, their urgency, is a function of 
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the importance and salience which the emotion-arousing circumstances hold for our 
goals and wellbeing. So, Nussbaum, whilst accepting that somatic states co-occur 
with emotions, assigns no role to them. 
Summary 
My aim in this chapter has been to provide a brief account of emotion as represented 
by a set of claims which are common to philosophers who take the view that emo-
tions arise from mental processes entailing evaluation – a view which I have de-
scribed as cognitive-evaluative. 
They argue first, that emotions are the outcome of intentional mental processes 
which entail evaluations or judgments in humans and other species, by which certain 
entities are revealed to have value. Valued entities may be objects, events, or circum-
stances which are appraised to have relevance for the subject, because they have the 
potential to promote or impair its wellbeing, or threaten its survival. The value in 
such objects may arise because they are desired, as, say, goals, expectations or needs, 
or because they pose threats. To hold such things as valuable, some subjective 
awareness is postulated in which the implications of the perceived value for the sub-
ject’s wellbeing are apprehended, allowing the subject to act towards the object of 
value in a manner appropriate for the maintenance or enhancement of its wellbeing. 
Cognitive-evaluative advocates propose that when an object of value is detected, an 
emotion arises in which thoughts directed towards the object of emotion are accom-
panied by physiological alterations and action impulses. In explaining the physiolog-
ical changes which accompany emotion, a common view is expressed that whilst 
such states mark the evaluation as emotional, they play no role in the evaluative pro-
cess. However, at this point, some divergence occurs. Nussbaum argues that the feel-
ings we experience in the emotional event are bound up with the process of appraisal 
and that the physiological changes accompanying the emotion are incoherent, bear-
ing no relationship to the experiential quality of the emotion, whereas Lazarus argues 
that the somatic disturbances accompanying emotions may be responses to the pat-
tern of appraisal issues detected, which occur as reflex mechanisms retained from an 
earlier period of our evolutionary development. 
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1.6.  Challenging the Cognitive-Evaluative Explanation  
In Chapters 2 and 3, I will challenge aspects of cognitive-evaluative theory. How-
ever, the arguments I put forward, are not to be understood as attempting to disprove 
the entire theory; my intention rather, will be to investigate claims that aspects of 
emotion are not explained by the theory, specifically: 
• Chapter 2. That certain manifestations of emotion in humans and other mam-
mals appear to arise in the absence of evaluation. 
• Chapter 3. That the arousal of bodily feelings and states of action prepared-
ness associated with emotion may play a role in the emotional process, and 
that the evidence which cognitive-evaluative advocates offer against such a 
role is inconclusive.  
The evidence to be considered is taken principally from the results of psychological 
or behavioural research which have been selected as supporting or refuting the 
claims made by the contesting parties. In consequence, the discussion must, in part, 
be steered by the examples which have been selected by cognitive-evaluative advo-
cates and their opponents - evidence advanced in disputes which have arisen inter-
mittently over the past forty years. 
In adopting this approach, my intention will be to prepare the ground for a separate 
category of emotion as a set of spontaneously-aroused primitive states common to all 










Chapter 2 – Comparing Evaluative and Non-Evaluative Theories of Emotion 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall examine the claims of psychologists and behavioural scientists 
who argue that emotional states can arise in the absence of evaluation, and I shall 
consider the objections of cognitive-evaluative philosophers who oppose this view. 
The psychological accounts I shall cite as evidence for the non-evaluative view do 
not require that all instances of emotion are non-evaluative: I shall propose that emo-
tions may occur as both evaluative and non-evaluative states.  
In making such a proposal, I do not assert that the non-evaluative states of emotion 
are differently structured to the stimulus-organism-response formation advanced by 
Nussbaum, only that, whilst entailing a mediating process, which meets Nussbaum’s 
requirement as ‘cognitive’, they operate in the absence of evaluation and hence, in 
the absence of intentionality. 
To test such a claim, it will initially be necessary to create a conceptual model of 
emotion which embraces the important elements of the emotional process without 
appeal to the view that emotion is the product of evaluation. I have been unable to 
discover a model of this kind, and so the account I offer below adopts important ele-
ments of the cognitive-evaluative account, without requiring that evaluation consti-
tutes a necessary precondition for emotion. My intention is to discover whether the 
non-evaluative accounts of emotion offered by psychologists and behavioural scien-
tists are consistent with these less stringent requirements.  
In constructing this conceptual model, the explanatory elements I shall adopt are 
first, the overarching concept of emotion as cognitive, i.e. that it is explicable as a 
separate mediating process, in which objects of value are identified, implying some 
process for detecting value. But value detection is not sufficient for an emotional oc-
currence. Once detected, the organism must generate a response to such value.  
As I have described it, the occurrence of an emotion rests upon a number of distinct 
but interrelated claims which I will elaborate and analyse separately, and it is only 
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when these claims are presented as an ensemble that the concept of emotion which I 
intend to investigate can be understood: 
1)   At the core of any emotion is one of a class of mental events/processes by which 
the relationship between the subject and the external world is mediated.  
2) The mediating event or process characterising an emotion has two interrelated 
components: 
2i) first, value detection, in which the environment is scanned for objects3 of 
value for the subject.  
2ii) second, a ‘rendering of value’ in which detection of a valuable object 
causes a mental state, directed towards the object, which is characteristic of 
an emotion. The emotion has the function of causing the subject to act to-
wards the object in a manner appropriate for the maintenance of its wellbe-
ing.  
In the following paragraphs, I will consider the constituent elements of my model 
separately in order to determine whether some ‘non-evaluative’ explanation can be 
established which could meet the framework requirements for emotion as a cognitive 
phenomenon. 
2.1  Emotion is Cognitive 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term cognitive, denotes Nussbaum’s use of the 
word rather than Solomon’s. Solomon argues that if ‘cognitive’ is referring to ‘cog-
nitions’ generally, then it does little to describe his particular view of emotion. Nuss-
baum is using it in a different sense: she is using it as a descriptive term in which an 
emotion arises as a particular chain of mental events, stimulus>organism>response. 
 
3 I use the term ‘object’ in a broad sense to encompass objects, events and circumstances or states 
of affairs arising in the external world. 
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This sequence of events does not have the conformation of either a reflex, (stimu-
lus>response) or that offered by James and Lange (stimulus-response-organism)4 ra-
ther, the response to a stimulus is determined by some intervening, separately expli-
cable, process. In Nussbaum’s account this intervening process is one of evaluation, 
in which the subject’s view of its own circumstances serves to mediate between 
stimulus and response, entailing some manifestation of intentionality upon the part 
of the subject. 
Whilst adopting Nussbaum’s ‘cognitive’ view as it pertains to both the sequence in 
which an emotion arises and the existence of some mediating role between stimulus 
and response, I shall argue that such a mediating role need not be exclusively evalua-
tive, and will provide evidence to support my arguments.  
In sum, in using the word ‘cognitive’, I am adopting Nussbaum’s account of emotion 
as a sequential process in which the detection of a stimulus is succeeded by a mediat-
ing process by means of which some response to the stimulus is evoked. The re-
sponse evoked is not invariant but occurs as some separately explicable outcome of 
the mediating process.  
In employing the term ‘cognitive’, therefore, I am denoting a category of processes 
for mediating between stimulus and response. Nussbaum’s account of emotion as en-
tailing evaluation is one example of this category of mediating processes, and I have 
used the term cognitive-evaluative, a term which Nussbaum herself employs, to dis-
tinguish her view of emotion.  
2.2  The Mediating Process has Two Components 
The framework account of the mediating process I have provided might be resisted 
by cognitive-evaluative advocates because it creates an undue distinction between 
processes of ‘value detection’ and ‘value rendering’ in the mediating process.  
 
4 The sequence I offer is based upon James and Lange’s claim that an emotionally-exciting object 




To better illustrate my proposal, I will provide two examples. First, if a tiger walks 
into the room, I will experience a strong disposition to leave the room, either as the 
effect of some inherited response to the presence of big cats, or as the result of a be-
lief that tigers are a threat to my survival. In this type of emotional event, object de-
tection and impulse arise rapidly and are experienced as co-occurring elements.  
The previous account may serve for simple object-directed perceptions but seems 
less cogent when emotions are generated from complex events. Some years ago, I 
was stopped by police and accused of speeding. When the officer explained his rea-
sons, I became angry. I had just dropped my son off at his school a few yards down 
the road, well after the speed trap, and in any case, I could not have accelerated to 
the legal limit before I was stopped. My thoughts were successively, a curiosity as to 
why I had been stopped, followed by bewilderment as I heard the account of the po-
liceman, who stated that I was speeding on a stretch of road on which I had not 
driven, succeeded by anger when the policemen said I would be prosecuted. Initially, 
I was not angry; my anger arose only when I had been fully informed. It had its ori-
gins in my belief that I had been wrongly, hence unfairly, charged – a charge which I 
said I would challenge in court. 
In this example, the identification of unfairness caused me to experience anger, but 
the detection of that unfairness constituted the more complex and lengthy process. It 
arose at the conclusion of a chain of reasoning which had as its outcome the belief 
that I was being unfairly treated. It may also be understood as a process of two parts: 
the deliberation leading to my belief that the police were treating me unfairly, suc-
ceeded by expressions of anger as a response to that belief. 
In an emotional process, the detection of an exciting stimulus may be addressed sep-
arately from the behaviour which is evoked as a response to that stimulus. Even if 
these two elements of emotion are experienced synchronously, they may be treated 
as conceptually distinct, if not numerically distinct. For this reason, I have separated 






The notion of emotion as the outcome of evaluation cannot exist separately from the 
concept that there are entities which the evaluator holds as valuable. The value of an 
entity is not something which can be determined by the senses alone. If some object 
is said to be of value to x, then this statement implies some relationship between x 
and that object.  
Value may be a sui generis property such as intense heat or high places, both of 
which can pose a survival threat for a wide range of species. In these cases, the value 
of an entity can be explained independently of subjective experience. But the value 
attached to an entity need not arise in consequence of some property or a generally 
held belief or opinion that the entity is valuable. Something may be valuable to me 
because I am accustomed to it. On this second account, the attribution of value is a 
mental construct of the experiencing subject. For instance, I may have a sentimental 
value for an old jacket. These sentiments would not be shared by others. But whether 
the attribution of value is a shared or subjectively-derived construct, both concepts of 
value can act as sources of emotion: if I find myself in a forest fire, I will be afraid; if 
you throw away my old jacket, I will be angry. 
To summarise, it is a necessary precondition for the arousal of emotion that subjects 
treat certain objects as valuable. If this account is correct and no object, event or set 
of external conditions can, of itself, be understood as possessing intrinsic or univer-
sal value, then for an animal to hold something to be valuable, that animal must first 
possess the ability to bring about some mental process, or processes, by which ob-
jects having value for a subject are discriminated.  
The foregoing account describes aspects of the relationship between the evaluator 
and what is valued. It does not explain how an object comes to have value. In my 
earlier account, valuable entities are described by cognitive-evaluative advocates as 
promoting our wellbeing or posing threats to our survival. Value for us might take 
the form of goals, aspirations, threats or expectations, food, desired objects or part-
ners. All these things may advance our wellbeing or promote our survival but they 
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have a diversity which invites further explanation. In the course of this thesis, I in-
tend to develop a concept of value which will bring together these diverse elements 
as collectively supporting a state of homeostasis. 
2.4 Value Detection 
Introduction 
Philosophers who advocate the concept of emotion as the outcome of evaluation ar-
gue that the mental processes entailed in evaluation are intentional, but cognitive sci-
entists such as LeDoux (1996) and Murphy & Zajonc (1993, 1995)) provide experi-
mental evidence that certain emotional responses are triggered automatically by the 
detection of value. This value is not revealed by evaluation; it is rather the outcome 
of some inborn process whereby the value of an entity has been affirmed phylogenet-
ically by the success of a particular response towards that entity in assuring the sur-
vival of the species.  
In this, and following chapters, I intend to develop a claim that there exists a wide 
range of stimuli capable of generating automatic emotion-like responses of this type. 
To exemplify: opposite sexes of the same species attract during mating; flames are 
avoided, as are snakes. Whatever inherited mechanisms cause these emotional be-
haviours, I shall argue that they may be understood principally as neurological sys-
tems without recourse to considerations of awareness or intention upon the part of 
the subject.  
Contrasting with this claim, I will propose, in accordance with cognitive-evaluative 
theories, that in mammalian species, value may also be revealed by the appraisal of 
an object as having implications for the subject’s wellbeing. If value is revealed 
through appraisal, implicit in this view is the possibility that humans may respond to 
values which are intentional constructs as disparate as justice, art and status – either 
learned, socially inculcated or self-conceived – which Nussbaum describes as sup-
porting “the idea of one’s own flourishing or one’s important goals and projects.” 
(2001 p.4).   
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In sum, I will propose that there are objects of value which animals, including hu-
mans, possess the capacity to acquire intentionally but there are also objects of value 
to which animals, including humans, respond automatically by means of inherited 
mechanisms and I will discuss the evidence presented for this latter category below. 
Emotions Manifested Spontaneously in Response to the Detection of Value  
I intend to demonstrate that in order to detect a valuable object, it is not invariably 
the case that an animal should have some comprehension of the value of an object. 
Robert Zajonc has offered a number of examples of emotion which he claimed could 
not be the outcome of evaluation and Lazarus, as an advocate of the cognitive-evalu-
ative view, opposes this view. The dispute between the two culminated in two papers 
in The American Psychologist (1984) termed respectively ‘On the Primacy of Cogni-
tion’ and ‘On the Primacy of Affect’. The titles of the papers, which imply that the 
dispute relates to the primacy of cognition or affect, are misleading: Zajonc is at-
tempting to establish that affect, as a mental phenomenon, can be distinguished from 
- and may occur independently of - evaluation, and Lazarus opposes this view. Both 
agree that in humans, affective states often have intentional explanations, but Za-
jonc’s attack produced the effect of drawing a response from Lazarus on the issue I 
am interested in – his treatment of ‘primitive evaluations’.  
Zajonc expresses his challenge thus:  
“For Lazarus, cognitive appraisal (of meaning and significance) underlies and is an 
integral feature of all emotional states. [  ] Thus all three aspects of an emotional re-
action – bodily processes, overt behavioural expression, and subjective experience – 
need cognitive appraisal as a necessary precondition. I believe that this is not so, 
and I shall try to show why not.” (1984 p.118) 
Zajonc believes that certain emotionally-associated behaviours arise as automatic re-
sponses to stimuli and he maintains that his claim is supported by experimental evi-
dence that simple emotional responses are instantiated in dedicated subcortical neu-
ral pathways. These pathways transmit sensory information directly from the sensory 
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input to the hypothalamus, a neural location which has been demonstrated to be ac-
tive during emotional episodes in a number of species. He claims further that: “Since 
the hypothalamus plays a central role in the arousal and expression of emotion, the 
retinohypothalamic tract allows the organism to generate an emotional reaction 
from a purely sensory input.”  (1984 p.119). On this account, the emotion generated 
is aroused spontaneously by means of a neurological system. I employ the term sys-
tem in this sense: that the emotional process can be described as a system, in which a 
neurological function, separate from stimulus or response, is able to generate a com-
mon behaviour (output) in response to multiple stimuli (input).  
 
Examples of emotional mechanisms of the sort Zajonc describes are rare in adult hu-
mans (less rare in other mammals) but Lazarus (1982) understands the potential chal-
lenge such processes would pose for his theory:  
“The only doubts I have are in the area of phylogenetically based triggers or releas-
ers of fear in humans such as those postulated by Hebb” (1982 p.1021).  
Hebb proposed from research that fear in humans could arise automatically in re-
sponse to the sight of spiders, snakes or strangeness.  
Lazarus, whilst accepting that such phenomena might exist, argued that they “seem 
to disappear or at least go underground with an ontogenetic shift to higher mental 
processes, just as they seem to disappear or go underground with the phylogenetic 
accretions of the neocortex that only suppress or regulate but do not banish lower 
functions. (my emphasis)”  (1982 p.1021).  
Lazarus is asserting that these effects occasionally exist but may be suppressed or 
overwritten by higher mental processes. 
Lazarus’s explanation of emotion, offered in a 1991 paper which he co-wrote with 
Craig Smith, is that it developed by means of an evolutionary process in which: 
 “innate reflexes were once the simplest solutions to the adaptational problem of get-
ting along in the world, but in more complex creatures these evolved into emotional 
patterns.” (1991 p.612).  
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In offering this explanation, Lazarus is proposing that emotional behaviours emerged 
from reflexes and the distinction he makes is this:  
“Probably all mammals meet the minimum cognitive requirements of emotion if one 
permits the concept of appraisal to include the type of process described by ethol-
ogists in which a fairly rigid, built-in response to stimulus arrays differentiates 
danger from no-danger. (my emphasis)” (1982 p.1023) 
On the face of it, Lazarus’s built-in response to stimulus arrays has the characteris-
tics of an automatically-generated emotional mechanism of the type I have proposed. 
He attempts to clarify his position in an argument against the ‘startle’ response: 
“Emotion results from an evaluative perception of a relationship [  ]between a per-
son (or animal) and the environment. Startle is best regarded as a primitive neural 
reflex process. It signals that something has happened, and although it could precip-
itate a “true” emotional response, it is in itself merely a physiological response to 
an unanticipated change in stimulation”. (1982 p.1023) 
Lazarus offers no account here of how startle, which he claims to be a reflex, fails to 
meet his minimal cognitive requirements for evaluative processes as ‘fairly rigid 
built-in responses to stimulus arrays’.  Startle could be argued to conform to Laza-
rus’s minimal cognitive requirement because it can be characterised independently of 
its arousing stimuli – i.e. as an independent cognitively explicable process capable of 
generating a response to any one of a number (an array) of stimuli. To clarify: Laza-
rus argues that startle is a reflex, yet it is a reflex which can arise in response to a po-
tentially unlimited array of stimuli, such as a sudden noise or movement, a rapidly 
approaching object or the unexpected presence of a person. Anyone who has been 
badly startled will know that this condition involves a raised heartbeat; we flinch and 
close our eyes. These responses – eye-closing to protect the eyes, flinching to brace 
the body, raised heartbeat to facilitate escape – are all appropriate for protecting the 
subject from injury and preparing it for escape.  
According to this account, many diverse and novel types of event may cause startle 
behaviours and each of these events may be separately interpreted as threatening. If 
we accept this account, then some mediating process must exist whereby any one of 
37 
 
an array of startle stimuli may be identified and subsequently addressed by the startle 
behaviour and I have argued that the existence of such a process marks the mental 
state as cognitive rather than reflexive. If this is the case, the distinction Lazarus is 
drawing between a reflex and an emotion is difficult to understand, unless it repre-
sents some unstated level of interpretative complexity. 
In sum, an array of potentially fear-inducing stimuli are observed to generate a com-
mon fearful behaviour, and yet both Zajonc and Lazarus appear to accept that no 
evaluation can have taken place. But whereas Zajonc argues that startle has the at-
tributes of an emotion arising in the absence of evaluation, Lazarus, in finding an ab-
sence of evaluation, treats startle as a reflex.  
 
This is not a discussion about language: Lazarus, in calling the startle response a ‘re-
flex’, is ruling out the possibility that startle occurs as a result of evaluation. In so 
doing, he seems to be arguing against his earlier ‘minimal cognitive requirement’ for 
emotion, that a mental process must evoke a fixed response to a diverse array of 
stimuli, a cognitive requirement which the startle response appears to meet. 
 
In charity, Lazarus has stated a second minimum requirement for emotion which 
‘startle’ fails: his precondition that, for a ‘startle’ emotion to occur, a subject, in re-
acting to any one of the ‘startle’ stimuli, must have some comprehension of their im-
portance for its well-being; and it is this condition which Lazarus believes has not 
been met. Lazarus takes the view, in common with Nussbaum, that for a mental state 
to be an emotion, some display of intentionality must first occur in which the subject 
is able to grasp the significance of an exciting object or state of affairs. I will now 
consider this view in the light of further evidence that emotional states can arise in 
the absence of intentionality.  
 
The Detection of Value by Intentional Processes 
Lazarus describes the full experience of emotion as consisting of thoughts, action 
impulses and somatic disturbances. His mention of ‘thoughts’ suggests that evalua-
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tions involve intentionality. Moreover, his descriptions of the causes of emotion re-
quire that the subject is able, albeit in a minimal sense, to have some comprehension 
of the value of the stimulus object. The relation between the object and subject on 
this account, is intentional.  
Nussbaum is more forthright on the subject:  
“By now nearly all major investigators in the area grant that emotions can and 
should be studied by psychologists and that emotions are richly cognitive phenom-
ena, closely connected with the animal’s way of perceiving and interpreting the 
world [  ]  a position in which intentionality is taken seriously and regarded as part 
of what any good theory must include.” (2001 p.94). 
Nussbaum shares Lazarus’s view that emotion-like behaviours which have a nonin-
tentional explanation cannot be emotions. Nussbaum cites the work of LeDoux who 
has characterised the conditioning of rats to neutral cues. Le Doux has outlined the 
mechanism by which stimuli such as electric shock can cause a rat rapidly to memo-
rise and anticipate shock-associated stimuli. A neutral cue (such as a tone) when it 
co-occurs with the shock will subsequently cause the rat to exhibit fear-like behav-
iours in the absence of shock. If LeDoux’s account is correct (see p.160), the acquisi-
tion of neutral stimuli able to trigger fear-like behaviours is explicable as a noninten-
tional process. Nussbaum explains LeDoux’s findings in this manner:  
 
“LeDoux claims only to have uncovered some phenomena involved in fright behav-
iour, not to have illuminated the subjective experience of the emotion of fear, either 
in rats or humans. LeDoux writes that he considers fear to be a “subjective state of 
awareness” involving reaction of the organism to danger, and that what he studies is 
therefore not that emotion.” (2001 p.115) 
  
I will set aside for the moment the question of how Nussbaum is able to adduce ‘the 




In the absence of such support, Nussbaum interprets LeDoux’s account as demon-
strating that even if rats may be conditioned to anticipate shocks and exhibit fear-like 
behaviours towards shock-associated (but previously neutral) stimuli, they must also 
have some awareness of the events in progress and it is this awareness which trans-
forms what may be a spontaneous process of threat detection into an emotion. This 
view is supported by behavioural observation. Tolman’s (1948) account of an earlier 
experiment by Hudson is illuminating: when a rat had been shocked by a food bowl 
mounted on a patterned panel, the rat’s subsequent behaviour, apart from staying 
well away from the panel most of the time, included heaping sawdust against the 
panel, presumably in an attempt to hide it. Although we cannot enter the rat’s mind, 
its motive in heaping the sawdust is strongly suggestive of a conscious aversion to 
the panel, in addition to a conditioned aversion. 
Such observations tend to confirm Nussbaum’s view of evaluation as entailing inten-
tionality. But I will provide a second example: a rat, which has never encountered or 
smelled a cat or a ferret, will reliably detect a cloth impregnated with cat or ferret 
odour and will avoid it in subsequent experimental sessions, even when the cloth has 
been cleaned so that the odour is absent (Munoz-Abellan). From this we may con-
clude that, in a single session, the rat not only avoids the cloth (impregnated with cat 
odour) but has been conditioned to avoid the cloth in future sessions when the cloth 
is free of cat odour. Supporting this account, when the cloth was present, the re-
searchers identified hormones in the rat’s bloodstream typical of ‘fear’ states. In a 
control experiment, these same hormones were measured in the animal’s blood-
stream for another fear-inducing activity but were not present when the animal was 
in a non-threatening environment. 
From this experiment, we may conclude that a cloth which was not previously 
feared, when impregnated with cat odour, causes the rat to act fearfully on this and 
subsequent exposures to the cloth, even when the cat odour has been removed. And 
because the rats had not previously experienced cat odours or cats, the observed be-
haviours may only be explained as 1) the product of an inborn detection mechanism 
in rats causing fear-like behaviours and 2) neural processes which automatically gen-
erate a subsequent avoidance behaviour towards the cloth. 
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Nussbaum’s claim that an emotional state entails evaluation does not explain this be-
haviour. The rat has been rapidly conditioned to act fearfully in the presence of the 
cloth and this state has been assessed as conforming to a neurobiological state char-
acteristic of fear responses to other threats. But what evaluation could cause the rat 
to treat that object as a fear stimulus? The rat would ordinarily treat the cloth as a 
neutral object and has never encountered a cat, and hence can have no beliefs about 
cats or cat odour. The notion that the cloth induces neurophysiological changes 
which cause the fear response will not serve for Nussbaum because she has excluded 
any role for such changes, arguing that only the evaluation of an object as threaten-
ing will induce emotion. Nussbaum’s rejection of the proposal that the physiological 
states co-occurring with emotion are indicative of the nature of the emotion ex-
pressed, or play some role in the emotional episode, coupled with her claim that: 
‘emotions are forms of intense attention and engagement in which the world is ap-
praised in its relation to the self.’ (2001 p.106), rules out the possibility for Nuss-
baum that what the rats are experiencing in response to the cloth is fear. 
In LeDoux’s example of conditioning by footshock, the rat could be argued to ap-
praise shock-associated objects as frightening, based upon a memory of a previous 
shock. But in the Munoz-Abellan experiment the odourless cloth is devoid of infor-
mation which would cause the rat to evaluate it as a threat.  
In sum, the presence of either cat or ferret odour will cause a rat which has never en-
countered these species to act fearfully. Not only this, the stimulus associated with 
the cat odour will cause the rat to condition to associated neutral objects. Both these 
changes occur in the absence of information which would permit cognitive evalua-
tion. 
Under these circumstances, Nussbaum may resort to the argument she employed in 
response to Lazarus’s conditioning experiments - that because the subject is not 
aware of the threat an object poses, the mental states associated with the spontaneous 
fear-like behaviours exhibited are not those of a rat which has comprehended the sig-
nificance of the stimulus as a threat to its wellbeing and hence, do not meet the con-
ditions necessary for an emotion, but she adds: 
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“We should certainly not eliminate the intentional account, and we should not at this 
time include a particular physiological process as a necessary element in a defini-
tion of a particular emotion type – although we should not rule out the possibility 
that such a move will in future be supported by evidence, at least for some simpler 
emotions such as fear and surprise.” (2001 p.114)   
Here Nussbaum could be interpreted as conceding that-cognitive evaluative theory 
may be unable to explain some of the evidence I have offered for the arousal of fear 
behaviours and associated conditioning processes. This challenge to the concept of 
emotion as an intentional phenomenon causes Nussbaum to advance the possibility 
of a limited role for spontaneously induced ‘fear-like’ behaviours, both as responses 
to inborn stimulus detection mechanisms and in the conditioning process itself - one 
in which a neurophysiological process, inducing fear-like behaviours, also acts as a 
catalyst for new stimulus acquisition. And my account thus far has only included 
fear-like behaviours; Panksepp (1998) has described other neurophysiological pro-
cesses in which the detection of a valuable stimulus will automatically induce char-
acteristic emotion-like behaviours such as rage, nurture and play, which he calls 
basic emotions. The core functions of these emotions are describable as mediating 
processes acting independently of stimulus and response and are, in consequence, 
cognitive according to my earlier description. Despite this, I will argue that such sys-
tems function – and may be explained –  as nonintentional phenomena (see Chapters 
6 to 14) 
  
Summary: Stimulus Detection 
Nussbaum, in requiring that emotion necessitates evaluation on the part of the sub-
ject, offers the prospect of explaining emotions as the products of thought or experi-
ence, but this account does not explain the examples of spontaneous stimulus detec-
tion and response I have offered.  Her argument against these examples is that alt-
hough certain emotion-like behaviours appear to arise spontaneously as the effects of 
neurobiological processes, such processes do not meet her requirements for emo-
tions, unless the animal is able to effect some process of mediation between stimulus 
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and response which entails a degree of comprehension on the part of the subject re-
garding the significance of the stimulus object for its well-being - some expression 
of intentionality.  
 
The position at this point is summarized as follows: 
 
1. I have provided evidence and offered arguments in support of a claim that 
in some cases emotion-like behaviours may be caused by the detection of 
value in the absence of evaluation and I have described the cognitive-
evaluative arguments against this claim. 
2. If the evidence I have offered in (1) is correct, then Nussbaum’s cogni-
tive-evaluative explanation must constitute a second, separate class of 
stimulus detection in which the subject has some comprehension of the 
significance of the entity towards which an emotion is directed. 
3. Lazarus, arguing against (2) maintains that the separate class of non-eval-
uative processes I have described have the characteristics of reflexes and, 
in consequence, the distinction I am making should lie between reflexes 
as ‘non-cognitive’, and emotional evaluations as ‘cognitive’.  
I will now develop my argument for a separate cognitive class of emotions in 
an investigation of the final component of the emotional model described on 
page 29 which proposes that emotional states, upon detecting value in an ob-
ject, will generate an appropriate response to that value.   
 
2.5 Value Rendering 
Introduction 
I have described a second stage of the mediating process in which: 
 a ‘rendering of value’ [occurs] in which detection of a valuable object 
causes a mental state, directed towards the object, which is characteristic of 
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an emotion. The emotion has the function of causing the subject to act to-
wards the object in a manner appropriate for the maintenance of its wellbe-
ing.  
The processes required to generate appropriate motivations and cognitions from the 
identification of valuable stimuli are claimed by cognitive-evaluative advocates to 
constitute a core element of evaluation. These processes are attributed by both Nuss-
baum and Lazarus to appraisals or judgments regarding the significance of some ob-
ject or state of affairs as it relates to the wellbeing of the subject. According to Nuss-
baum’s account, notions of appraisal, because they originate in beliefs or judgments 
with respect to that state of affairs, must entail intentionality.  
In previous paragraphs, I have proposed that a separate class of mental processes ex-
ists whereby an animal detects external entities of relevance for its wellbeing and 
that such processes may be cognitive, without being intentional. To complete such an 
account of the processes which mediate stimulus and response, for any given animal, 
there must exist, not only a set of entities which are of value, together with mecha-
nisms for detecting those entities, but also some nonintentional mechanism which, 
for each category of value detected, may render that value into some act - mental or 
behavioural – which is supportive of the animal’s wellbeing; because without such 
mechanisms, value may be detected, but nothing follows from this. The mental state 
disposing the animal to act therefore, constitutes the second element of the emotional 
process, whereby the behaviour observed is triggered by the nature of the value de-
tected.  
My use of the term ‘rendering of value’ can be understood in the same way that we 
speak of rendering a desired element from an ore – that we apply to an ore some pro-
cess appropriate for extracting that element. To exemplify, whether I am a rat or a 
human, if I am confronted with a wildfire, my detection of this object as having 
value does not, of itself, cause me to treat the object as a threat or create the notion of 
flight away from the fire; the cognitive-evaluative account requires that I compre-
hend that the wildfire is a threat and  that I act in a manner appropriate for avoiding 
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that threat, whereas a non-evaluative account would require only that in detecting the 
fire, flight behaviour is aroused automatically.  
The cognitive- evaluative view is challenged by psychologists and neuroscientists 
who provide accounts of emotion in which emotional behaviours may arise in the ab-
sence of beliefs or judgments on the part of the subject. My intention will be to pre-
sent some of these claims and I will subsequently consider Lazarus’s objection that 
such stimulus-response mechanisms are reflexes. In addressing this objection, I in-
tend to demonstrate that Lazarus’s view of emotion fails to account for more recent 
scientific discoveries regarding spontaneously arising (non-evaluative) manifesta-
tions of emotion, which meet the requirements for emotional processes which I have 
provided on page 29. 
Panksepp’s account of basic emotions 
Jaak Panksepp, a neuroscientist specialising in affect, has identified a set of brain 
mechanisms which cause a mammal to respond automatically to particular stimulus 
types. He describes such processes as ‘basic emotions’ and to illustrate this ap-
proach, I shall briefly outline his account of the neural pathway involved in the gen-
eration of rage or rage-like behaviour in cats.  
“The core of the RAGE system runs from medial amygdaloid areas downward, 
largely via the striae terminalis to the medial hypothalamus and from there to spe-
cific locations within the periacqueductal gray of the midbrain. The system is organ-
ised hierarchically, meaning that aggression evoked from the highest areas of the 
amygdala is critically dependent upon the lower regions, while aggression from 
lower sites does not depend critically upon higher areas” (1998 p.196).  
What Panksepp is describing here is a neural mechanism by which information re-
garding some external event or circumstance, when identified by the animal as a 
stimulus for rage, will automatically trigger a rage-like behaviour. The action of the 
system described, once such a stimulus has been detected, is automatic; it is as if the 




In demonstrating this hypothesis, Panksepp stimulated the neural ‘rage’ pathway of a 
cat via an electrode located in the medial hypothalamus. In response, the cat at-
tacked, displaying all the attributes of rage, hair erect, spitting and clawing with its 
fangs bared. Very rapidly after the electrical stimulation was removed, the aggres-
sion ceased. Panksepp cites similar research using humans, generally employing 
electrical stimulus to specific locations of the amygdala, in which subjects experi-
enced states of intense anger.  
According to Panksepp, a state of rage can arise from nothing more than the admin-
istration of a current to a brain location. His findings demonstrate that an emotional 
behaviour, of the sort which cognitive-evaluative proponents take to be the outcome 
of an evaluation in the form of a response appropriate for the cat’s well-being, need 
be no more than an automatic process once the ‘rage’ circuit is triggered. This tells 
us nothing about the neural processes which cause the rage behaviour circuit to acti-
vate. Panksepp mentions a number of stimulus types which trigger aggression, inter 
alia, ‘inter-male’, ‘maternal’, ‘territorial’ and ‘sexual’. The taxonomy of cues which 
trigger rage, such as a large approaching male, a threat to offspring, or territorial in-
cursion, are postulated by Panksepp to be detected by inborn neural encoding, in a 
process by which each of those stimuli is addressed by the single rage behaviour. 
Such mechanisms - by which a number of stimuli are detected and addressed in a 
single response - acting separately from stimulus or response, are characteristic of a 
cognitive process and I have already cited examples of similar inborn stimulus inter-
pretation mechanisms for fear behaviours.   
My aim here is to prepare the ground for a claim that a number of different emotions 
can occur as mechanisms in which both detection and response can occur without the 
subject holding any beliefs about the objects of emotion, or carrying out any behav-
iours towards those objects which have arisen as a consequence of evaluations or 
judgments on the part of the subject. I will describe these mechanisms as primitive 
emotions. The evidence I have presented thus far is sufficient to outline a challenge 
to the claim that the cognitive-evaluative view of emotion embraces all manifesta-
tions of emotion. A good deal more evidence is required to support this claim and I 
shall present this in Part II.  
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Lazarus’s objection to the class of ‘nonintentional’ emotions I have proposed – that 
such phenomena are reflexes - remains.  
Lazarus’s view: the distinction between evaluations and reflexes 
Lazarus, like Panksepp, believes that emotions are the outcome of adaptation. He ar-
gues that evolutionary processes have generated three different types of survival-pro-
moting activities: reflexes, physiological drives and emotions. Lazarus’s notion of 
physiological drives extends to desires such as thirst and hunger, which I shall dis-
cuss in Part II (Chapter 8); what I wish to investigate here is the distinction which 
Lazarus makes between reflexes and emotions. 
Smith and Lazarus (S&L) propose that reflexes arise to cope with circumstances in 
which “a need is reliably signalled by a very specific cue or set of cues and can be 
met by performing a specific behaviour.”  (1991 p.612). Such stimulus-response 
mechanisms are inherited, allowing organisms to interact successfully with their en-
vironments in a stereotypical manner. For S&L, the adaptational disadvantage of 
such mechanisms is that if survival depends upon a successful response to valuable 
cues, then in the presence of a multiplicity of cues with value for the organism, sur-
vival chances can only be improved via a phylogenetic process in which each new 
stimulus is matched by a dedicated response. However, an evolutionary process by 
which an organism becomes capable of reacting to even a modest range of stimuli 
with a reflexive response, is, according to S&L, ‘disadvantageous’ with the result 
that:  
“with increasing complexity there is an increasing selective pressure to surmount 
the behavioural rigidity inherent in reflexes and to decouple specific stimuli from 
specific responses.” (1991 p.612)   
I will accept S&L’s argument from complexity here, although they have not suffi-
ciently demonstrated it. They simply assert that reflexes, in pairing a specific stimu-
lus to a single dedicated response ‘have a high cost’. They do not state what that cost 
is or how it increases with complexity in such a way that it exceeds the adaptational 
‘cost’ of decoupling stimulus from response.  
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The argument S&L are preparing is one in which emotion-like behaviours which 
arise spontaneously in response to exciting stimuli are reflexes. According to this 
view, reflexes because they directly connect a stimulus to a response, are non-cogni-
tive, whereas emotions: “developed in ways that differentiate them from reflexes in 
flexibility, variability, richness, and dependence upon intelligence.” (1991 p.614). 
Such mental phenomena are cognitive because the processes which mediate between 
stimulus and response are separately explicable as evaluations, and evaluations – in 
requiring some awareness by the subject of the significance of the emotional object 
for the its wellbeing - can be understood to exhibit intentionality.  
More particularly, S&L believe that emotions are mental states which expand both 
the flexibility of response of an animal to a stimulus and the ability of an animal to 
detect stimuli of value, moving away from stimulus specificity towards a much 
wider characterisation of stimuli as, say, threatening or frustrating so that: “in place 
of the unwieldy adaptational solution of developing a different reflex in response to 
every signal of every significant event in all contexts, more complicated species have 
to stake all their security on their capacity to evaluate the significance of what is 
happening.” (1991 p.614) 
Such an account of emotion excludes the type of emotions which are enacted sponta-
neously as responses to stimuli of value – cases in which, say, the detection of a 
wildfire will automatically cause flight. For S&L, the subject will evaluate the wild-
fire as a threat, in response to which the animal will take some action appropriate to 
avoiding the wildfire. For this reason, S&L argue that the action taken is the result of 
some thought (or more primitive judgment) directed towards the object of emotion 
by which the value of the stimulus is apprehended in such a way that the subject is 
able to behave towards the stimulus in a manner appropriate for the promotion or 
preservation of its wellbeing. 
Lazarus explains his view of meaning in emotion in his 1982 paper Thoughts on the 
Relations between Emotion and Cognition. His view is summarised in his response 
to Zajonc’s claim that emotions can arise free of evaluation:  
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“it is entirely possible that the very first stage of the organism’s reaction to stimuli 
and the very first elements in retrieval are affective. It is further possible that we can 
like something or be afraid of it before we know precisely what it is and perhaps 
even without knowing what it is.” (1982 p.1020). 
Lazarus argues that Zajonc has failed to understand his view of the cognitive process 
by mistakenly assuming that Lazarus’s concept of mind is analogous to that of a 
computer in which cognitions, involving meanings, are created by information pro-
cessing from short or long-term memories containing information which has previ-
ously been received, registered and encoded in preparation for processing. He con-
cludes that if Zajonc believes an organism generates meaning in such a tortuous 
fashion, it is understandable that he has doubts as to its ability to evaluate a stimulus 
with the rapidity which characterises many emotional responses. 
He provides this counter-argument:  
“Zajonc is therefore correct in asserting that meanings are immediately inherent in 
emotionally-laden transactions but for the wrong reasons. In my view the concept of 
meaning defined by the traditional information processing approach subscribed to 
by Zajonc has a perfectly reasonable – and better – alternative. We do not always 
have to await revelation from information processing to unravel the environmental 
code. [  ] in perception, personal factors such as beliefs, expectations, and motives 
or commitments influence attention and appraisal at the very outset of any encoun-
ter.” (1982 p1020). 
To test Lazarus’s argument, Murphy & Zajonc carried out experiments in which sub-
jects were shown meaningless ideographs, paired with flashed images of friendly or 
angry faces known as ‘affective primes’, occurring too rapidly for the subject to have 
any awareness of them5, (1993,1995). When subsequently exposed to these ideo-
graphs, the subjects reported liking or disliking the ideographs in a pattern which 
correlated with the nature of the associated affective primes (for further details see 
Chapter 16). 
 
5 Each affective prime was exposed for four milliseconds 
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Lazarus’s explanation of such phenomena is that because the information acted upon 
is incomplete or degraded, the meaning derived from such information will be im-
precise and that such imprecision characterises the meaning we take from many ordi-
nary transactions. For this reason, he argues that his theory should allow for such im-
precise renderings of meaning alongside more clearly articulated and thoroughly pro-
cessed meaning. 
Murphy & Zajonc’s experimental evidence appears to contradict this view; a Chi-
nese ideograph, verified as having no affective content, when associated with a sub-
liminally detected angry face image, is reliably reported as disliked rather than liked. 
The subjects seemed to be rather efficient at associating subliminally detected affec-
tive images with meaningless ideographs. The problem is therefore not one of vague-
ness of attribution, rather it lies in explaining how an individual would display aver-
sion as the result of an evaluation of meaningless ideographs – how it came about 
that these ideographs were judged to be of significance for the subject’s wellbeing. If 
the aversive ideographs had been paired optimally6 with an affective image, such im-
ages could be said to predict the affective image. However, in Murphy & Zajonc’s 
experiment, the subjects were unaware that they had been exposed to the affective 
image. This creates a difficulty for Lazarus’s account, because if the subjects’ cogni-
tive evaluations had been made in response to the ideographs alone, they would be 
uniformly appraised as neutral i.e. non-affective. 
LeDoux would attribute the observed behaviours to a process of fear conditioning in 
which the affective prime – say, the angry face – acts as an unconditioned stimulus 
for humans and its brevity of exposure, whilst excluding cognitive appraisal, has the 
ability directly to access the subcortical pathways which evoke fear-like behaviours. 
When the subject is in a state of fear, associated neutral images are acquired and 
stored in such a way that these images will act as a proxy for the unconditioned stim-
ulus upon future exposure. 
LeDoux’s account (1992) can be understood in this way: that previously neutral 
stimuli, offering no particular threat to the organism, when they are associated with 
 
6 For a period sufficient for conscious evaluation. 
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some unconditioned fear-inducing stimulus are ‘welded’ directly to the primitive 
emotional circuits associated with the arousal of fear, so that in subsequent encoun-
ters the organism reacts to the conditioned stimulus in the same manner as it would 
to the unconditioned stimulus. 
Fear conditioning offers a cognitive – but non-evaluative - explanation to the evolu-
tionary problem of matching a beneficial response to multiple disparate stimuli. Con-
ditioned fear-associated stimuli are acquired throughout the lifetime of any animal in 
response to threats which may be particular to the environment of that animal. How-
ever, such conditioned stimuli act, not through any comprehension of meaning or 
value, but rather by directly triggering a fearful behaviour. This has the effect of al-
lowing the animal to expand the range of stimuli to which it can respond, but in do-
ing so, it need not employ even the rudimentary processes of ‘beliefs, expectations or 
motives’ described by Lazarus. Conditioning is more accurately described as a sys-
tem in which a stimulus triggers a response in the absence of evaluation. 
On the basis of the evidence and arguments I have presented, I advance the follow-
ing proposals:  
1. that a class of emotion exists whereby emotional behaviours may be di-
rectly aroused by unconditioned stimuli and by conditioned (affect-neu-
tral) stimuli.  
2. that these processes are cognitive because a single behavioural response 
is mediated from diverse stimuli by processes acting independently of 
stimulus or response.  
3. that such mechanisms act in the absence of evaluation. 
Lazarus, expresses the view that a clear distinction is to be made between evalua-
tions - being cognitive/emotional - and reflexes - being non-cognitive/non-emotional. 
My counter-claim has been that indeed there are physical processes which, as Laza-
rus asserts, are reflexive and non-cognitive but, in forcing the distinction between the 
emotional and the reflexive, he overlooks the existence of a separate but important 
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class of emotions - neurological mechanisms mediating between stimulus and emo-
tion-like behaviours which, while functioning nonintentionally, are nonetheless cog-
nitive.  
My proposals, if accepted, require a more comprehensive account of the manner by 
which this separate class of emotions are to be reliably distinguished from reflexes. I 
will consider this question more fully in Part II of this thesis.   
2.6. Summary: Two cognitive accounts of emotion 
 
I have accepted the cognitive-evaluative proposal that emotion may occur as the out-
come of evaluation but, in order to test the limits of the evaluative theory, I have 
cited a number of experiments, employing humans and other animals, in which rap-
idly-arising emotion-like behaviours occur under experimental conditions which are 
constructed in such a manner that the results obtained cannot straightforwardly be 
explained as the products of evaluation.  
 
In pursuing this course, I hope to have provided sufficient evidence to provide the 
outline of a second proposal: that there exists a class of emotions which arise either 
from the activation of inborn responses to unconditioned stimuli or from the effects 
of conditioning - both processes being explicable as the spontaneous action of neuro-
physiological mechanisms, rather than as the outcome of evaluation. 
 
I have not discussed Nussbaum’s response to Zajonc because she defends her cogni-
tive-evaluative view of emotion against Zajonc by citing Lazarus’s arguments (2001 
pp. 106-126). She draws from Lazarus the view that the goals which motivate an ani-
mal: 
 
 “may be the objects of conscious reflection, or they may be deeply internalized with-
out being conscious” and that emotions “need not be ‘rational’ in the sense of being, 
in every case, explicit or verbal. But in another, normative sense they are profoundly 




Nussbaum, like Lazarus, is arguing that appraisal is a necessary element of emotion 
and, like Lazarus, she does not require that such emotions are rationally constructed 
or derive from beliefs which are consciously-held. Nonetheless, in claiming that 
emotions are intentional phenomena, she is arguing for a relationship between the 
subject and the significant object, in which the subject plays an active role – as Laza-
rus proposes:  
 
“cognitive appraisal means that the way one interprets one’s plight at any given mo-
ment is crucial to the emotional response” (1982 p.1019).  
 
My claim that certain emotions arise as the outcome of spontaneously arising neuro-
physiological mechanisms challenges Nussbaum’s assertion that evaluation is neces-
sary for emotion. However, I do not intend to challenge the cognitive-evaluative 
view that appraisal constitutes a necessary element of emotion in cases when inten-
tionality can be demonstrated, because in these cases, the class of nonintentionally 
arising emotion of the sort I have proposed is often unable to account for either the 
thought processes or behaviours of the experiencing subjects. 
 
My introduction of a second ‘primitive’ class of cognitive emotions allows me to 
modify my earlier framework account of a cognitive emotion in order to characterize 
each process more fully.  
 
For primitive emotional systems, my original model may be modified to describe the 
action of a neurobiological process:  
  
1)   At the core of any emotion is one of a class of mental processes by which the re-
lationship between the subject and the external world is mediated.  
2) An emotion is caused by a mediating process acting in two stages: 
2i) first, detection, in which the environment is scanned for objects of value 
for the subject;  
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2ii) second, a ‘rendering of value’ in which the detection of a valuable object 
arouses a mental state, which is characteristic of an emotion, having the 
function of disposing the subject to act towards the object in a manner appro-
priate for the maintenance of its wellbeing. 
. 
The cognitive-evaluative account may now be described more extensively as an in-
tentional phenomenon: 
1) At the core of any emotion is a mental event by which the relationship be-
tween the subject and the external world is mediated.  
2) The mental event is an evaluation requiring intentionality, in which some 
process, employing explicit or implicit beliefs, event or circumstance reveals 
it as having significance for the wellbeing of the subject.  
3) The type of emotion aroused may be characterised as a particular configura-
tion of thoughts directed towards the external object of emotion which will 
cause the subject to act - or be disposed to act - in a manner which is appro-
priate to the achievement of some goal, implicitly or explicitly held by the 
subject, or to exploit some value which promotes the survival of the subject 
or its species. 
This second description provides a view of emotion which would be recognised by 
cognitive-evaluative philosophers. As a philosophical theory, it casts its net wide: its 
subjects may be humans or other animals and in consequence, it takes both the ap-
praisals which may be formed by and expressed as language, together with the evalu-
ations and judgments of non-linguistic species, to be sources of emotion. These pro-
cesses may deploy explicit or implicit beliefs directly or represent the products of de-
liberation which employ such beliefs. The beliefs themselves may be intentionally 
acquired, socially-inculcated, or the accidental products of experience.  
But even if we accept that any or all of these elements may be constituents of the 
evaluative account, an anterior question remains unanswered: how does it come 
about that the evaluations which reveal external entities as being of significance to 
ourselves have the mental and physiological characteristics of emotions?  
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I will illustrate my problem by means of an earlier example: I have previously de-
scribed the thoughts which caused me to experience anger when I was wrongly ac-
cused of speeding. Imagine now that I hear this account from some other person; he 
could extensively detail the same events and the same outcome but having shared 
those thoughts and concurred with his evaluation, I would be unlikely to experience 
the same anger. At most, my thoughts might contain sympathy for the narrator and 
his minor misfortune, or, more likely, I might experience nothing more than a mild 
interest. This would be true even if I shared the narrator’s beliefs and his ideas of 
fairness.  
The view that we can regard the emotion-arousing evaluations of others with relative 
equanimity is one that is generally shared. The extent to which we are able to take a 
dispassionate stance seems to bear some relationship to acquaintance: we might not 
take the same view of the misfortunes of our friends and family. But this is explained 
by evaluative theory; because if a friend or family member is concerned, then that 
person’s misfortune – or fortune – is often a matter of direct importance for me and 
hence a cause of emotion. 
To summarize: the cognitive-evaluative assertion that I experience emotions only on 
those occasions when externalities arise which I appraise to have significance for 
myself, or when my reflections cause me to infer that circumstances have arisen 
which are of importance for myself, seems to be verified empirically by the relative 
absence of emotional feelings7 when I hear the accounts of the emotional evaluations 
of others. But the empirical evidence for this phenomenon is not explained by cogni-
tive-evaluative theory as I have described it thus far. Cognitive-evaluative theory 
takes as its premise the occurrence of an emotion as being conditional upon an ap-
praisal of some state of affairs as carrying implications for the wellbeing of the sub-
ject. But how does it come about that a particular emotion is associated with some 
concatenation, say, of my caring about x, or thinking that x is good/bad for me, or 
whether I can cope with x? 
 
7 I accept that humans can experience empathy towards those in the extremes of suffering, but for 
most other animals, expressions of empathy are difficult to verify.  
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Assume now that A and B, have identical cognitive abilities and life experiences, so 
that a state of affairs x, when explained to A, would have the same goal-associated 
significance for B, causing an evaluation in which each would respond to x with a 
thought y. In this case if A and B share similar goals and make – towards significant 
entities - the same appraisals, then evaluative theory is satisfied. Nothing more is ex-
plained by introducing the notion that when A, as a participant, evaluates event x as 
significant for his wellbeing, he experiences an ‘emotion’ which would not be expe-
rienced by B evaluating x as hypothetical. Indeed, to a being who had never experi-
enced an emotion, the idea would seem incomprehensible. 
I will provide an example. In the absence of emotional feelings in humans, assume I 
were to ask A & B to imagine their wives had died and to predict their subsequent 
responses. They would, as the products of a process of appraisal, prioritize certain 
necessary actions, such as informing relatives and the authorities, arranging the bur-
ial and considering future living arrangements. Assume now that I inform A that his 
wife has actually died: then my investigation of cognitive-evaluative theory at this 
point predicts that A will simply carry through the actions he has imagined, whereas 
B will not. Nothing in this appraisal would predict how A would feel and act upon 
such feelings if his wife had died, which, if such a state of affairs were to occur, 
would constitute for most of us, the critical manifestation of the event as experi-
enced, and - revealingly - as others would expect it to be experienced. 
My description of the cognitive-evaluative account thus far accepts that its propo-
nents offer a great deal of evidence to demonstrate that the mental states associated 
with appraisals of significance for the self, have effects – often far-reaching effects – 
which are not explained by the appraisal itself but I have offered no explanation as to 
why this should be so. In Chapter 3, I will present the cognitive-evaluative explana-
tions for the turbulence of the mental states associated with emotion and I will offer 






Chapter 3: Reviewing Cognitive-Evaluative Explanations for the Turbulence of 
Emotional States 
3.1 Introduction 
My exploration of the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion thus far has led me to 
conclude that although an emotion may be caused by my appraisal of a state of af-
fairs as having significance for my goals, the association of such appraisals with 
states of mind and body, generally described as ‘feelings’, has not been explained. 
Nussbaum recognises that appraisal alone is insufficient to account for these aspects 
of emotion:  
“We see several features of the emotions that it will be the business of my argument 
to try to explain: their urgency and heat; their tendency to take over the personality 
and move it to action with overwhelming force; their connection with important at-
tachments, in terms of which a person defines her life” (2001 p.22) 
Nussbaum’s subsequent account of the qualitative aspects of emotional appraisals 
and their effects upon our mental landscape - which she describes as ‘upheavals of 
thought’ - are extensive. By carefully detailing these effects from her own experi-
ence, and from observation of the emotional behaviours of other species, she demon-
strates that the thoughts associated with emotion have a character and salience which 
can distort or overset the routine thoughts and actions which we employ in going 
about our day-to-day business. 
It will not be my purpose to dispute this. What I am interested in is how it comes 
about that emotional appraisals differ from ‘routine’ appraisals.  
3.2. Does eudaimonia explain the particular urgency of emotional thoughts? 
Nussbaum believes she can provide the kind of explanation I am seeking and that it 
lies in the special nature of emotional thoughts: that they have ‘heat’ and ‘urgency’ 
as they pertain to the interests of the self. More particularly, she argues that these 
qualities attach to emotional thoughts because they concern the subject’s conception 
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of eudaimonia. I think there is no exact translation for this word, which for each in-
dividual encompasses “all to which the agent ascribes intrinsic value.” (2001 
p.190); so what is valued, is not valued simply because it bears some instrumental 
relation to the subject’s wellbeing, it may also apply to personal relationships or, say, 
aspects of society, such as fairness or community spirit, which are valued for their 
own sake. For this reason, these things have value only as they constitute elements of 
my mental life, rather than someone else’s. 
The notion of eudaimonia expresses an aspect of our mental life which is not imme-
diately evident in cognitive evaluations of objects, events or circumstances as having 
significance for the subject: it is that the things which we value, taken collectively, 
represent a model of what (to use Nussbaum’s term) our flourishing would consist 
of, so that any threat to these values must be interpreted as a loss - a withering of our 
prospects. Nussbaum also asserts that our values form a framework - a self-woven 
fabric - such that any evaluation which challenges or undermines a component of 
this framework, is potentially disruptive of the whole; and anything which extends or 
confirms these values will strengthen eudaimonia as a whole, and is to be prized. 
Nussbaum explains the effects of emotion upon our conception of eudaimonia in this 
way:  
“This, it seems, is what emotions are like, and this is why, in negative cases, they are 
felt as tearing the self apart; because they have to do with damage to me and to my 
own, to my plans and goals, to what is most urgent in my conception of what it is for 
me to live well.” (2004 p.190) 
 For Nussbaum what is at stake, separately from the instrumental effects of a threat, 
is my idea of the way things ought to be for me, and the more potent the emotional 
circumstance, the greater the potential effects upon the framework of my beliefs.  
I will illustrate this effect by providing different responses to the loss of £5:  I lose 
£5 accidentally; I would feel a mild frustration at the small loss of cash. In treating 
the loss of cash in this way, I am taking an instrumental view of my loss. Suppose 
now that I buy something for £1 in a shop and pay with a £10 note. The woman at 
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the till gives me £4 in change. When I point this out, the woman refuses to give me 
the correct change.  
Since both examples involve me losing £5, it would seem reasonable that I treat both 
losses in the same manner. However, my level of emotion at the till woman’s refusal 
to return my money would be of a different order altogether. It finds its source in my 
belief that the till woman is cheating me. My evaluations differ; but what is it that 
makes the thought ‘this is an attempt to cheat me’ qualitatively different from ‘this is 
annoying’? The answer is intuitively obvious: in the second case, I am very angry 
because I believe I have been cheated. But this is begging the question. 
Nussbaum’s explanation would be that the evaluation caused by my belief that I am 
being deliberately cheated is the effect of a much broader assault upon my values 
than the instrumental effect of a loss of £5; it represents a challenge to my notion of 
how the world ought to function. It is this more general assault which, for Nuss-
baum, undermines the construct which constitutes my notion of eudaimonia, intro-
ducing an urgency into my thoughts. My sense of grievance following that event 
would be of some duration and would draw me into other considerations of value 
which pertain to the arousing event. I might think “This woman stole money from 
me whilst I was in her presence.”; “I’ll never use cash again.”; “I’ll never go to that 
store again.”; “I will warn my friends about that store.” These thoughts would echo 
on and finally subside. But it is undoubtedly true that if such thoughts had occurred, 
I would have willingly given more than £5 to be free of them, because they represent 
a much broader assault upon my peace of mind than that of the actual loss incurred. 
 Nussbaum argues that the phenomenological states we experience during an emo-
tional event are attributable to the effects of the appraisal itself. Emotions arise when 
external circumstances are appraised to have significance for oneself (or that part of 
the self which constitutes our beliefs and values) and it is the process in which this 
structure of beliefs and values are reappraised – the mental upheavals involved in 
such processes and the urgency with which we enter into the emotional evaluative 
process – which explain the feelings which accompany emotion, rather than any as-
sociated physiological changes. 
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I offer two broad objections to Nussbaum’s view: 
• The eudaimonistic concept of emotions as the outcome of thoughts arising 
from the evaluations of entities with importance for the self, entails a require-
ment for a concept of a self as affected by these thoughts – a self, represented 
as a network of values. I will argue that the appeal to a self in which our val-
ues and goals constitute an interconnected whole seems to bear little relation-
ship to a reality in which individual values and goals are formed haphazardly 
and locally, often having no discernible relationship to one another.   
 
• But even if -for any individual - eudaimonia exists, my original question re-
mains unanswered, why should the thoughts that refer to ourselves have the 
experiential character of emotions? Simply to raise the stakes so that the ob-
ject of significance is an ‘entire network’ of values explains why emotional 
thoughts may have priority but does not explain why emotions have a sense 
of urgency.  
I will expand each objection separately: central to the identity of cognitive-evalua-
tive emotions is their basis in belief-like cognitions and their relationship with evalu-
ation. To use my earlier example: the transaction between myself and the woman at 
the till is driven by the implicit beliefs that she will deduct the price of an item from 
the amount I give her and return to me the correct change. The day-to-day ability to 
enact monetary transactions efficiently is valuable to me. And it connects to many 
other beliefs: inter alia, that there exist written codes with which commercial enter-
prises must comply regarding such matters and that such transactions constitute an 
expression of fellow-feeling between members of a community. If the woman at the 
till refuses to return the correct change, all these beliefs are potentially challenged. 
To this extent, what Nussbaum is saying is correct, but this does not demonstrate that 
all the values I hold have been, to some extent, impaired; it has nothing to do, say, 
with my value for liberal as preferable to populist politics. Nor need it be the case 
that even the rather narrow set of beliefs I have regarding the sanctity of unwritten 
contracts all occur to me during or after my encounter with the till woman. 
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However, if, as per my second objection, I nonetheless assume that our values are 
connected in a manner such that a challenge to one constitutes a challenge to all, I 
can think of no cognitive-evaluative explanation for a claim that emotional apprais-
als, even if they were to have such wide-ranging effects upon this network of values, 
need in consequence be imbued with any particular quality of ‘urgency’. To priori-
tize a thought is simply to assign to that thought a preference above others. In this 
sense the thought may be described as urgent. But to give a thought preference is not 
to assign a particular quality to that thought; it is simply to ascribe to it a position in 
our sequence of thoughts. This is best understood by example: imagine you are 
walking in the countryside and find yourself in a field with an angry bull. An ap-
praisal of these circumstances as they concern your wellbeing would cause you to in-
terrupt your plans for the walk and leave the field as rapidly as possible. Your well-
being would not be better served by Nussbaum’s idea of urgency as giving prefer-
ence, since preference has been awarded as a consequence of the appraisal process 
itself. The urgency which attaches to this cognitive process – if we agree that the en-
counter would arouse a sense of urgency - is no more (in fact less) a part of our ap-
praisal than the bodily feelings we undergo and behavioural responses we enact 
when we see the bull. 
In summary, I accept Nussbaum’s proposal that certain events in our lives have 
widespread implications for our values and goals, compelling us to access and reap-
praise those values and goals, a process in which each appraisal arouses some new 
emotion, but this, of itself, provides no evidence that some particular quality attaches 
to appraisals made under these circumstances. Nothing has been offered to persuade 
us that the appraisal processes associated with emotion have an experiential quality 
which separates them from other sorts of appraisal.  
Nussbaum’s assertion that there exists some overarching system of values, acting in 
the manner of, say, a spider’s web so that any disturbance at one location may set up 
a vibration which is detectable in the whole, and to which the whole (in response to 
the threat of ‘tearing the self apart’) reacts by imbuing that response with an urgency, 
which provides emotional appraisals with their characteristic quality (or qualities), is 
not verified by the arguments she offers.  
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3.3 Lazarus and ‘hot cognitions’ 
The idea that emotions have ‘heat’ carries an intuitive appeal; Nussbaum and Laza-
rus both employ the term and Lazarus took the notion from Abelson (1963). In a 
1993 paper Smith & Lazarus clarify what is entailed in the concept of ‘hot cogni-
tion’: 
“We propose that for emotion to occur, the "facts," as construed by the individual, 
must be further appraised for their implications for personal well-being. Relevant is-
sues include, Do I care about what is happening? Is it good or bad for me? Can I do 
anything about it? Can I accept it? Will it get better or worse? We suggest that this 
latter type of evaluation provides the emotional "heat" in an encounter [  ], and we 
refer to it as appraisal to distinguish it from colder cognitions that play a more indi-
rect role in emotion generation. Thus, of the many attributions, inferences, and eval-
uations that one might make during an encounter, appraisal represents a con-
strained subset that, we propose, bears a special relationship to emotion.” (1993 
p.917) 
Lazarus is concerned to demonstrate that appraisals conforming to cognitive-evalua-
tive theory have a special character – that they are ‘hot’ cognitions – but he has not 
explained how this comes about. Rather, Lazarus cites his psychological research to 
support his assertion that, although emotions result from causal attributions (infer-
ences concerning the perceived causes of an event), it is only those attributions con-
cerned with ‘adaptational significance’ - being connected with deeper biological ef-
fects associated with our survival - which can be described as ‘hot cognitions’. Other 
considerations of external events, when they result in causal attributions without ad-
aptational significance, play out unemotionally. 
  
Thus far, Lazarus’s description of emotions as ‘hot’ seems to carry no clear implica-
tions for the subjective experience of emotion, but when Lazarus describes the emo-
tional experience as normally including three fused components: “thoughts, action 
impulses and somatic disturbances” (1982 p.1019) he seems to be preparing the 
ground for the explanation of a phenomenology of emotion; because, if, in response 
to some stimulus, we undergo bodily changes and impulses to act towards that stim-
62 
 
ulus, independently of any appraisal we might make, it would be interesting to un-
derstand how such physiological changes and action impulses might affect the ap-
praisal process. However, I cannot find that Lazarus, whilst frequently mentioning 
that somatic disturbances and action impulses co-occur with appraisals, ever clearly 
states how such phenomena, whilst being fused with emotionally-generating apprais-
als, act in any role. His approach to feeling can be summarised thus:  
 
“emotion or feeling is never totally independent of cognition, even when the emo-
tional response is instantaneous and nonreflective [  ]This is the real import of the 
expression “hot cognition”. The thoughts and feelings are simultaneous. (1984 
p.1021) 
Lazarus’s mention of ‘emotion or feeling’ here is noteworthy. For both Nussbaum 
and Lazarus, emotion, being fused with bodily feelings, is a cognition. Lazarus is as-
serting that emotional feelings cannot exist separately from emotional cognitions, but 
he also claims that feelings imbue emotional cognitions with ‘heat’. However, he 
does not make this claim as a first step to providing some distinct role for feeling in 
his cognitive-evaluative account of emotion but rather to bind feeling into that ac-
count.  
What emerges from both these accounts is that cognitive-evaluative advocates, in 
their concept of emotion as the outcome of appraisals or evaluations, claim that such 
appraisals, whilst being associated with physiological changes and action impulses, 
are not importantly affected by them. The emphasis of cognitive-evaluative philoso-
phers upon the role of appraisals, and their relegation of associated physiological 
changes to the status of associated phenomena is challenged by alternative views in 
which emotion finds its origins in feelings. The best known of these is the James-






3.4 Objections to the Cognitive-Evaluative Account of the Role of Bodily Feelings 
3.4.1 Introduction 
James and Lange advanced the notion that the bodily changes which arise when we 
perceive some emotion-inducing stimulus act as a trigger for our subsequent cogni-
tive states of emotion. So, if I find that my heart is beating rapidly, I am trembling 
and my face is flushed, I judge that I am angry, or if I am crying and cowering, I am 
afraid. Hence, the cognitive processes which occur in emotions arise as a conse-
quence of the initial perception that I feel, say, afraid or angry. 
Nussbaum’s argument against emotion as the perception of bodily feeling is that the 
physiological sensations which we experience in the course of an emotion are not 
characteristic of that emotion. In support of her argument, Nussbaum challenges the 
theories of James and Lange, employing evidence provided by Cannon (1929) and a 
widely-cited work by Schachter and Singer (1962)8, which I shall now investigate. 
3..4.2 Schachter and Singer 
Introduction: Nussbaum cites Schachter and Singer’s work as supporting her claim 
that it is the evaluations which subjects make of their circumstances, rather than the 
physiological alterations associated with an emotion, which comprise the necessary 
condition for the arousal of an emotional state, enabling the subject to discriminate 
one emotion from another. She maintains that that Schachter and Singer’s experi-
ment demonstrates that:  
“Given one and the same induced physical condition [my italics], subjects will 
identify their emotion as anger if placed in a situation where they are given reasons 
to be angry [ ]; they will identify their emotion as happiness if put in a situation 
where they are given reasons to think the world is great [  ], and so on.” (2001 
p.98).  
 
8 Commenting on experimental programmes in the 1970’s to demonstrate that subjects’ reports of 
feeling emotions correlate with their introspection as regards the emotion they were encountering, 
Nussbaum states "This program was inspired not only by the general atmosphere but also by the still 
pervasive inference of the James-Lange theory of emotions which had led researchers to expect a cor-
relation between an emotion and a discernible state.” (2001 p.96) 
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Clearly, if two quite different emotions are attributed by the experiencing subjects to 
the same co-occurring physiological state, then this is a strong argument for aban-
doning the notion of bodily feelings as indicative of – and hence, as playing an active 
role in - an emotional state. 
I will argue that a closer examination of Schachter and Singer’s experiment reveals a 
number of problems of methodology, some of which were raised by the experiment-
ers themselves. I hope that the extent of the problems I raise will demonstrate that 
they are not mere hair-splitting; they create a complexity that makes a definitive in-
terpretation impossible and provide no basis for the argument that bodily feelings do 
not comprise an active constituent of the emotional state.  
Experimental Procedure and Results:  In 1962 Schachter and Singer carried out an 
experiment to ascertain whether the nature of the emotion reported by the experienc-
ing individual could be determined by the ‘cognitive’ aspects of the emotional state 
rather than its physiological characteristics. In order to make this determination, an 
experiment was devised whereby one group of subjects were injected with epineph-
rine9 and another was injected with a placebo. The epinephrine-injected group was 
further subdivided: one group was advised of the physiological effects of epineph-
rine (Informed) which include hand tremor, raised heartbeat and flushing of the face. 
A second group was misinformed (Misinformed), that is, given a false account of the 
effects. A third group was told nothing about the potential side-effects; this group in-
cluded all Placebo subjects (Ignorant). 
Subjects who were injected with epinephrine prior to the emotion-inducing experi-
ence were monitored for the occurrence of characteristic symptoms as compared to 
those injected with a placebo. If these symptoms were not observed, the subjects 
were excluded from the experiment. 
All subjects were advised that the experiment was intended to test the effects of the 
injection upon vision. When awaiting the vision test, a part of each group (Informed, 
 
9 Epinephrine is more generally known as adrenalin 
65 
 
Misinformed, Ignorant and Placebo) was subjected to one of two experiences (de-
signed to appear accidental) which were described as either euphoric or anger induc-
ing. 
The results of the ‘euphoric’ group are described below: 
• The subjects who were informed of the effects of epinephrine upon their bodily 
states were less likely to attribute their feelings to euphoria than those who had 
been given no information (Ignorant) or those who had been misinformed. 
Schachter and Singer in interpreting the similar reactions of Misinformed and Ig-
norant subjects observe that: 
 “Comparisons between Misinformed and Informed conditions makes it immedi-
ately clear that the experimental differences are not due to artifacts resulting 
from the informed instructions.” (1962 p.389) 
• Subjects who were given a placebo were likely to report marginally less euphoria 
than those who had been injected and Misinformed or Ignorant but reported sig-
nificantly more euphoria than those who had been Informed. 
• The subjects’ behaviours were also observed during the ‘euphoric experiences’. 
In these sessions a ‘stooge’ accidentally wandered into the room and began to 
fool about (in a controlled routine). The extent to which the subject participated 
was observed. Again, it was found that the ‘Placebo’ subjects were marginally 
less likely than the Misinformed and Ignorant to join in the stooge’s activity, 
whereas the Informed group were significantly less likely than all other groups to 
participate. 
In the second set of experiments, which tested anger, Schacter and Singer point out a 
potential flaw in the design of the experiment. Subjects had volunteered for the ex-
periment in order to gain points for their final examinations; the ‘stooge’ in the anger 
experiment aroused irritation in the subjects by selecting aspects of the questionnaire 
design which were intrusive or pointless, and subjects, when subsequently reporting 
their motivations, said that they were (according to Schacter and Singer) unwilling to 
risk their final results by revealing their dissatisfaction as regards the questionnaire 
design, making their reporting of the experiment potentially unreliable.  
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Before the experiment, one group of epinephrine-injected subjects were advised of 
the possible effects (Informed) and one group, including Placebo, was not (Ignorant). 
No Misinformed subjects were used in this experiment. 
• Despite the experimental difficulties, Informed subjects reported less irritation 
than Ignorant subjects with Placebo subjects showing more irritation than In-
formed and less than Ignorant. 
• Behavioural observations of irritation (based upon the tendency of the subject to 
agree, disagree or ignore the stooge’s remarks about the questionnaire) showed 
that Placebo subjects and Informed subjects displayed markedly less irritation 
than Ignorant subjects. 
Schachter and Singer’s Interpretation of the Results: The results indicate that inform-
ing the subject of the effects of epinephrine had an effect upon his/her judgment that 
the bodily feelings experienced were the result of emotion and caused subjects not 
only to report their feelings differently but to behave differently during the experi-
ment. 
However, Schachter and Singer, in analysing the outcomes state that:  
“for a perfect test for these hypotheses, it should be anticipated that in the euphoria 
conditions the degree of experimentally produced euphoria should vary in the fol-
lowing fashion: Misinformed ≥ Ignorant > Informed = Placebo. And that in the an-
ger conditions anger should conform to the following pattern: Ignorant > Informed 
= Placebo.” (1962 p.393) 
However, in neither case did this prove to be true  
“The results for the Placebo subjects fall between the Ignorant and Informed sub-
jects. This is a particularly troubling pattern for it makes it impossible to evaluate 
unequivocally the effects of the state of the physiological arousal and indeed raises 
serious questions about our entire theoretical structure.” (1962 p.393) 
In order to investigate the troubling nature of the results, Schachter and Singer re-an-
alysed post-experimental interviews of the ‘Ignorant’ and ‘Misinformed’ subjects 
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(N.B. not the Placebo subjects) and arrived at the view that a proportion (13% An-
ger/Ignorant; 32% Euphoria/Ignorant; 20% Euphoria/Misinformed) had drawn for 
themselves the conclusion that the injection was causing their feelings and hence 
were dubbed ‘self-informed’. By eliminating these subjects, the experimenters were 
able to create a greater distinction between Ignorant/Misinformed and Placebo sub-
jects (.03 significance). 
The researchers then move to discuss the unexpected difference between Informed 
and Placebo subjects. Importantly they note  
“This expectation should hold if there is no sympathetic activation in the Placebo 
conditions. This assumption is completely unrealistic for the injection of a placebo 
does not prevent sympathetic activation. The experimental situations were fairly dra-
matic and certainly some of the placebo subjects gave indications of physiological 
arousal.” (1962 p.394).  
Subsequent measurement of pulse levels demonstrate indeed that subjects were phys-
iologically aroused but provide no further indication as to the nature of the physio-
logical arousal in Placebo subjects. 
Having made these adjustments and qualifying statements Schachter and Singer ob-
serve:  
“It has been suggested that given constant cognitive circumstances an individual 
will react emotionally only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological 
arousal. Without taking account of experimental artifacts, the evidence in support of 
this proposition is consistent but tentative. When the effects of ‘self-informing’ 
tendencies in epinephrine subjects and ‘self-arousing’ tendencies in placebo subjects 
are partialled out, the evidence strongly supports the proposition.” (1962 p.396). 
Discussion of Results 
• Experimental Method: Panksepp, in his brief description of the Schacter and 
Singer experiments comments: “The most famous series of studies, which have 
proved quite difficult to replicate, were conducted by Schacter & Singer” 
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(Panksepp p346), an observation confirmed by Nussbaum herself. This is not un-
expected. The results must have been heavily dependent upon the degree to 
which the performance of the two ‘stooges’ was convincing and how forceful or 
charismatic each performance was. Schacter and Singer also reported differences 
in subject behaviour between each session as the stooge worked through a set 
routine which was designed to produce interaction with the subject. As the level 
of interaction evidently varied, the exchanges between the stooge and the subject 
must have been modified to accommodate more or less interaction. This does not 
necessarily invalidate the research but makes it difficult to repeat. 
• The use of Epinephrine: Epinephrine is a neurotransmitter found in the body and 
brain during ‘fight or flight’ (rage and fear) episodes, which, as a minimum, 
causes some of the physical conditions which are found during bona fide epi-
sodes of fear and anger. Schacter and Singer note “Latane and Schachter (1962) 
demonstrated that rats injected with epinephrine were notably more capable of 
avoidance learning than were rats injected with a placebo.” This finding both 
anticipates the work of LeDoux and supports the action of epinephrine as the out-
come of mental and physiological mechanisms causing fear. As both Panksepp 
and Cannon note, rage and fear are closely associated states and so it is unsur-
prising that epinephrine occurs in both. Hence by injecting the subjects with epi-
nephrine, the experimenters may be generating complex neurochemical and 
physiological states associated with anger. Consequently, when subjects were in-
duced by the stooge into irritation or anger, the physiological changes induced by 
epinephrine may have corresponded to bone fide feelings of anger, or at least 
some part of them.  
• Potential complexities of induced physiological states: Schachter and Singer, in 
attempting to establish the lack of coherence between reported emotions and 
bodily states make a critical and, I will argue, unjustified assumption in the de-
sign of their experiment: they assume that the physiological state which the sub-
ject experiences in response to each emotional event is caused by the injection of 
epinephrine. In the first set of sessions they set out to induce a state of euphoria 
in the subject by exposing him/her to playful or irritating circumstances. Assume 
now that some bona fide physiological state exists which is generated by play 
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(P). Similarly, assume that when the subject is angry, a physiological state (A) 
arises. When Schachter and Singer inject the subjects with epinephrine they cre-
ate a third physiological condition (E). However in constructing the experiment 
Schachter and Singer must at least allow for the possibility that the induced emo-
tional states of anger and euphoria may be accompanied by physiological feel-
ings A and P as per Table 3(i) below: 
 
*The bodily feelings associated with anger and epinephrine injection are represented as A(E) to 
indicate that bodily states (E) as a minimum comprise a part of the feelings associated with anger. 
According to this account, if emotions anger and play generate physiological 
states A and P respectively, we cannot know whether the epinephrine subjects, 
when attributing their behaviour to feelings of euphoria (playfulness), are refer-
ring to P or E. And it may well be that in the anger scenario, subjects are making 
genuine attributions of angry feelings when referring to either A or E. 
• Treatment of Placebo Subjects: In the initial ‘euphoria’ results Placebo subjects 
report and exhibit both feelings and behaviours which correspond loosely to 
those of the epinephrine injected but ignorant subjects. If both groups were expe-
riencing physiological states associated with ‘play’, rather than the epinephrine-
induced physiology, this would be explained. But Schacter and Singer adjust the 
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‘epinephrine ignorant’ numbers by removing those subjects who ‘self-informed’ 
regarding the effects of the injection. However, the Placebo subjects were also 
injected and ignorant of the effects of the injection and so potentially there is a 
second adjustment to be made for ‘self-informed’ Placebo subjects who believe 
their emotionally-induced feelings are caused by the injection. Such an adjust-
ment might have restored the responses of Placebo subjects to equivalence with 
Ignorant subjects; despite this, I can find no evidence that such an assessment 
was made. 
 
Schachter and Singer - Summary 
Schachter and Singer wish to test the hypothesis that if an individual is unable to ex-
plain a state of physiological arousal, he will describe his feelings in terms of the 
cognitions available to him. 
 
It will be noted here that the experimenters make no reference to ‘appropriate physi-
ological feelings’ because their aim is to demonstrate that any set of accompanying 
(e.g. epinephrine-like) feelings will suffice to satisfy the subject’s need for a cogni-
tive condition to be described as ‘emotional’. 
 
To test this theory, the researchers induce two very different emotional states and 
aim to create a single set of physiological conditions. This, it is proposed, will enable 
them to ascertain whether subjects attribute both emotional states to the same physio-
logical conditions. But, if, as Lazarus claims, emotions are fusions of thoughts, phys-
iologies and action impulses, the researchers have set themselves an impossible task. 
If you induce in me the emotion ‘play’ by using a stooge, then the ‘fused’ physiolog-
ical state I experience in association may have characteristics corresponding to the 
‘play’ emotion. The injection of epinephrine would ensure that at the same time, I 
have hand tremblings, a raised pulse, and flushing which are not appropriate to the 
emotion ‘play’. But if the physiological feelings associated with play are distinctive, 
then they ought to be discriminable by the subject from other physiological condi-
tions. The reactions and reports of the Placebo subjects strongly indicate that they are 
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undergoing play-induced feelings – feelings which have not been induced by an epi-
nephrine-induced physiological state - and so the possibility that they are experienc-
ing bona fide physiological states caused by play seems real. 
 
I conclude therefore, that Schacter and Singer have not demonstrated that the physi-
ology of an emotion is not indicative of the emotion experienced. Nor, in default of 
such evidence, does their experiment demonstrate that physiological configurations 
characteristic of particular emotions do exist. In consequence of this, Nussbaum’s 
claim that Schacter and Singer have demonstrated that ‘one and the same physical 
condition’ will be claimed by experimental subjects as accompanying different emo-
tions is not confirmed. 
 
3.4.2  Cannon’s Emotional Research 
 
Cannon’s work Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage is also cited by 
Nussbaum as an example of the incoherence of physiological feelings. It was the out-
come of a programme of biological and behavioural research carried out in the early 
years of the 20th Century. It finds its origins in work carried out by Pavlov and a 
number of other researchers in the late 19th Century. His study of the physiological 
changes which happen during rage, fear, fatigue and hunger led him to conclude that 
although noticeable visceral and physical changes occurred, there was no reliable 
correlation between the two emotions studied and the characteristics of the associ-
ated physiological state.  
Cannon also discovered that when the viscera10 were separated from the brain by le-
sions to the spinal cord, emotional behaviour in humans and animals was not notice-
ably impaired. Since sensory information is transmitted from the body to the brain 
via neural pathways in the spinal column, this tends to confirm the view that the bod-
ily changes we undergo during an emotion do not cause the emotional event. 
 
10 When Cannon refers to the ‘viscera’, he is specifically referring to the stomach and the alimentary 
tract and the changes which occur to those organs during anger and fear 
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Interestingly, Cannon noted that visceral changes occur too slowly to trigger emo-
tions. His counter theory was that emotions were brain-based and that particular neu-
ral pathways, especially those related to the thalamus, were responsible for the 
arousal of emotions. So, whilst Cannon’s work tends to confirm that physiological 
changes do not initiate emotions, he attributes the origins of emotion to the thalamus, 
located in the limbic system, rather than to the action of higher cognitive processes. 
To summarise, Cannon’s physiological and behavioural studies confirm Nussbaum’s 
view that bodily sensations do not initiate emotions. He provides three reasons: 
1. Humans who are unable to sense visceral or other bodily functions are still 
able to experience emotions. 
2. There is no reliable correlation between the bodily sensations experienced 
during the course of an emotion and the nature of the emotion which the sub-
ject believed he/she was experiencing. 
3. The bodily states experienced during an emotion occurred too slowly to ac-
count for those states being the arousers of an emotion. 
Cannon’s observations were based upon the best scientific evidence of the time but 
Panksepp separately addresses each of these findings with later discoveries in the 
fields of behavioural science and neuroscience (1998 p.57): 
• Visceral separation. Whilst confirming that the intensity of emotions is less-
ened by lesions of the spinal cord, he observes “We now know that the vis-
cera secrete many chemicals (especially hormones and neuropeptides) that 
may feed important information back to the brain indirectly. (that is, inde-
pendently of the spinal cord) 
• Similar visceral changes occur in very distinct emotional states. “More re-
cent evidence suggests that the patterning of many visceral changes is mod-
estly different among different emotions 
• Bodily response too slow to cause emotion. Panksepp does not dispute this 
general finding but observes “injections of certain gastric peptides can rap-
idly produce emotional episodes”.  
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In summary, none of the claims which Nussbaum makes from Cannon’s research can 
be confirmed by more recent research, with the single exception of the sequence of 
emotional arousal. Bodily changes are initiated by affective neural processes which 
co-occur with cognitions and hence cannot be the cause of emotional cognitions as 
James and Lange propose. 
 
3.5 Summary of the Cognitive-Evaluative Treatment of Bodily Feelings  
Two claims are made by cognitive-evaluative philosophers regarding the role of bod-
ily feelings: first, that such feelings do not cause the emotion and second that bodily 
feelings are not characteristic of the emotion type. I will discuss a third claim, that 
bodily changes act as signifiers of emotion, in 3.6 and subsequent sections. 
Regarding the first claim, the evidence from more recent neuroscientific research 
(See Chapters 7 to 9) supports the cognitive-evaluative claim that the bodily sensa-
tions associated with emotions do not trigger emotions. But this does not demon-
strate that the bodily effects of emotion play no role in the unfolding of emotions 
once those states are aroused: they may provide a reason for believing that an emo-
tional event is occurring, or act as a mechanism in the physical realisation of that 
event without constituting its entirety. 
As to the second claim, Nussbaum interprets Cannon’s research as reducing the feel-
ings associated with emotions to a collection of incoherent bodily sensations and 
cites the work of Schachter and Singer as demonstrating that similar physiological 
sensations will be accepted by subjects as signalling emotion even when they accom-
pany different emotion types. In the case of Schachter and Singer, the evidence she 
has cited does not confirm her claim and I have argued that the experiment is con-
ceived in such a way that it never could.  
Cannon however, in claiming that different emotions evoke indistinguishable bodily 
changes, adopts a more promising methodology, but in limiting his measurement of 
bodily changes to a few basic physiological processes, he might be unable to identify 
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such changes even if they existed. More recent research indicates that, as a mini-
mum, the physiologies which accompany emotions have complex presentations, as-
sociated with the generation of particular neurochemicals in addition to changes in 
physiology. If this is the case, it makes little sense to think of the effects of such pro-
cesses simply as bodily changes to be measured by heart rates, temperature, skin 
conductivity, or the generation/non-generation of gastric juices. We may experience 
effects associated with the chemical state of the brain, combined with tensing or re-
laxation of certain muscles, cold sweats, a tendency to cry or blush. All these 
changes and many others are known to be associated with emotions - and if we add 
to these considerations the possibility that mixed emotions aroused by multiple stim-
uli may induce combinations of these effects, it seems possible that if characteristic 
patterns of feelings were to exist, we would be hard put to discriminate them experi-
mentally even using the measurement techniques currently available. 
But before investigating the nature or function of emotional feelings, it is important 
to acknowledge them as a phenomenon: what is remarkable about emotional feelings 
is that these effects exist and manifest as they do. For humans and other animals, it 
has somehow come about that we are not only able to discriminate those things in 
the world which are of value to ourselves, but our psyche is so constructed, that 
bound up with our evaluations of objects as having value, we feel the importance of 
that value for ourselves. As Goldie puts it, we have feelings toward those things.  
The evidence that cognitive-evaluative advocates offer against a role for bodily feel-
ings in emotional processes fails to support their contention, but neither does it sup-
port an alternative assertion that the feelings associated with emotions in some way 
invest those objects with phenomenological characteristics which are indicative of 
the implications for the self as it relates to the object detected. I will now consider 
further arguments for this latter claim – specifically that emotional feelings are sen-
sations: and that they constitute a separate mode of identifying the implications of 





3.6 Feelings as signifiers of emotion 
In summarising my earlier discussion of bodily feelings as sources of emotion, I ac-
cepted that bodily feelings developed too slowly to trigger emotions but I concluded 
that bodily feelings might play a role in the unfolding of emotional states once 
aroused, and that the experience of such feelings could cause us to believe that a par-
ticular emotion was occurring. 
Goldie shares this view, but he offers this caveat: “It is only a prima facie reason be-
cause one can be mistaken about whether the feeling is part of an emotional experi-
ence. You might, for example, feel red and think that this is because you are embar-
rassed (that you have blushed in embarrassment) while in fact you have just come 
into a room on a frosty day.” (2004 p.93) 
In proposing that bodily changes might cause us to apprehend that we are experienc-
ing an emotion, Goldie is introducing the view of physiological changes as signifiers 
of emotion without claiming that such physiological changes generate characteristic 
emotional phenomenologies. I believe that this constitutes a useful first step towards 
understanding the role of feelings in emotion. But in his ‘frosty day’ example, he is 
asserting that certain bodily changes could ‘trick’ us into believing that we are expe-
riencing an emotion. This seems unlikely. I can remember no occasion when I have 
confused ‘feeling red’ with being embarrassed. There are at least two conditions 
which entail reddening of the skin: the first is ‘blushing’ which is normally confined 
to the face and upper chest and the second is ‘flushing’ which can occur more widely 
on the body. Flushing is a physiological condition which may respond to medical 
treatment, whereas blushing will only respond to psychological treatment of a mental 
state which arises from the evaluation of a set of social circumstances in which one 
of my responses would be to blush. But blushing would be unlikely to be my only re-
sponse to an embarrassing situation: I might have a raised heartbeat, a disposition to 
be elsewhere, an inability to collect my thoughts. It is only when the stimulating cir-
cumstances are present and that some or all of these associated physiological and 
psychological conditions arise that I will acknowledge that I am embarrassed. 
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If my description of the symptoms of embarrassment finds resonance in the experi-
ence of others, then Goldie’s ‘frosty day’ example, rather than disproving the argu-
ment that there is a complex physiology of emotion, tends to support such a view by 
demonstrating that the occurrence of a single bodily sensation can never be mistaken 
for an emotion. In charity, it may be that upon entering the room, if we were to as-
sume that the appropriate ‘embarrassing’ circumstances were also present, then it 
may well be that we could mistake ‘feeling red’ for a physical sign of embarrass-
ment, but Goldie, in framing his example, seems to be intent upon excluding that 
possibility.  
Goldie might overcome my objection by accepting that the feelings associated with 
embarrassment manifest in a considerably more complex form than he describes. 
However, such an acceptance takes us an important step away from the cognitive-
evaluative view of such physiological states as incoherent; inviting us to consider the 
view that emotional feelings are explicable separately from appraisals.  
3.7 Cases of Non-identity between Appraisal and Feeling 
Lazarus claims that emotional feelings are “bound up” with cognitive evaluation and 
signify to the subject that an emotion is occurring. This view is supported by Nuss-
baum’s claim that the emotional feelings we experience are a constituent of the ap-
praisal process itself, rather than its physiological accompaniments. 
I will now offer two states of affairs in which emotional states arise or disappear in-
dependently of appraisals.  
The first concerns cases of the sort described by Marks (p.24) in which emotions 
may take us unawares. Such emotions might arise in response to places, smells or 
sounds or random memories, causing us to experience feelings for which we can find 
no reason.  
In the second case, the subject becomes inured to emotionally potent circumstances 
in such a way that he/she is able to reflect that a state of affairs which was once an 
emotional cue is no longer emotionally arousing. I will provide an example: shortly 
after leaving university I was employed in a human resources department. My work 
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entailed interviewing several job applicants per week. Initially I was anxious but ex-
cited by the prospect of interviewing people who might be a good deal older and 
more experienced than myself. However, after a few weeks the work became routine 
and unemotional, causing me to have no feelings of anxiety or anticipation.   
The evaluation of a set of circumstances which initially caused me to experience 
emotion, would later cause no emotion; and in determining whether the experience 
was – or was not - emotional, the criterion I employ for emotion is the presence or 
absence of feelings.  
Smith and Lazarus would argue that in the intervening period, I have come to under-
stand that I can cope with the situation so that it no longer constitutes a threat. Intui-
tively this seems obvious. But the relationship between the appraisal of some situa-
tion (I remained young and inexperienced) and the construal of that appraisal as con-
stituting more or less of a threat, based upon some inverse function of my ability to 
cope, does not immediately explain the presence or absence of emotional feelings as 
accompaniments to the appraisal. 
In sum, if my appraisals of a set of circumstances as occasioning emotion can change 
over time, then appraisal alone cannot be the mark of the emotional. What does ap-
pear to be characteristic of all emotional experience, is the arousal of feelings. But if 
feelings are necessary for emotion, the attributes and effects of feelings discovered 
thus far provide no further clarification of the nature or function of those feelings. I 
have observed that feelings may arise spontaneously, or they may fade with cue rep-
etition or, as Schachter and Singer’s experiment demonstrates, feelings may be sub-
dued or eliminated by evaluation; but all these are matters requiring explanation, 
they are not explanations in themselves.  
3.7 The Commonsense View of Emotional Feelings 
I will now describe a view of emotion which is not explained by emotion as the out-
come of an evaluation, or as a spontaneous neurological response to the detection of 
certain stimuli. To illustrate: my friend may observe to me that “A feels angry.” or 
“B feels afraid.” When I am told this, I am able - even without knowing what A feels 
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angry about or why B feels afraid - to apprehend the state to which my friend is re-
ferring; so that there is some aspect of the experience of anger which distinguishes it 
from fear, existing independently of the circumstances occasioning those emotions in 
A and B. This interpretation of emotional feeling, which I shall call the Com-
monsense View, is sufficiently prevalent in everyday accounts of emotion to invite 
further consideration. 
Before proceeding further, there is a potential cognitive-evaluative objection to the 
view I am about to develop: that on hearing that B is afraid, it can be assumed that 
there is some state of affairs he is afraid of, having the attributes of a threat. I cer-
tainly do not discount this view; it will be important to the theory I will presently 
propose, but I am hoping to establish, separately from this, that there is a commonly 
shared view that, separate from the notion that fear arises in response to a threat, that 
there is something it is like to be afraid.   
Viewed from the perspective of commonsense explanation, the cognitive-evaluative 
account constitutes a radical reinterpretation of emotion. To illustrate, here are two 
statements involving emotion: the first is a well-known piece of advice given to indi-
viduals who are observed to be angry: 
 
• Don’t make important decisions while you are angry. 
 
The second is a quote from a speech given by Roosevelt at his first inauguration in 
1933 regarding the challenges faced by the nation which, again, is generally accepted 
as providing an insight into the nature of fear: 
 
• The only thing we have to fear is fear itself. 
 
Taking the first example: the decision to be taken is understood to be a decision con-
cerning the object of one’s anger. The Commonsense View is that anger constitutes a 
state of mind and body, an ill-humour, centred around some source of frustration, so 
that judgments made in anger, rather than leading to beneficial outcomes, may cause 
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the subject to take overly-aggressive and self-destructive measures against the object 
of his/her anger.  
 
The inference to be drawn is that the decisions taken when one is angry are not deci-
sions which would normally be regarded as optimal, where an optimal appraisal of 
the circumstances would be one taken in an unemotional state which would produce 
outcomes more conducive to the wellbeing of the subject. In saying this, I am not re-
quiring that appraisals are conscious or rational, only that they produce behaviours 
beneficial to the subject. 
 
Roosevelt’s example describes the Commonsense view of emotion more completely. 
The cognitive-evaluative view is that when an object or state of affairs is appraised 
as a threat, the appraisal will conform to a pattern of issues consistent with the 
arousal of fear. Interpreted in this cognitive-evaluative sense, the statement can be 
restated as “The only thing which should cause us to fear are the thoughts caused by 
events, circumstances or objects which have been appraised as threats to our wellbe-
ing.” The banality of this interpretation makes it unlikely that this was the message 
which Roosevelt was attempting to convey. His following sentence immediately 
clarifies his meaning: fear is a “nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which par-
alyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance”.  
 
A cognitive-evaluative advocate might focus on Roosevelt’s use of the term ‘unjusti-
fied’ as an indication that emotional appraisals may be biased - based upon a mis-
reading of circumstances - and that, in consequence, our fears of some events may be 
exaggerated11. But Roosevelt is not exhorting American citizens to prioritize their 
appraisals of threats more rationally. In speaking of a ‘nameless, unreasoning terror’, 
he is speaking of that which cannot be put into words - he is asserting that there 
comes to exist amongst individuals, in communities which perceive themselves as 
 
11 To exemplify:  no people have been killed in terrorist attacks in the UK in the past two years, 
whereas over 3,000 were killed in road accidents. Viewed from this perspective the level of public 




being exposed to incalculable threats, a quality attached to thought, existing sepa-
rately from any particular appraisal, which is inimical to a settled, rational pursuit of 
our day-to-day goals and hence, the best interests of those individuals. 
 
That Roosevelt could send such a message and that its content should be accepted by 
the public indicates that fear is not construed simply in the cognitive-evaluative 
sense - as an emotion arising in response to an apprehension of danger caused by the 
appraisal of some state of affairs. The Commonsense View of emotion contains – in 
part - elements which are phenomenological, maintaining that states such as fear, an-
ger or shame each have a characteristic quality which is particular to the emotion it-
self. The best cognitivist response is this: assume that in a lifetime an individual will 
make numerous appraisals of objects or circumstances as emotion-inducing, then we 
will progressively come to associate patterns of circumstances which are potentially 
good or bad for the subject. So, for example, if some set of circumstances has simi-
larities to previous circumstances in which the pattern of appraisal caused us to view 
those circumstances as dangerous, we could describe the thoughts we experienced in 
response to that set of circumstances as negatively-valenced, just as pleasant 
thoughts generally arise in response to conformations of circumstances involving in-
dividuals who we find attractive. 
 
But the diversity of emotional qualities which are commonly thought to exist extends 
well beyond their being ‘good or bad’ for the subject. There seems to be some aspect 
of being afraid which does not attach to anger, so that even if I desired it, I cannot 
find in my anger at a four-year-old child any sense of fear, though both these things 
are ‘negatively valenced’; and the pleasures of love are not the pleasures of play: my 
pleasure at playing chess has a different quality to the pleasure I take from a roman-
tic attachment. On this account, there is a quality particular to each emotion as expe-
rienced which is distinguishable from other emotions. Taking Thomas Nagel’s idea, 
there seems to be something ‘it is like’, to be afraid, distressed, playful, loving etc.. 




The Commonsense View of emotion requires that when I feel emotional, I am liter-
ally ‘in a state’ - a condition of mind and body. To exemplify: if I am embarrassed, it 
may be that I am blushing or that my heartbeat increases, but it is not these things 
alone – or even primarily - which cause my discomfort, rather it is a quality which 
attaches to the thought itself; so that if, say, I am embarrassed, this quality is embed-
ded in such a way that even if I wished to be free of it, the sentiment is entrenched. I 
cannot view my embarrassment dispassionately. 
3.8 Emotional Feelings – Summary 
Cognitive-evaluative advocates justify their theory of emotion on the basis of its ex-
planatory power, maintaining that any associated bodily feelings play no demonstra-
ble role in the emotional event, except that of signalling the presence of emotion. As 
Kenny puts it:  
“a bodily state is not qua bodily state an emotional state; for it is only if it occurs in 
the appropriate circumstances that we can call it an emotional state at all [ ] The oc-
casion on which an emotion is elicited is part of the criterion for the emotion.” 
(1963 pp.48-49).  
For cognitive-evaluative philosophers, it is the nature of the occasion - the context – 
and its relevance for the self, which will determine the type of emotion experienced.  
Nussbaum attributes the turbulent character of emotional experiences to their ur-
gency - the pressing need to prioritize emotionally-potent appraisals according to 
their significance for the wellbeing of the subject. She claims that this significance is 
augmented by the role of any value revealed by appraisal as a component of a net-
work of values – a network which constitutes, for any given individual, her/his con-
cept of eudaimonia. According to this account, any challenge to – or confirmation of 
– a single value will be experienced as challenging or confirming, to a greater or 
lesser degree, the subject’s broader conception of value. 
Responding to this view, I have accepted that our beliefs and values tend to be inter-
connected and that an appraisal of a change in some external state of affairs as it re-
lates to myself, may cause me to embark upon a process in which other beliefs and 
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values as they relate to that state of affairs are reappraised, but such reappraisals 
themselves will not necessarily involve some broader assault upon the entirety of the 
beliefs and values which I may hold. Nor do I accept that the urgency with which 
emotional appraisals are addressed in our thoughts is the cause of the mental turbu-
lence attending emotion. I have argued that the urgency of an appraisal is restricted 
to the assignment of priority, a mental rearrangement of thoughts according to pref-
erence and that such prioritisations are insufficient to account for experiential quality 
of the mental upheavals which Nussbaum ascribes to emotion. 
Lazarus asserts that emotions are ‘hot’ cognitions, and although he observes that 
emotional states produce somatic changes and states of action preparedness which 
differentiate them from non-emotional states, he does not ascribe the ‘heat’ of emo-
tion solely to physiological change: rather it is understood to arise as a consequence 
of the apprehension that some external entity has adaptive significance for the sub-
ject, signalling a convergence of emotional appraisals with ancient neurobiological 
responses arising in circumstances which affect the subject’s wellbeing. 
Both Nussbaum’s and Lazarus’s accounts conflict with claims advanced by James 
and Lange who propose that experienced emotions find their origins in the physio-
logical changes arising in response to some “exciting fact”. More recent scientific 
evidence by researchers such as LeDoux and Panksepp indicates that physiological 
arousal is triggered by mediating processes which follow the detection of an exciting 
object, tending to disprove the James-Lange hypothesis. 
Nussbaum further proposes - and offers evidence to demonstrate - that the physiolog-
ical changes co-occurring with an emotion exhibit no pattern characteristic of the 
emotion being expressed and, in consequence, play no discernible role in the arousal 
of a particular emotion type.  
I have investigated the evidence provided by Nussbaum, which she claims has 
demonstrated that the physiological changes observed to co-occur with emotion bear 
no relationship to the emotion reported, and I have concluded that while the evidence 
fails to support her claim, neither does it support the James-Lange hypothesis that 
somatovisceral changes act as initiators of an emotional event. 
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In attempting to introduce a role for feelings into cognitive evaluative explanations 
of emotion, Goldie proposes that the sensations associated with emotion, even if they 
conform to no discernible pattern relating to the emotion experienced, could be un-
derstood as introducing an experiential quality into what would otherwise be a purely 
cognitive process of appraisal. Our feelings might offer a prima facie reason for be-
lieving that the emotion we are experiencing is of a certain type, and that even when 
they mislead us, their presence serves to authenticate a mental state as emotional.   
In the absence of experimental evidence to verify either the existence or absence of 
patterns of physiological states associated with emotional appraisals, Goldie’s view 
offers a useful step towards a recognition of a function for emotionally-associated 
feelings, without committing us to the view that feelings necessarily complement or 
play any role in appraisals, or that feelings exhibit characteristic phenomenologies.  
This latter interpretation is developed in my account of a Commonsense View of 
emotion in which Goldie’s account is expanded to encompass the notion of feelings 
as possessing qualities which are characteristic of the type of emotion experienced. 
The Commonsense View, whilst accepting that emotional states may find their ori-
gins in events, objects or circumstances of significance to the self, treats the feelings 
which accompany those states as comprehensible independently of the appraisals 
which occasion them. Yet, on the basis of the evidence provided, the Commonsense 
View is no more verifiable than the cognitive-evaluative ascription of the mental tur-
bulence of emotion to their urgency or adaptive significance.  
In sum, unless some brain mechanism can be identified which would explain the 
arousal of the feelings co-occurring with emotional appraisals as having a function 
and an experiential quality which can be understood separately from those apprais-
als, the cognitive-evaluative view offers the better theory of emotion by virtue of its 
explanatory power. 
My intention now will be to pursue the notion that the neurophysiological changes 
which co-occur with emotion have function. I intend to demonstrate that the feelings 
we experience during an emotion are the products of subcortical brain processes, 
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having characteristic neurological and neurochemical elements, which generate atti-
tudes, bodily effects and action impulses. 
In the course of my previous account, a number of aspects of emotion have been 
identified which my proposed account must satisfy: 
1. It must explain the co-occurrence of action impulses and changes in bodily 
states. 
2. It must explain how our emotional thoughts come to have characteristic expe-
riential qualities. 
3. It must describe some mechanism whereby these effects may be suppressed 
or ‘overwritten’ by appraisals. 
The mental processes which I will offer as candidates for the generation of emotional 
feelings are primitive emotions. I will argue that primitive emotions are inherited 
mechanisms, capable of autonomous function, with the ability to generate a spectrum 
of behaviours in response to valuable stimuli. I will propose that primitive emotions 
provide the source of physiological sensations and action impulses, existing along-
side the cognitions which form emotional appraisals. My explanation will be pre-
sented in two stages: 
• First, I will provide a more comprehensive account of the nature of primitive 
emotions and their function. The existence of subcortical affect mechanisms 
is acknowledged by some philosophers working in the field of emotion, but 
the full implications of the existence and function of such mechanisms are 
less well understood. Neuroscientists and behavioural scientists have been 
able to outline the action of core affect systems as neural processes which, 
taken collectively, describe an extensive mental architecture, providing a ru-
dimentary survival programme for both humans and other mammalian spe-
cies which is able to function in the absence of the intentional processes re-
quired for appraisal. The challenge in presenting the findings of these re-




• Having provided an overview of the action of primitive emotional systems, I 
shall argue that the arousal of primitive emotion is a necessary condition for 
any emotion, in contrast to the view of cognitive-evaluative advocates who 
argue for the necessity of appraisal or judgment.  However, I intend to 
demonstrate that although a primitive emotion is a necessary component of 
an emotional occurrence, this does not conflict with the cognitive-evaluative 



























PART II - PRIMITIVE EMOTIONS 
 
Introduction 
The concept of primitive emotion I intend to develop in Part II will have as its focus, 
not some primitive subset of human emotion, but rather an account of primitive emo-
tional mechanisms as mediating between stimulus and response in mammals.  
 
I shall treat the mental processes which bring about this mediation as nonintentional. 
Such processes are often described by cognitive scientists as being pre-programmed 
or automatic, arising spontaneously in the presence of particular stimuli. They are 
also described as arising and acting without the subject’s being conscious of their 
functioning, driven by mechanisms which may act autonomously. Each of the terms 
used denotes some aspect of the processes I shall describe as nonintentional, but 
none describes the mental states so completely, except perhaps ‘nonconscious’. 
However, the use of this term would entail first, a model of consciousness with 
which nonconscious states may be contrasted, and I can provide no such model. 
 
For any animal species, a nonintentional account of emotion must explain the role of 
emotion in generating behaviours without recourse to the notion that the subject is 
acting with intention, that is, employing implicit or explicit beliefs towards either the 
exciting stimulus, or in forming the actions deployed in response to that stimulus.  
Moreover, such an account as a very minimum, must explain how, in the absence of 
an ability to identify a stimulus intentionally, the animal is able to detect emotionally 
stimulating objects and behave appropriately towards them.  
 
In the following paragraphs, I outline the approach I shall adopt in developing a the-
ory of primitive emotions: 
 
• Chapter 4 will examine a number of theories concerning the nature and action of 
emotion in animals. A key issue is identified when attempting to distinguish be-
haviours which entail emotional processes from those which do not: in making 
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this distinction, the behaviourist argument - that many of the ethologies dis-
played by animal species may be interpreted as reflexes, without recourse to the 
notion of affect - is contrasted with the view that primitive emotions play some 
role in the aetiology of more complex behaviours.  
 
As a first clarifying step in responding to the behaviourist challenge, the concept 
of homeostatic value is introduced and it is proposed that all animal species re-
spond to objects of homeostatic value, hence eliminating the notion of value as 
discriminating what is emotional from what is reflexive. Accordingly, it is pro-
posed that some other boundary criteria are required to distinguish those re-
sponses which entail emotional processes from purely reflexive responses.  
 
• Chapter 5 considers stimulus-response mechanisms lying below the emotional 
boundary in which an animal exhibits predatory and flight behaviours as a reflex. 
To demonstrate this effect, research into the ethology of toads is described, in 
which the behaviours exhibited may be expressed as the action of neurological 
mechanisms without recourse to the view that emotional processes play a role in 
the systems described. 
 
• In Chapter 6, two approaches for expanding the toad’s ability to detect and re-
spond to valuable stimuli are considered: the first assumes that the animal, as it 
evolves, is able straightforwardly to add reflex mechanisms in which each new 
stimulus is addressed directly by an appropriate response. This approach encoun-
ters difficulty in the increasing complexity inherent in selecting an optimal re-
sponse to multiple stimuli. A second approach, in which some mediating process 
enables multiple stimuli to be addressed by a single response, is found to sim-
plify the prioritization of responses in multi-stimulus environments.  
 
• Chapter 7 offers Panksepp’s account of basic emotions as candidate mechanisms 
for the mediating role proposed in Chapter 6.  Panksepp claims that a number of 
emotions are common to all mammals, and that they find their origins in a set of 
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subcortical mechanisms for mediating stimulus and response which are, by and 
large, both anatomically and functionally homologous in mammalian species. 
However, he claims that these basic emotional mechanisms are extensively con-
nected with higher cortical mechanisms entailing conscious processes; and be-
cause cortical development varies markedly across mammalian species, these un-
derlying emotional mechanisms, after processing by higher cortical processes, 
will exhibit broad variations between species, both in terms of the range of emo-
tionally motivated behaviours observed and the objects detected as valuable.  
 
In response to these findings, I have differentiated those aspects of Panksepp’s 
basic emotions which can be understood as spontaneous responses to external 
cues, arousing characteristic neurochemical and neurophysiological states (E-
states), functioning nonintentionally, as distinct from higher level mental pro-
cesses associated with emotion which Panksepp often describes as conscious. 
Each E-state consists of a brain mode, an impulse to behave and a set of muscu-
loskeletal and visceral conditions supportive of that behaviour. In order to arrive 
at an understanding of the role of these states in motivating the behaviours of 
mammalian species, I have advanced the notion of a primitive mammal with be-
haviours governed only by the action of E-states.  My intention will be to demon-
strate that a primitive mammal, motivated by E-states, will perform those func-
tions necessary to achieve homeostasis.  
 
• In Chapters 8 and 9, a set of E-states are described, corresponding to Panksepp’s 
basic emotions. Chapter 8 is dedicated to the description of SEEKING. The con-
cept of SEEKING - an emotion associated with the act of searching or foraging - 
is not one which would be generally acknowledged, and Panksepp’s description 
of SEEKING, both in terms of its sources of stimulus and its outcomes, requires 
separate explanation.  
 
In Chapter 9, six more E-states are described. Each description consists of a brain 
mode, having neurodynamic and neurochemical constituents, an account of the 
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physiologies characteristic of the E-state, and a description of the action impulses 
evoked.   
 
• Chapter 10 considers the role of unconditioned stimuli in triggering E-states. For 
each E-state it is proposed that several characteristic stimulus classes may exist 
which will directly activate a single E-state. 
 
• Chapter 11 reviews the role of conditioning in the acquisition of stimuli as a 
function of E-states, and in particular, fear. Cognitive scientists propose that the 
stimuli acquired by conditioning are not selected randomly but as a function of 
their attentional salience, introducing into the primitive emotional process the 
concept that for an object to be conditioned, it must, first, be subject to some pro-
cess requiring attention. 
 
• The function of attention in conditioning is reviewed in Chapter 12. A series of 
experiments are described in which a mammal is observed to attend preferen-
tially to and retain certain aspects of its environment, such as shape and move-
ment12, in the absence of emotion.  
 
Additional evidence is put forward in support of the view that the process of at-
tending and retaining object information is accelerated when the animal is in a 
state of SEEKING. I have designated such object information, when acquired, as 
passive rather than conditioned.  
 
From these observations I conclude that attention constitutes a separate function 
for acquiring and retaining object information in mammalian species which is ac-
cessed by the emotional process during conditioning. This information is further 
supported by research I shall cite in Chapter 17. 
 
 
12 That is, as a function of an object’s salience 
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• In Chapter 13, the relationship between E-states and their activating stimuli is in-
terpreted as one in which an E-state, together with its stimulus objects, consti-
tutes a realisation of a set of motivating principles, each of which may be ex-
pressed as a strategy for the achievement of homeostasis in mammalian species – 
a homeostatic imperative. According to this account, an object acquires its emo-
tion-arousing status by virtue of its membership of one of a set of stimulus ob-
jects, which are collectively described as a metastimulus. Each metastimulus is 
one of a class of metastimuli, each of which represents some generic challenge or 
opportunity for the wellbeing of the subject. To illustrate the role of a metastimu-
lus, I offer an outline schematic demonstrating the respective functions of uncon-
ditioned and conditioned stimuli, metastimuli, E-states and attention in primitive 
emotional processes. 
 
• Chapter 14 gives an account of mammalian behaviours in the presence of multi-
ple stimuli, which I attribute to the competitive action of E-state brain modes. 
This model is compared with the account of Panksepp, who proposes that multi-


















Chapter 4: Philosophical and Naturalist Theories of Primitive Emotion  
 
In his paper The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin proposes 
that emotions have arisen as the result of an evolutionary process. Darwin and his 
later followers were interested in expressions of emotion in men and other animals in 
which an exciting object will automatically generate the physical conformations and 
behaviours characteristic of an emotion13. For Darwin, the nature of emotions, which 
he regarded as characteristic physiologies, conformations and behaviours as opposed 
to thoughts, was not of primary interest; his goal was to extend his evolutionary the-
ory to emotional adaptation. Darwin was concerned with the existence of apparently 
emotional responses to certain types of stimuli, occurring both within and between 
species, which could be explained as common adaptive strategies for responding to 
those stimuli.  
 
This treatment of primitive emotions – as a set of inherited, predictable, species-wide 
responses to certain types of stimulus – exposes the Darwinist view of primitive 
emotions to a behaviourist objection. M.F. Meyer predicted:  
 
“Why introduce into science an unneeded term? [  ] I predict: the “will” has virtu-
ally passed out of scientific psychology today; the “emotion” will do the same”  
(1933 p.300). 
 
Behaviourists reasoned that if an ‘emotional’ response was evoked predictably by a 
stimulus, the concept that an emotion plays some role in instantiating that response 
becomes unnecessary. On this account, if rats respond predictably to foot shock by 
freezing, then that behaviour can (or will eventually) be explained as the outcome of 
some invariant neural mechanism connecting the detection of the stimulus to the mo-
tor outputs required for the response. The introduction of an additional concept ‘fear’ 
is unnecessary and potentially misleading, inviting us to seek for some neurobiologi-
cal state causing the emotion ‘fear’ where none exists. 
 




To avoid the behaviourist objection, more is required of primitive emotions as a spe-
cial class of mental states than that they generate invariant responses to certain types 
of stimulus. William James (1884) and Carl Lange (1885) proposed that emotional 
cognitions are evoked by ‘feelings’ - sensations which are caused as a consequence 
of the arousal of the physical (i.e. visceral and musculoskeletal) responses when a 
stimulus object is detected. The sequence of events as James and Lange describe 
them is disproved by later neuroscientific evidence, but a less specific contention 
that emotion may be determined by characteristic physiological changes can, in some 
respects be reconciled with Darwin’s view: both accept that emotions are associated 
with feelings but Darwin does not treat feelings as predictive of emotion in the man-
ner of James and Lange. Taking these two approaches into account, I offer this mini-
mally controversial statement about primitive emotions: 
 
Primitive emotions are inherited states of men and animals, arising automatically in 
response to certain classes of external stimuli. These states are associated with neu-
rophysiological alterations and behavioural impulses directed towards those objects.  
 
There are difficulties with this account. It seems reasonable to assume that humans 
associate the experiential quality of an emotion with certain types of musculoskeletal 
and visceral alterations in addition to the arousal of behavioural impulses, but, as hu-
mans, we have no warrant for attributing this correspondence to other species, leav-
ing us dependent upon observation of behaviour alone for our attribution of emotion 
to those species.  
 
The difficulty of attribution of emotion in other species remains unresolved in more 
recent texts. In his essay Primitive Emotions (2004) John Deigh proposes that a the-
ory of emotion should cover the fact that emotions are common both to humans and 
beasts. He does not propose that humans and beasts share the same set of emotions; 
rather he asserts that there exists a subset of emotions common to men and beasts 




In claiming that some emotions may be distinctively human, he cites shame as an 
emotion to which men are liable and beasts are not, but asserts that fear, anger and 
delight all have primitive forms found in other species. His view of the unique status 
of certain human emotions finds support in the views of modern Darwinists such as 
Ekman. They claim that facial expressions indicative of the emotions disgust or sur-
prise are found in humans, but while many other species appear to be surprised by 
unexpected stimuli, none appear to exhibit disgust. 
 
Deigh’s view is difficult to verify: if I am constrained to the observation of behav-
iour alone for the detection of emotion in other species, then it may be that there are 
species for which observation will not reliably detect the presence of emotion. To ex-
emplify, Deigh claims that the emotion ‘delight’ has a primitive form (2004 p.10) in 
both men and beasts but I do not believe I have ever observed a delighted fish. Now, 
this apparent conflict may have arisen from one of two sources:  
 
1. Deigh might have identified some outward expression of the emotion ‘de-
light’ in species such as fish which I have not, and hence feels able to attrib-
ute this emotion to all animals. 
 
2. The taxonomy of species which Deigh describes as ‘beasts’ does not extend 
to fish and, by implication, any other species which cannot express delight in 
a manner which he or I would recognise. (accepting that certain species ap-
pear to express delight). 
 
In proposing the existence of primitive emotions which are common to men and 
beasts, Deigh provides no evidence that the taxonomy of primitive emotions he has 
provided comprises the full spectrum of emotions which fall into this category, nor 
does he specify the set of species (excluding humans) to which these emotions can 
be reliably attributed, unless by the term ‘beasts’ he is referring to all animal species. 
But if this is the case, then the behaviourist objection pertains: if we are to think of 
all animals - even fish, insects and molluscs – as having primitive emotions, then it 
becomes increasingly difficult to assert with confidence that the behaviours of the 
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more ancient species such as molluscs or insects are the products of emotions rather 
than reflexes. 
 
This behaviourist objection is important for any theory of primitive emotions. If as 
Deigh proposes, there exists some boundary between the ‘higher’ emotions which 
are exclusively human and the primitive emotions which are shared by men and 
beasts, then to avoid the behaviourist objection, there must exist a second lower 
boundary between those beasts whose behaviours are attributable to the action of 
primitive emotions and those which exhibit only reflexive responses to stimuli.  
 
The higher boundary which Deigh proposes to lie between primitive emotions and 
exclusively human emotion is described by Deigh as ‘cognitive’. Deigh’s use of the 
word in this case denotes the existence of theories of emotion as experienced mental 
states, employing propositional attitudes. In previous chapters I have described how 
cognitive-evaluative philosophers such as Nussbaum and Lazarus argue that for both 
men and animals, emotion entails evaluation, requiring some manifestation of inten-
tionality towards the object of emotion, but Deigh, whilst concurring that cognitive 
emotional states are intentional, further claims that there exists a special ‘human’ 
category of intentional states of emotion which require that the subject has language.  
 
I do not intend to pursue this distinction; rather I wish to acknowledge the existence 
of a concept of emotion as a mental phenomenon requiring intentionality, which I 
have described as cognitive-evaluative, and to argue that primitive emotions com-
prise a different class of emotion which arise in the absence of intentionality. This 
distinction between the intentional and the nonintentional states represents the higher 
boundary of primitive emotion.  
 
My immediate purpose however, will be to establish the existence of a second lower 
boundary between behaviours which are evoked by primitive emotions, and behav-
iours which may be characterized as reflexive responses to stimuli. Such a boundary 
is required for just the same reason as the higher boundary between primitive emo-
tions and cognitive-evaluative emotions is required; the distinction between these 
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two processes cannot be established without a clear understanding of the particular 
nature and role of primitive emotions as contrasted with those which constitute eval-
uative processes. Similarly, the action of primitive emotions cannot be fully expli-
cated without identifying the differences between their nature and function and those 
of the reflexive stimulus-response mechanisms which can be explained straightfor-
wardly by behaviourist theory.  
 
My goal of establishing a lower boundary for primitive emotion in this manner might 
feasibly produce an outcome in which both primitive emotions and reflex behaviours 
are present in a single species - just as Deigh is able to attribute both intentional and 
primitive emotions to humans. Even if this were the case, the establishment of some 
criterion to distinguish between the emotionally-driven and the reflexive would not 
be fundamentally affected by my discovering that the distinction I am aiming to 
achieve lies between processes rather than between species.  
 
Defining this lower boundary therefore, could help me to identify a set of species 
which are subject (partially or wholly) to the action of primitive emotions, and to as-
sign a role for primitive emotion together with a taxonomy of primitive emotions to 
which those species are subject. This in turn should place me in a position to explore 
the extent to which primitive emotions can complement or inform more complex hu-
man emotions. 
 
The project as described is ambitious. I have already outlined the difficulties in as-
signing the action of emotion to animals by the observation of behaviour alone. It is 
only by examining the neural processes which drive these behaviours that there can 
be any prospect of distinguishing neurophysiological states which are emotional 
from those which are not. And even here a problem is apparent: given two neurobio-
logically defined processes for explaining the action of stimulus and response, it is 
not obvious how the emotional is to be distinguished from the reflexive. 
  
The argument which I shall provide for the existence and role of primitive emotions 
will rest heavily upon the notion that they provide a particular mode of response to 
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clusters of valuable stimuli. In order to develop this argument, it will be initially nec-
essary to introduce a concept of exciting stimuli as sources of homeostatic value for 
the responding animal. And having established homeostatic value as a common mo-
tivator for all animal species, I intend to investigate differences in the neurological 
mechanisms by which the detection of a homeostatically valuable object generates a 
response in amphibians as opposed to mammals. 
 
In elaborating these processes my intention will be first, to demonstrate that for an 
amphibian, the entire process by which a stimulus causes a response can be ex-
plained as a neurological algorithm, without recourse to the concept of emotion.    I 
shall contrast this account with that of stimulus-response processes in mammalian 
species, in which a set of intermediate neurobiological processes intervene to enable 
an animal to cope with an increasing complexity of stimulus and response and I shall 
argue that these processes, which I describe as primitive emotional systems, engen-
der brain states, physiological alterations and behaviours having attributes character-
istic of the physiological states of action preparedness which occur during emotional 
events. 
 
As a first step in the process I have described, I will propose that all animals are able 
to respond to objects of homeostatic value. 
  
4.1  The Concept of Homeostatic Value 
 
The sea hare, Aplysia Californica has a simple nervous system containing around 
20,000 neurons14. As Panksepp puts it: “In its journey from rock to rock, it uses an 
intrinsic behavioural strategy of reaching out and swinging from side to side in 
search of a new anchor point. In so doing, it exhibits a photoactic preference for 
darker rather than lighter environments.”  (1998 p.37) 
We can view the sea hare’s behaviour as a causal chain: 
 
14 An adult human central nervous system contains approximately 100,000 million neurons. 
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        (Light Intensity) → Neural Impulse → Swing Modification.  
I use arrows here to indicate the causal relationship between the elements described. 
For the sea hare, once some variation of light intensity is detected, the animal has no 
control over its subsequent behaviour.  
The sea hare undergoes a sequence of events by which a stimulus is identified, gen-
erating a state of the nervous system which causes a behaviour; it possesses two 
characteristics: 
• Each element of the chain is caused by the preceding element. No other order 
can occur. 
• Once the entire chain has been activated, all the elements act together. 
 
The sea hare’s response is the result of a connection between the identification of a 
stimulus (some gradient in light intensity) and a neural impulse which alters its 
movement, generating a single state of the organism.  The consequence of the sea 
hare’s behaviour is that in moving towards dark places it will improve its chances of 
survival. The behaviour of the sea hare is automatic, but its effects are likely to be 
beneficial for its wellbeing. 
As observers of the sea hare’s behaviour, we might reasonably conclude that it car-
ries a high risk. Undersea predators lurk in dark places and the sea hare’s flight from 
light places might often end badly. But the sea hare is an ancient creature and its sur-
vival as a species must, in part, be attributable to this behaviour, despite its occa-
sional failures, and so taken on aggregate across the entire species, the behaviour 
must have been beneficial – it must have had a value for the species. I would further 
propose that the behaviour constitutes an appropriate response to the light stimulus, 
but this raises an objection, I have already observed that fleeing to a dark place can 
be a dangerous strategy, in which case it would not be appropriate. 
Compare the sea hare’s behaviour to that of an octopus, which exists in a similar en-
vironment and hides in dark places: in its search for concealment it will deploy its 
eyes and tentacles, supported by a nervous system comprised of 500 million neurons 
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to select less hazardous locations as compared to the sea hare’s simple preference for 
dark places. The octopus’s more discriminating approach is achieved by the deploy-
ment of a vastly more extensive array of sensory and processing resources. The sea 
hare cannot choose where it hides with the same rate of success because it does not 
possess the same cognitive and motor resources as the octopus but the sea hare’s re-
sponse is effective when viewed in terms of its more limited resources and its persis-
tence as a species. 
To summarise: by ‘appropriate’ behaviour I am referring to some inherited species-
wide response which is, on aggregate, effective when viewed in terms of the percep-
tual, cognitive and motor resources available to individuals of that species. But, if an 
animal’s response can be understood as appropriate to the stimulus presented, the 
stimulus itself must address some goal or need of the organism which would render 
the response appropriate, and I propose that for all species, that goal is the achieve-
ment of homeostasis.  
 
Homeostasis is the persistence of some steady, balanced state of an organism; it may 
also be understood as the goal towards which its actions are directed. This drive to 
homeostasis has been taken by Neu from a description by Spinoza:  
 
“Each particular thing, interacting with other particular things within the common 
order of Nature, exhibits a characteristic tendency to cohesion and to the preserva-
tion of its identity, a striving (conatus), so far as it lies in itself to do so, to persist in 
its own being” (1977 p.72). 
 
 I amend this by adding “or to promote the propagation of its species.” 
 
As a result of its drive to maintain homeostasis, an animal will act when it detects an 
object of homeostatic value. By ‘homeostatic value’, I am referring to some property 
of an external object which might prove valuable for the well-being of the organism 




My concept of value here is limited to those objects in an animal’s environment 
which, if identified, are likely to promote or preserve the homeostasis of the subject 
or the persistence of its species. In this sense, it is valuable for a rat to be able to 
identify a cat and it is valuable for a cat to identify a potential mate. Viewed in this 
way, an object can be understood to have a value irrespective of whether that object 
offers a threat or an opportunity for the detecting organism. 
  
The theory of homeostatic value predicts that for any species there exists a set of ob-
jects having homeostatic value (HVOs). The configuration of sensory information 
generated by the HVO to which an animal is responsive is a stimulus, and if the ani-
mal displays an inborn response pattern to an HVO, the stimulus generated is de-
scribed by behavioural scientists and psychologists as ‘unconditioned’.  
  
Although I have described the activating stimuli as homeostatically valuable ‘ob-
jects’, the term may apply equally to an object, a relationship between objects (a con-
text), or an event (entailing changes in relationships between objects), any of which 


















Chapter 5 - Setting the Lower Boundary of Primitive Emotion 
 
Introduction 
In offering a concept of homeostatic value which is common to all animals, I have 
generated a potential difficulty for both cognitive-evaluative and primitive models of 
emotion. An ant exhibits a wide range of responses to objects of homeostatic value: 
inter alia, in nurturing its progeny, it ensures the survival of its species and in de-
fending its nest and its territory, it deters the threats of predators or competitors. If 
emotion consists simply of detecting and responding to stimuli with value for the 
subject’s (or its species’) wellbeing, the ant may be argued to undergo the emotions 
associated with nurturing and aggressive behaviours. 
 
Hence, the concept of emotion, if it is predicated only upon detection and response to 
value, potentially extends to all animals. Cognitive-evaluative advocates escape this 
challenge by requiring that emotion entails some apprehension on the part of the sub-
ject of an object’s value – some display of intentionality.  
 
The precondition of intentionality therefore, establishes a key criterion for cognitive-
evaluative emotion. But no such escape is available for a concept of primitive emo-
tion which I will argue is both cognitive and nonintentional - so that primitive emo-
tions arise in response to stimuli but in the absence of evaluation. 
 
In addressing this challenge, I will propose that primitive emotions, whilst arising 
nonintentionally, may be treated as cognitive because they are elaborated as a set of 
separate intermediary mental processes, allowing an organism both to acquire new 
stimuli and to respond flexibly to multiple stimuli. Such processes conform to the 
cognitivist condition I have stated previously, i.e.: “a class of mental processes by 
which the relationship between the subject and the external world is mediated.” (p. 
52)  
The difficulty with this project lies in identifying the boundary between primitive 
emotion and reflex. If an organism displays behaviours in response to stimuli, it is 
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unclear how an emotional behaviour is to be differentiated from a reflex. It may be 
argued, as I have, that emotional behaviours can be distinguished from reflexes by 
the complexity and unpredictability of responses and the abundance of stimuli de-
tected, but observations from complexity or behavioural unpredictability alone will 
not suffice to create the distinction I am seeking; it must lie in the mental process it-
self. For a reflex, the response generated must derive from the stimulus by means of 
some invariant neural mechanism, whereas for a primitive emotion, the neural path-
way between stimulus and response must contain some mediating process (or pro-
cesses) whereby the stimulus-response behaviour may be varied or expanded. 
In establishing the boundary between the emotional and the reflex, my first step will 
be to provide an example falling below that boundary. I will later contrast this simple 
set of stimulus-response behaviours with the operation of ‘basic emotions’ which 
Panksepp ascribes to the action of neural mechanisms in the mammalian subcortex. 
 
5.1  The Neuroethology of the Toad 
 
Jörg-Peter Ewert (1993) has carried out an extensive range of research into the neu-
rophysiological basis of stimulus-response mechanisms in amphibians. In the experi-
ments described here, toads were selected because they displayed low levels of ha-
bituation and hence would display naturally-occurring behaviours for extended peri-
ods. 
 
5.1.1 Stimulus-Response Characterisation 
A toad was placed in the centre of a circular platform. Cut-outs of various shapes and 
sizes could be attached to the platform periphery and rotated, traversing the visual 
field of the toad at a variety of speeds, or even in a stop/go motion. Under these con-
ditions it was observed: 
 
i) The toad would strike consistently at a horizontal bar moving parallel to its 
axis 
ii) The toad would ignore the same bar moving perpendicularly to its axis. 
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iii) The toad would retreat from a square shape moving horizontally. 
 
From this, it was concluded that to stimulate behaviour: 
 
1. The object must have a certain visual configuration; it must occupy a certain 
proportion of the toad’s visual field and be within a certain distance. 
 
2. The object must move within a range of speeds. 
 
3. The direction of movement – either horizontal or vertical to the toad’s visual 
orientation - was relevant but only when taken into consideration with (4) be-
low. 
 
4. The object is assessed for its horizontal or perpendicular extension relative to 
the direction of movement. 
 
5.1.2 Neurobiological Explanation 
In attempting to understand the neurobiological processes which were driving the 
toad’s behaviour, the researchers monitored the electrical activity of separate clusters 
of neurons in the midbrain and diencephalon which are activated simultaneously, fol-
lowing pre-filtering by retinal neurons. 
 
Each of the brain centres activated are sensitive to different combinations of configu-
ration and movement: certain neurons in the Optic Tectum (T5) register movement 
of objects extended parallel to the direction of travel (i.e. the orientation and the mo-
tion of the bar are the same). Conversely the neurons in the thalamus (TH) are sensi-
tive to movements of objects extended perpendicularly to the direction of travel. 
Both these modes of activation have been confirmed using EEG measurements of the 
brain centres under study. 
 




1. Strong activation 
2. Weak activation 
3. No activation 
4. Inhibitory (i.e they may inhibit the activity of other neurons) 
 
A horizontal bar-shaped object moving horizontally (see Diagram 5a. below) will be 
accepted by T5(1), and hence T5(2) receives excitatory information from T5(1). 
T5(2) may also receive inhibitory information from TH3 neurons if TH3 is also acti-
vated15. However, if TH3 is weakly activated, prey catching is released. This process 
is shown schematically below. In the diagram a visual signal ‘prey’ (horizontal bar 
moving horizontally), does not sufficiently activate TH3 and hence the prey capture 
behaviour is not inhibited.   
 
 
When the toad encounters an object extended perpendicularly to the direction of 
movement (Diagram 5b.), TH3 is strongly activated, transmitting an excitatory sig-
nal to TH4. However, in order to activate strongly, TH4 requires a second excitatory 
signal from T5(1) but because the object observed has minimal horizontal extension, 
TH4 is not activated beyond the threshold necessary to induce the toad to flee. 
Hence, for a moving vertical bar-shaped object, the toad displays no behaviour. 
 
15 This stimulus route is weakly activated because any real horizontal object as well as being horizon-
tally extended, must have some extension vertically. So the more a horizontal object is vertically ex-




In the final case (Diagram 5c.), the cue object is extended both horizontally and ver-
tically sufficiently to represent a predator, both T5(1) and TH3 are activated. TH3 in-
hibits T5(1) whereas T5(1) excites TH4 and this signal, together with a signal from 




5.1.3  Summary of Findings 
This account of the toad’s behaviour can be described in terms of a neurobiological 
process in which a stimulus is captured and interpreted, initiating a neural circuit 
which triggers a response. 
 
Taking this last notion first; the three explanations of behaviour in response to differ-
ent object shapes are automatic. The toad does not have to choose between predator 
and prey related behaviours, each option automatically excludes the others and all 
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options are products of an integrated analytical process. But the process also carries a 
‘failsafe’ mechanism: whenever the shape is vertically extended relative to motion, 
approach is inhibited so that a toad is prevented from striking at a prey [T5(2)] when 






Ewert’s experiments provide insights into a toad’s stimulus-response mechanisms.  
 
• First, for all toads, common responses to controlled stimuli at the same brain 
locations were recorded, providing support for the assumption that the toad’s 
system for processing visual information has arisen phylogenetically.  
 
• Second, the stimulus interpretation function is a single process occurring in 
two interlocked stages i.e. retinal pre-filtering, followed by analysis. It is the 
first stage of this two-stage process which has the function, (by selectively 
admitting movement/shape-related visual data) of discriminating the HVO, 
whereas the analytical network described by Ewert has the function of select-




• Third, the toad’s visual system is directed towards the normative characteri-
sation of HVOs in order to enable subsequent analysis and selection of be-
haviours in response to those objects. To be identified as an HVO, an entity 
must have movement and extension, both of which must fall within certain 
parameters in order to generate behaviour. Objects falling outside these pa-
rameters, even if they display movement, do not access the system. 
 
• Finally, the toad’s visual system (at least insofar as I have described it) seems 
to provide a straightforward answer to the problem of object discrimination. 
For the toad, valuable objects in the world are picked out by movement, 
proximity and extension; these are further sorted into particular combinations 
of motion and extension, triggering responses which are appropriate for the 
movement and shape detected.   
 
The foregoing account has been created without reference to the concept of emotion. 
We may, in observing the toad’s behaviour, conclude that it is displaying aggression 
toward a worm-like configuration and fear towards a predator-like shape but in at-
tributing characteristic feelings to these behaviours, we are introducing unnecessary 
entities into Ewert’s explanation by anticipating neurobiological mechanisms or phe-
nomenologies which have no experimentally verifiable foundation. 
 
In sum, in the case of the toad, the behaviourist objection is confirmed. 
  
The toad’s stimulus-response mechanism is fixed and its structure embodies a stimu-
lus-driven algorithm enabling it to extract three homeostatically valuable stimulus 
types from its visual field and respond appropriately to each.  Extension and move-
ment yield approximations of ‘predator’ versus ‘food’ - shadows of the world as we 
perceive it - and it is difficult to imagine how such a characterization could yield 




But I believe that the simplicity and rigour of the mechanism which the toad em-
ploys to register a stimulus and select a response is signalling an important aspect in 
the development of neural systems: for nonintentional mental states, an ability to 
pick out multiple stimuli having homeostatic value will inevitably necessitate an 
ability to choose automatically between those stimuli. Any animal able to respond 
involuntarily to more than one HVO with more than one behaviour must also possess 
the ability to select the correct response in the presence of any combination of those 
HVOs. And the necessity for some involuntary mechanism for choosing between 
competing stimuli is often an existential requirement.  
 
The toad is employing a retinal pre-filtering mechanism for stimulus characterization 
which is further analysed into one of three responses. Not only this, for a toad to 
choose to strike at a worm when a predator is present constitutes an incorrect sur-
vival choice and the animal is ‘pre-programmed’ to prevent this option (Diagram 
5c.). Hence the toad’s interpretative mechanism can be understood as a computa-
tional algorithm with two functions: 
 
I. To provide homeostatically appropriate responses to three shape/movement 
combinations. 
 
II. To select the most appropriate response when competing stimuli are present. 
 
Understood in this way, the limitations of an algorithmic ‘stimulus-response’ mecha-
nism become apparent: a ‘toad-type’ mechanism in which HVOs are selected simply 
on the basis of movement and extension does not allow for a precise characterisation 
either of predator threats or of prey selection and hence carries a high probability of 
failure, favouring evolutionary innovations which provide the ability to discriminate 
a greater range of HVO’s. But the more stimuli an animal is able to respond to, the 
greater the likelihood that an animal will be confronted at any given moment by mul-





Chapter 6: Contrasting Reflexive and Primitive Emotional Models 
 
I have proposed that the toad’s chances of survival would be improved by its having 
an ability to respond to many more stimuli with an appropriate behaviour. But the 
task of generating dedicated responses to a broader range of stimuli than those ad-
dressed by the toad’s neural mechanism presents challenges. In particular, those 
challenges arise in selecting the optimum response when confronted by combinations 
of stimuli. 
 
Imagine an amphibian with a neural structure similar to that of a toad which, rather 
than having an ability to respond to three stimulus types with three behaviours, could 
in responding to n stimuli, generate n dedicated behaviours, and when confronted by 
any combination of two of these stimuli simultaneously, would select and prioritize 
the most appropriate response. On this assumption then n stimulus-response pairs 
would require the ability to prioritize (n-1)(0.5n) combinations. It may be noted here 
that by opting for pairs of stimuli, I am adopting the simplest option. I have not con-
sidered the much more complex algorithms which would result from a prioritization 






As the amphibian evolves, it acquires new stimulus-response mechanisms but to ac-
commodate this expansion, the animal’s ability to prioritize between pairs of stimuli 
must increase geometrically so that, say, for sixty stimulus-response mechanisms, 
the animal must be able to prioritize between c.1800 stimulus-response pairs. 
 
The ‘enhanced amphibian’ project faces additional obstacles: the ability to pick out 
more HVOs may well require a corresponding enhancement of any or all of its per-
ceptual faculties. Toads do not appear to discriminate objects16: rather, they appear 
able to identify a moving shape as a two-dimensional form within certain parameter 
sets, and once that shape has been picked out, the response appears uniform. In order 
to distinguish more objects, some perceptual enhancement would be required 
whereby features of a moving shape could be selected which would enable the toad 
to achieve greater differentiation between shapes, 
 
In summary: it would be valuable for the toad to discriminate large numbers of stim-
uli – particularly predators and prey – but the ability to identify stimulus A, as well 
as demanding enhanced perception, critically requires the animal to respond appro-
priately to that stimulus in the presence of other stimuli, and this might entail re-
sponses which are not those prompted by stimulus A. To achieve an optimum re-
sponse, each stimulus-response entity must be integrated into neural excitatory/inhib-
itory networks with other stimulus-response entities in order to achieve the appropri-
ate prioritization for homeostasis. 
 
The evolutionary project I have described is challenging but not impossibly so. It 
may well be that animals exist with the ability to identify and respond spontaneously 
to many more stimuli than the toad and to prioritize those stimuli effectively, even at 
the cost of increasing complexity of prioritization; but a possible simplification of 
 




this programme exists: observation of core mammalian behaviours17 suggests that 
relatively few response classes will suffice to accommodate a much broader diversity 
of stimulus type. Behaviours are constrained in this way because the existence of 
land-based animals is conditional upon their compliance with a number of criteria 
imposed upon species by the natural environment afforded by this planet: 
 
• to persist beyond a single generation, they must reproduce successfully and in 
sufficient numbers to guarantee replacement. 
• as water-based organisms, they must consume water.  
• to grow and move, they must find and consume nutrients. 
• to survive adverse climates, they must find shelter. 
• in carrying out these activities, they must avoid threats. 
• to pursue these activities successfully, they must resist constraints upon these be-
haviours. 
 
The taxonomy of behaviours I have emphasised above need not be comprehensive, 
my intention is only to demonstrate that for any behaviour there may be many more 
valuable stimuli in an environment than there are behaviours required to address 
those stimuli appropriately18. 
 
I return now to the enhanced stimulus response model based upon an amphibian: as-
sume that, for the amphibian, behaviour R1 is appropriate for detection of odours of 
predators A and B; assume further that some other behaviour R2 is appropriate for 
food stimuli C and D, then the optimum behaviour may only be selected by means of 
a neural mechanism by which A, B, C and D are paired with their responses in a 
computational network, permitting only the optimum response to occur. On this ac-
count, if the enhanced amphibian is assumed to be driven by reflexes, the neural 
 
17 I have taken these behaviour types from Panksepp’s Affective Neuroscience. They represent a 
number of basic responses to stimuli in mammalian species which are inborn and can be understood 
separately from behaviours acquired throughout the lifetime of the animal by means of operant 
conditioning or learning.  
18 To exemplify: for any number of nutrients, there need only be one consummatory behaviour and 
for any number predators, there need only be one flight behaviour. 
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structures required to select the optimum response between multiple stimulus-re-
sponse pairings would not be simplified by its responding to multiple stimuli with a 
limited set of behaviours. (See Diagram 6b. below) 
 
In view of the limitation of response types, a natural step for reducing the complexity 
associated with the process of prioritizing multiple stimuli would be to permit di-
verse stimuli to trigger a single response, a behaviour which is appropriate to that 
stimulus group. But to gain advantage from this step, something important must oc-
cur: the process which allows the subject to prioritize the most appropriate behav-
iour can no longer be an invariant mechanism in which a stimulus evokes a fixed re-
sponse; rather that stimulus must activate an intermediate neural entity. It is this in-
termediate entity which will both evoke the designated behaviour for that stimulus 
group and represent the stimulus when arising in competition with alternative inter-
mediate entities supporting different behaviours which provide optimum responses 
for other stimulus groups.  
 
To exemplify: an animal will evoke response R1 in the presence of the odour of pred-
ators A or B. But the simplification implicit in this development entails a loss of 
ability to discriminate behaviourally between these stimuli19, so that if the animal 
were confronted simultaneously by A and B, it would be unable to prioritize its re-
sponse to these two stimuli. In effect, this is of secondary importance for the ani-
mal’s wellbeing; what is important is that the animal should flee upon the detection 
of either stimulus.  
 
I will assume now – just as in the example previously offered for the amphibian - the 
mammal is also offered two food stimuli, C and D inviting the consummatory re-
sponse R2.   I will now assume that for the mammal, there exists some intermediate 
neural entity, E2, capable, not of comparing stimulus-response mechanisms, as per 
 
19 In making this distinction, I am assuming that the paired stimuli have equal intensities. I will 
demonstrate in chapter 14 that in the case of the presentation of multiple stimuli at different inten-




the amphibian, but rather acting as a comparator of behaviours – and that for A and 
B there exists a similar neural entity, E1.  The determination of the optimal response 
to four stimuli is achieved by a single comparison E2↔ E1 in which E1 is dominant, 
suppressing E2 and inhibiting behaviour R2. (Diagram 6c.) 
 
 
Summary: The Lower Boundary of Emotion - Reflexive and Primitive Emotional 
Models 
 
The contrast I have drawn above constitutes the basis for a claim that the ‘enhanced 
amphibian’ model is one in which a stimulus will automatically trigger a response 
and hence would conform closely to Lazarus’s description of a behavioural process 
as ‘reflexive’, whereas I have proposed that the mammal is able to activate some in-
termediate neural entity which is able both to generate a behaviour and prioritize be-
haviours in the presence of multiple stimuli. Such a mental entity, acting inde-
pendently of the stimulus, could provisionally be described as conforming to my ear-
lier definition of ‘cognitive’.  
I intend to argue that the intermediate mental states characterised by E1, E2 are brain 
modes corresponding to primitive emotions and that the lower boundary of emotion 
can be understood as existing between those behaviours which follow reflexively 
from a single stimulus type and those behaviours which are the outcome of a brain 
mode which may arise in response to multiple stimuli. The evidence I have presented 
thus far is insufficient to support this claim. On the face of it, the ‘brain modes’ I 
have presented as primitive emotions might be components of a more elaborate and 
extensive stimulus-response mechanism. 
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To establish the intermediate brain modes represented by E1, E2 as cognitive, a much 
richer range of function must be attributable to these conditions than the ability to 
prioritise responses. The evidence I will present will draw upon the research of neu-
roscientists and ethologists into the behaviour of mammalian species. I will demon-
strate that primitive emotional states, inter alia, promote the acquisition of valuable 
stimuli throughout the lifetime of the animal and are able to represent the salience of 
emotional stimuli in the strength of response instantiated.  
My intention is to present the functions of primitive emotion as nonintentional and 
cognitive, so that in responding to existing stimuli and acquiring new stimuli, the an-
imal may do so nonintentionally. In introducing this possibility, I shall not challenge 
the cognitive-evaluative argument that animals may also evoke emotional states 
through intentional processes. But even in the absence of intention I will argue that 
primitive emotional systems provide viable and complex mechanisms for the detec-















Chapter 7: The Neurobiological Foundations of Primitive Emotional Systems 
7.1  Introduction 
In his work, Affective Neuroscience, Jaak Panksepp provides evidence that some spe-
cies possess a set of neurobiological mechanisms which will evoke characteristic re-
sponses to the identification of valuable objects. He claims that these mechanisms - 
neural systems originating in the subcortex or proximate brain locations, sometimes 
characterized as the limbic system – are basic emotions, common to all mammalian 
species. He offers this explanation for the existence of the feelings associated with 
these states: 
“Feeling states may have been a neurosymbolic way for the brain to encode, in rela-
tively simple fashion, intrinsic values for the various behavioural options that are 
open to an organism in a specific situation” (1998 p.183) 
By restricting my account to the emotional states of mammals, I do not assert that 
similar subcortical affective states are not found in other species - there is good evi-
dence that birds also exhibit affective neurologies. However, as my purpose is to ex-
amine the role of emotion in human thought processes, Panksepp’s claim that sub-
cortical affective systems exhibit homologies in mammalian cerebral anatomy allows 
me to review the action of emotions at this shared mammalian level in the light of 
the expression of human emotional states as described by psychologists and philoso-
phers. 
Research available from neuroscience and behavioural science supports a view of 
primitive emotion as providing a core mental architecture for mammals; it provides a 
set of elementary responses to objects or events of importance for the wellbeing of 
the subject, whilst enabling the animal to adapt during its lifetime, both in terms of 
the range of stimuli it is able to discriminate and the responses it is able to generate. 
 
The action of these core affect systems requires a good deal of explanation. In re-
sponse to this challenge, Chapters 8 to 14 pull together the results of scientific re-
search into the causes and effects of subcortical affect systems, expressed as both 
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neurobiological states and behaviours, with the object of incorporating these ac-
counts into a model for the action of primitive emotions which can usefully be com-
pared with the cognitive-evaluative accounts described previously. To do this, a 
methodology is employed in which scientific research into the action of affect in 
mammals is progressively expanded from a description of a set of subcortical neural 
systems into an account of primitive emotions as brain states able both to access and 
direct perceptive, memory and motor centres. 
 
It could be argued that the account I am about to present strays too far into the 
realms of cognitive science and that my purpose might be equally served by chal-
lenging the philosophical theories of emotion previously discussed using individual 
counterexamples from primitive emotional theory. This approach could be effective 
in contesting the view that emotion is exclusively evaluative. However, my aim here 
will be to create an account of primitive emotion from the findings of cognitive sci-
ence which is internally consistent and can serve not only as a tool to challenge some 
of the views of philosophers working in the field of emotion but, more importantly, 
may be understood as a separate account of emotion, functioning in parallel with - 
and interacting with - emotion as a cognitive-evaluative phenomenon.  
 
My approach to presenting this research will be as follows: 
 
1. It will initially be necessary to pick out from Panksepp’s account of basic 
emotions those aspects which represent primitive emotional states. Panksepp 
uses the term ‘basic emotions’ to indicate the class of affective states he has 
identified. But, in addition to describing the action of basic emotions as auto-
matic responses to environmental stimuli, Panksepp’s account incorporates 
claims regarding the action of these affective states in higher processes of 
cognition, and I shall argue that these higher cognitions can be treated sepa-
rately from the action of basic emotions at a subcortical level.  
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2. I will propose that these subcortical mechanisms conform to the outline re-
quirements contained in my earlier description of the role of primitive emo-
tions as neural states which mediate between stimulus and response, and I 
shall offer a much fuller account of their action.  
3. A range of primitive emotions will be elaborated in which a number of dis-
crete neurobiological systems - acting and interacting automatically to instan-
tiate a number of physiological states and behaviours - can be understood as 
accounting for primitive mammalian behaviours without appeal to the notion 
that the subject animal is acting intentionally.  
The requirement for the notion of a primitive mammal is driven by neurobiological 
and psychological accounts of mammalian ethology which indicate that for mammalian 
species, primitive emotional states may be subject to regulation by later-evolving 
mental processes. These higher functions tend to mask – to a greater or lesser extent 
– the action of emotions at the subcortical level. The concept of a primitive mammal, 
therefore, provides a theoretical construct for revealing the collective action of primi-
tive emotions independently of these controlling brain functions. It takes as its prem-
ise the notion that each emotion is activated by its own range of characteristic stimuli 
in which stimulus, brain mode and response comprise a ‘primitive emotional sys-
tem’. The collective action of the full range of primitive emotional systems, when 
conceived as operating independently of other mental states, provides a framework 
of basic responses to environmental threats and opportunities which enable a mam-
mal to survive and flourish.  
 
7.2 The Existence of Subcortical Homologies between Mammalian Species. 
 
In Paul MacLean’s ‘triune brain’ theory (Kral 1973), the brain is viewed as a layered 
structure, progressively established by an evolutionary process whereby the earliest 
stratum, consisting of the spinal column and basal ganglia (which still constitute the 
entire executive function of the reptilian brain), is succeeded by the elements of the 
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limbic system (emotional type systems) arising in ‘paleomammalians’ with the more 
recent development of the cortex to be found in ‘neomammalians’.20 
 
Commenting upon MacLean’s theory, Panksepp observes: “Considerable evolution-
ary diversity has been added by species-typical specialisation in the higher brain ar-
eas as well as lower sensory motor systems [ ], but [ ] the basic affective value sys-
tems deep within ancient recesses of the brain appear to be reasonably well con-
served across mammalian species.” (1998 p.303).  
Panksepp provides evidence that the cortex does not have an executive function in 
more primitive mammalian species; these key functions are provided by sub-cortical 
systems. According to this account, the primary behavioural functions of mammalian 
brains are emotionally-driven and located at a subcortical level, and it is this level of 
function which I attribute to a primitive mammal. Higher brain functions regulate the 
effects of emotional systems, hence protecting the animal from the potentially dan-
gerous extremes of behaviours induced by primitive emotional drives. 
 
 
7.3  Basic Emotions and E-states 
 
Panksepp provides extensive neurobiological evidence for the existence of a number 
of basic emotional mechanisms in causing mammalian behaviours as diverse as for-
aging, rage-induced, fear-induced, sexual, caring (maternal), distress, play and pred-
atory aggression, but Panksepp makes additional claims for the interaction of these 
subcortical systems with neocortical emotional processes, which I will exclude from 
my explanation of emotion as ‘primitive’. 
 
In choosing to treat basic emotions at the subcortical level, I am aware that I have 
chosen to by-pass a very important element of Panksepp’s conception: that is, I am 
ignoring for the moment the existence of an extensive network of neural circuitry for 
 
20 Deacon (1990) has provided a more extensive and nuanced commentary. 
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exchanging information between these subcortical mechanisms and higher brain 
functions. Panksepp has a good deal to say with respect to the action of basic emo-
tions in higher cerebral processes which he argues are often evoked as conscious ex-
pressions of emotion. I do not dismiss these observations; rather, I am hoping pres-
ently to develop a more structured model of the relationship between subcortical 
emotions and the cognitive-evaluative accounts of emotions as appraisals – accounts 
which are recognised in Panksepp’s text. 
 
In order to clarify the distinction between Panksepp’s basic emotions and the set of 
subcortical states which I intend to characterize, I will designate these core emo-
tional states using the term of art ‘E-state’ and I list below Panksepp’s description of 
the properties of basic emotions (1998 p.49) each presented with my own observa-
tions either contrasting or comparing those properties with that of the corresponding 
E-state.   
 
1. “The underlying [emotive] circuits are genetically predetermined and de-
signed to respond unconditionally to stimuli arising from major life-challeng-
ing circumstances.”  
 
• The term ‘life challenging’ is potentially misleading, perhaps implying 
that basic emotions arise only in response to threats or situations of peril. 
A study of Panksepp’s text shows that this was not his sole intention21. I 
believe my definition of a homeostatically valuable object provides a bet-
ter fit with his concept of a stimulus. Other than this, Panksepp’s descrip-
tion accords with that of an E-state. 
 
2. “These circuits organise diverse behaviours by activating or inhibiting motor 
subroutines and concurrent autonomic-hormonal changes that have proved 
 
21For example, Panksepp’s account of the action of hunger as a homeostatic regulator (1998  
p.170-177) demonstrates that a rat may forage and eat, well before its wellbeing is threatened by 
loss of bodyweight.  
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adaptive in the face of such life-challenging circumstances during the evolu-
tionary history of the species.” 
 
• My notion of an E-state extends beyond Panksepp’s concept of a basic 
emotion inasmuch as it encompasses the characteristic brain mode and its 
associated physiological and behavioural manifestations.  
 
3. “Emotive circuits change the sensitivities of sensory systems that are rele-
vant for the behavioural systems aroused.” 
 
• Here Panksepp is describing an aspect of the neurophysiological response 
of the organism to an emotional stimulus. (See also Mackintosh, Tolman, 
Vuilleumier and Driver)  
 
4. “Neural activity of emotive systems outlasts the precipitating circum-
stances.” 
 
• My interpretation here is simply that E-states arise as a chain of neural 
events, but once aroused, each link continues to function, creating a state 
of the entire animal. Panksepp does not clarify here that withdrawal of the 
HVO will lead to the abatement of a basic emotion. But while the se-
quence in which the S-O-R chain arises is predetermined, withdrawal of 
the HVO may cause behaviour to cease, while physiological arousal often 
persists. 
 
5. “Emotive circuits have reciprocal interactions with the brain mechanisms 
that elaborate higher decision-making processes and consciousness.”  
 
• Panksepp makes many allusions to the interaction between ‘emotive cir-
cuits’ and brain mechanisms which regulate the action of those circuits. I 
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accept that such mechanisms exist, but my purpose here will be to estab-
lish the extent to which Panksepp’s emotive circuits (which I call brain 
modes) together with the behaviours and visceral states which they 
arouse, are able to account for much of the behaviour of simpler mamma-
lian species – those with less cortical development.  
 
The difference between our explanations reduces, more or less, to this: Panksepp 
views the subcortical affect mechanisms he has identified as a component of a much 
wider range of mental activity which he describes as basic emotions - processes en-
tailing high levels of ‘reciprocal interaction’ with higher brain function - whereas I 
am attempting to identify the nonintentional elements of basic emotions which I will 
argue are realised in the operation of these subcortical mechanisms. 
 
By adopting this approach, my intention is to investigate the extent to which E-states 
are able to account for the ability of primitive mammals to address a wide range of 
cues with appropriate behaviours, without resorting to the action of Panksepp’s 
‘higher decision-making processes and consciousness’ as explanation. 
 
My model of an E-state, therefore, is a subcortical system in which a stimulus has 
aroused a characteristic state of the animal, consisting of a brain mode, a set of vis-
ceral, sensory organ and musculoskeletal conditions, supporting a disposition22 to be-
have in a particular manner – all acting together so that they collectively describe the 
entire condition of that animal. My concept of a primitive mammal takes as its prem-
ise the notion of a mammal, driven only by the action of E-states, being the physio-
logical and neurobiological states of the animal necessary to deliver an appropriate 
response to the stimulus detected. This state will persist as long as the stimulus is 
 
22 Rather than ‘a disposition to behave’ it would have been simpler to use the word ‘behaviour’ here, 
but my explanation will demonstrate that although a primitive mammal upon entering an E-state 
will normally instantiate a behaviour automatically, that behaviour is sometimes withheld as a result 




present, and a primitive mammal is completely dependent upon the action of these 
states for the determination of its behaviour.  
 
The notion of a primitive mammal may be closer to reality for some mammalian spe-
cies than might be imagined: much of the ‘higher level’ regulation of emotional be-
haviour in mammals is controlled by the cortex. In order to test the effect of cortical 
function, Panksepp allowed his students to observe the behaviour of two rats, one of 
which had had its cortex removed:    
 
“asked to observe two animals one normal and one decorticate, [the students] typi-
cally mistook one for the other. This arises from the fact that decorticates are more 
active, while the normal animals appear more timid [  ] The ability of such decorti-
cate animals to compete effectively with normal animals during bouts of rough-and-
tumble play is further testimony to the likelihood that internal self-coherence is sub-
cortically organized” (1998 p.308) 
 
None of the actions of a primitive mammal is intentional: an animal enters into an E-
state without possessing any mental apparatus to intimate that it might, at some other 
time, have been in some other state. 
 
A primitive mammal in any one of these states conforms to the requirements of Put-
nam’s probabilistic automaton (1975) in which the description of the automaton’s 
operating system can apply to the realisation of any one of a range of discrete states 
(in this case E-states). Putnam’s automaton is able to shift between states in response 
to changes in sensory inputs, and each state, when active, will generate a characteris-
tic motor output, so that, for example, a primitive mammal stimulated by the pres-
ence of its offspring x into caring behaviour, ‘a’, is in a different neurophysiological 
state A, to state B, when that same animal exhibits stalking behaviour, ‘b’, towards 




An E-state arises as the result of a brain process in which a stimulus generates a be-
havioural response. In Diagram 7a. ‘Stimulus-Response Chain’ presents a fixed se-
quence of mental and physical events in which a homeostatically valuable object is 
detected, giving rise to a characteristic brain mode which in turn instantiates behav-
ioural and physiological responses appropriate to the homeostatically valuable ob-
ject. This diagram depicts the order in which each element activates the subsequent 
‘linked’ element. A good way to think of this is as a train with carriages, each linked 
to the next by a length of chain. As the engine begins to move, a certain length of 
time is required for each chain to tension. This period constitutes a transitional state 
but once each chain is under tension, the train and the carriages move synchronously. 
When all elements are operating synchronously, the resultant state of the system is 
an E-state. This phase of arousal will take much less than a second to work through.  
 
 An animal which is in the throes of stimulus/response arousal cannot be understood 
to be in any state23; rather it is undergoing a process of transition between E-states. 
The lower Diagram in 7a. represents, not a chain of causality, but a neurophysiologi-
cal state of the animal in which all elements of the stimulus-response chain are acting 
 
23 One way to understand this condition is by the term ‘reaction time’ – the time it takes for a hu-
man to perceive a threat and act upon it. In this period, it is difficult to characterise our thoughts and 
behaviour as being in any particular state because they are in transition; our brain processes have 
not worked through to selecting the action appropriate to the external threat.  
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collectively. The interaction of all these elements is an E-state. This state will persist 
as long as the stimulus is present. 
7.4  E-states and Primitive Emotional Systems 
E-states have a much broader role than that of effecting a response to an uncondi-
tioned stimulus. As will be demonstrated, the findings of researchers such as Le-
Doux (1996, 2000), Mackintosh (1975, 1976), Dickinson (1980) and Olds (1977) – 
all of whom have analysed mammalian behaviour in response to an array of stimuli - 
confirm that the outputs of an E-state are not limited to the triggering of visceral and 
motor functions; they may extend inter alia to the acquisition of stimuli by condi-
tioning and the modification of behaviours by operant conditioning. These effects are 
complex for any particular E-state but in Chapters 10-13 I intend to provide evidence 
that the relationship between E-states and their activating stimuli can be expressed as 
a set of general principles:  
1. An E-state can be understood as acting as a proxy for any one of its initiating 
stimuli so that the stimulus will evoke some E-state, having a nature and an 
intensity which represent an appropriate behavioural expression towards that 
stimulus as it is presented. 
2. An E-state, when activated by some inborn process of stimulus identification 
in response to an unconditioned stimulus, may cause the subject to discrimi-
nate and retain associated, but previously affect-neutral, cues as conditioned 
stimuli, with the effect that the neutral cue will subsequently activate that 
same E-state in the absence of the unconditioned stimulus. By this process a 
single E-state may become activated by an increasing array of unconditioned 
and conditioned stimuli. 
3. In the presence of multiple stimuli, the different E-states aroused will each 
tend to displace the other in a bid to control the behavioural outcome, and it 
is both the nature and the intensity of each E-state which will determine the 
likelihood of a particular E-state-induced behaviour occurring24.  
 
24 Although the ability of any given E-state to ‘out-compete’ another will, in part, be a function of its 
intensity, the competitive process is biased as to the nature of the E-state aroused. In general, aver-




The evidence I will provide will demonstrate that E-states may cause an animal to 
detect and respond to stimuli in a complex and unpredictable manner. An E-state, 
when aroused by an unconditioned stimulus, will act as the core mechanism for the 
capture of associated neutral stimuli (conditioning) or compete with other E-states in 
the presence of multiple stimuli. Seen from this perspective, any treatment of E-
states which discusses these states independently of their arousing stimuli is likely to 
have a limited explanatory power. In consequence, my approach to investigating the 
action of individual E-states will first be to describe the neurobiological evidence for 
a particular state and subsequently to furnish that description with an account of the 
relationship between the E-state and its arousing stimuli, the entirety of which I shall 
term a primitive emotional system. 
 
7.5 Primitive Mammalian Ethology as a Product of the Action of E-states 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 will explain the ethology of a primitive mammal as the product of 
primitive emotions acting separately and collectively. Following this account, I will 
extend my description to include the categories of stimuli which will activate a char-
acteristic E-state, in which the response to a stimulus is mediated by the E-state brain 
mode.  
 
It might be objected that primitive emotional systems as I will describe them carry 
little significance for philosophical theories of affect, but I hope to demonstrate that 
the range and action of these emotional processes, in conjunction with their associ-
ated stimuli, provide a rich and diverse explanatory substrate of affect systems which 
motivate and influence emotional appraisals. 
 
 
foot shock will immediately cease playing or eating. These relationships are not fixed: a hungry rat 





In his taxonomy of basic emotions, Panksepp uses upper case lettering to indicate 
each emotion (e.g. RAGE). This measure is intended to encourage us not to take too 
narrow a view of the word by regarding it as a simple behaviour or as any single in-
termediary process which might cause that behaviour, but rather as the combination 
of neurological and physiological states that precede and accompany rage-induced 
behaviour. I will continue to use this method of indicating the separate subcortical 
affect mechanisms when referring to corresponding E-states 
 
A closer examination of each class of emotion reveals that they may contain some 
important sub-classes. For example, Panksepp provisionally includes ‘predatory ag-
gression’ as a sub-class of RAGE, whereas it appears to be a neurobiologically dis-
tinct class of affect. Again, some emotions such as CARE appear to be compara-
tively late evolutionary arrivals, tending to find their origins in earlier emotional pro-





















Chapter 8: SEEKING – Panksepp’s ‘Goad without a Goal’ 
 
Panksepp’s identification of SEEKING as an emotional state alongside more gener-
ally accepted forms such as FEAR and RAGE is controversial and in view of some 
unique aspects of this primitive emotion and its effects, it will open my explanation 
of primitive emotional types.   
 
The emotion SEEKING is associated with two very different stimulus types: first, it 
is aroused by homeostatic imbalances such as hunger and thirst which I describe as 
urges. Second, and more controversially, SEEKING is associated with the detection 
and passive acquisition of unfamiliar objects. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I will describe the stimulating effects of the onset of 
physical urges in the arousal of the SEEKING emotion. 
 
8.1  Urges 
  
Urges as I shall describe them here are not E-states, rather they describe a fairly nar-
row class of neurobiological states of the organism which arise unbidden and in-
crease in intensity if the homeostatic imbalances they signal remain unaddressed.  
Other words have been used to describe these phenomena: I have not used ‘desires’ 
because desires may be generated intentionally; ‘impulse’ is, I think, not quite right: 
it carries too much of a sense of the actions required to correct the homeostatic im-
balances which these conditions signal. The sort of things I have in mind here are in-
ternally-arising stimuli such as hunger, thirst, a need for warmth and the urge to re-
produce. My intention here is to describe how these urges arise and to explain the 
roles they play in triggering SEEKING.  
127 
 
In selecting hunger, thirst and thermal balance as a class of stimulants for an organ-
ism25 Panksepp is able to locate the circuits and neurochemical processes which gen-
erate these conditions. He details the neurological processes which register the pres-
ence of homeostatic imbalances (locating their function primarily in neural pathways 
found in the hypothalamus). 
Much of the evidence provided by Panksepp in his account of urges relates to the 
ability of specific brain processes which act to control energy supplies in the body 
both in the long and short term, and the behaviour which issues from these processes 
- the seeking and consumption of nutrients; I will briefly describe these processes as 
paradigmatic for the action of urges more generally. 
From this research, Panksepp concludes that there exist mechanisms in the brain 
which normalise fat reserves by the generation or suppression of the urge to eat. He 
identifies the joint action of these two mechanisms by investigating the comparative 
neurologies of normal rats with that of rats which are genetically disposed to obesity 
- cases where appetite suppression does not occur. 
 
From this evidence, he argues that the mechanisms which control feeding behaviour 
fall into one of two types: 
 
1. The brain detects circulating nutrients and correlated substances in the blood 
and adjusts feeding accordingly. 
 
2. The brain itself sustains an ongoing energy-dependent integrative process 
that simulates bodily processes and adjusts feeding in response to its own lo-
cal energy transaction mechanisms. 
 
Panksepp believes that both these mechanisms are continuously active.  
 
25 Panksepp also identifies LUST (i.e. the sexual drive) as an urge causing the subject to seek a mate 
(SEEKING) but treats it separately.  He further speculates that sexual drives and behaviours are the 
evolutionary precursors of maternal behaviour (CARE) 
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The critical (but not the only) location in the brain for controlling weight is the ven-
tromedial hypothalamus (VMH). The VMH has metabolic properties which distin-
guish it from other brain systems. It is the only system to have insulin sensitivity, en-
abling it to monitor and control a long-term signal of body energy status, whilst local 
measurement of VMH energy levels may generate a signal to suppress feeding dur-
ing repletion states.  These VMH signals have a small sustained effect on eating be-
haviour, rather than acting summarily to terminate any single meal. This means that 
a rat may indulge in short bouts of opportunistic gluttony without impairing its long-
term optimum metabolic function. 
 
Taken as a whole, this complex system of hunger-inducing/inhibiting states chal-
lenges the assumption that in the presence of food, a rat will always eat; or that it 
will eat the same amount of food whenever the opportunity presents itself. And 
Panksepp argues that there are cases in which a rat would not eat at all26.  
 
The act of eating therefore does not occur predictably in response to the presence of 
food, or its associated stimuli, but is the outcome of a number of complex long-term 
and short-term brain processes which make the animal more or less responsive to 
food-related stimuli. Despite this complexity, the urge to eat is expressed as a single 
impulse; it is as if all the factors involved in causing hunger have come together to 
operate a single dial, which can be turned up or down in response to an amalgama-
tion of short-term and long-term requirements. 
 
8.2  SEEKING 
In identifying hunger, thirst and thermal balance as motivating drives, Panksepp lo-
cates the ‘circuits’ or neurochemical processes which generate these states. He out-
lines the interaction between bodily imbalances and the neurological processes 
which register their presence and describes how such neurobiological imbalances act 
upon other motivational brain systems (Diagram 8a.).  
 
26 Apart from longer-term VMH controls and short-term satiety controls, a rat that has experienced 




According to Panksepp’s account, the drive to satisfy our bodily needs cannot be un-
derstood as a response to external stimuli but arises as a consequence of homeostatic 
imbalances. If urges arise as the result of the detection of internal homeostatic imbal-
ances, then this creates a potential argument against my concept of a primitive mam-
mal able to function without access to intentional cognitive processes: if, in 
Panksepp’s account, an animal is driven by urges to eat/drink/find shelter, the valua-
ble objects necessary to satisfy those urges (nutrients, water or shelter) need not be 
present; and for a primitive mammal, there is no necessary relationship between the 
fact that, say, it is hungry now and the fact that there are sources of nutrition else-
where in this world which could satisfy that hunger.  
And even if we were to assume that for each primitive mammal, some inborn mental 
faculty existed with the function of representing the goal object for each urge, it 
would serve no obvious purpose in assisting the animal to locate that object in its ab-
sence. However, Panksepp has identified a basic emotion which prompts an animal 
to forage in response to urges: so, if I am thirsty, my thirst acts as a general foraging 
stimulus and SEEKING is the E-state supporting this foraging behaviour; so that - as 
it were –  the foraging animal carries its thirst around with it, with the effect that 
when it encounters water, a separate consummatory behaviour is initiated in which 
130 
 
the animal will detect and consume water and receive a reward - the pleasurable sen-
sation of consuming water when one is thirsty. In this way the emotional state 
‘SEEKING’ can be understood as bridging the spatiotemporal gap between having 
an urge and satisfying that urge. In this manner, an urge is carried into the presence 
of those objects which will satisfy it.  
 
8.3  Panksepp’s Evidence for a SEEKING E-state 
8.3.1 The location and action of the LHSS neural pathway  
The brain locus of the SEEKING system consists of a bundle of transhypothalamic 
circuits arising in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and extending forwards to the 
nucleus accumbens. Panksepp notes that electrical stimulation of this area evokes an 
energized forward motion and sensory arousal. He characterises this pathway as the 
Lateral Hypothalamic SEEKING System, or LHSS (See diagram 8a. above).  
 
 
The LHSS pathway (originating at point DA in Diagram 8b. to indicate that this core 
system is dopamine activated) is able to instantiate purposeful responses to homeo-
static imbalances. In the simplest case, the LHSS tract acts as an engine which can 
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be activated by a range of urges, thereby sustaining the organism in foraging27 activ-
ity in the absence of the ‘goal’ object. Viewed more extensively, Panksepp offers the 
LHSS as the brain’s core motivational system, functioning independently of the 
urge-satisfying objects which it serves to locate. Such a concept constitutes an im-
portant hypothesis, not just for cognitive science but for any exploration of mental 
function. 
  
8.3.2  Neurochemical effects associated with the arousal of SEEKING 
 
The core LHSS system is associated with the action of dopaminergic28 neural sys-
tems in the core (subcortical/limbic brain systems) including the amygdala and can 
extend to areas of the frontal cortex. Panksepp notes that norepinephrine and epi-
nephrine also play a modest facilitatory role. These neurochemical effects cause the 
characteristic sensory arousal associated with the SEEKING state, and if the sought-
after object is located, they trigger the release of neurotransmitters involved in con-
summatory behaviours.  
 
8.3.3 Electrical Stimulation of the SEEKING Response: Two Experiments into the 
action of the LHSS 
  
i) The Effect of Electrical Self Stimulation of the LHSS pathway 
Taking LHSS activation in its most basic form, Panksepp describes an experiment in 
which the LHSS may be electrically stimulated to activate the SEEKING behaviour: 
“If one presents the animal with a manipulandum, a lever that controls the onset of 
brain stimulation (by electrical stimulation of the LHSS), it (the rat) will readily 
learn to press the lever and will eagerly continue to ‘self stimulate’ for extended pe-
riods, or until physical exhaustion and collapse set in. The outward behaviour of the 
animal commonly appears as if it is trying to get something behind the lever. This is 
not the kind of behaviour one sees when animals are either pressing levers to obtain 
 
27 I will explain subsequently how the foraging activity is shaped to locate specific goal objects. 
28 Dopamine specific or dopamine-related mechanisms 
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conventional rewards or when they are actually engaged in consuming them. (1998 
p.145) 
 
It will be noted that the only reward the rat receives for self-stimulation of the LHSS 
is a further spate of forward, eager movement. The urgency of the rat’s movement is 
combined with an arousal of the senses. In Diagram 8c. above, I have attempted to 
represent the operation of the self-stimulation process. The onset of stimulation is 
characterised by the increase in dopamine levels along the LHSS pathway.  As the 
level of this neurochemical diminishes, the animal will self-stimulate by pulling a 
lever, suggesting that this activity is preferred to a passive state. 
ii) External Electrical Stimulation of the LHSS Pathway 
Panksepp’s concept of an undifferentiated LHSS process is founded in the failure of 
attempts of other experimenters such as Valenstein (1973) 29 to discover discrete cir-
cuits in the lateral hypothalamus for specific homeostatically valuable goal objects; 
 
29  Valenstein’s experiments in the 1970’s were prompted by the behaviourist notion that each urge-
related behaviour (e.g. eating, drinking, thermal balance) could be tracked backwards via a dedi-




to exemplify: according to Valenstein’s hypothesis, a particular neural strand of the 
lateral hypothalamic pathway would be concerned with the sensing and consumption 
of water, with another guiding the location and consumption of food. This did not 
prove to be the case: “ what these researchers did, quite simply, was to study ‘stimu-
lus bound’ eaters, drinkers and gnawers after they took away each animal’s pre-
ferred goal objects, while leaving two other goal objects available throughout pro-
longed periods of intermittent electrical stimulation of the brain [that is, at the same 
hypothalamic location]. By morning, most animals had shifted to another behav-
iour.” (1998 p.153)  
 
In summary he notes:  
 
“The experiments indicated that the hypothalamic motivational system that was acti-
vated when animals exhibited distinct behaviours was non-specific. The lateral hypo-
thalamus apparently mediated some process other than the specific behaviours ob-
served.” (1998 p.153).  
 
In Valenstein’s experiments, electrical brain stimulation (ESB), in which the lateral 
hypothalamic pathway was stimulated remotely, caused animals to ‘latch on’ to any 
goal object available, and the stronger the ESB signal, the more rapid and vigorous 
the switch between goal-directed behaviours became, causing Panksepp’s rebuttal of 
the behaviourist argument for separate motivational pathways directed toward spe-
cific homeostatic goals.30  
 
8.4  Discussion 
This evidence supports the hypothesis that the LHSS is a multi-purpose motivational 
mechanism rather than a bundle of neural circuits, each dedicated to instantiating 
separate HVO-directed behaviours (i.e. for hunger, thirst etc..).   
 
30 “if there were many systems coursing through the LH, one would have predicted that a movable 
electrode could be repositioned into different sites to yield different motivational behaviour as it 
passed through different neural systems. In fact, a single animal tended to show a single behaviour in 




If the onset of SEEKING is occasioned by a homeostatic imbalance, its conclusion is 
signalled by what Panksepp describes as ‘consummatory behaviours’. These behav-
iours commence when the SEEKING behaviour – the eager anticipatory forward 
movement, and sensory arousal - brings the animal into the proximity of an urge-sat-
isfying object. When such an object is detected, behaviour will normally change31. 
For a predator, it may entail stalking and predatory aggression, and for rats, the dis-
covery of food will be preceded by a different, more leisurely approach behaviour, 
licking and/or manipulating the food prior to eating, which are accompanied by neu-
rochemical changes in the brain which reward the subject for its achievement and 
terminate the SEEKING state. 
Panksepp acknowledges that SEEKING has characteristics which distinguish it from 
other emotions. SEEKING acts as the core motivational system for any primitive 
mammal – ‘a goad without a goal’- explaining the apparently objectless but purpose-
fully directed activity which we associate with foraging in many species. He ob-
serves that most emotions arise and subside quickly, whilst SEEKING is ‘tonically 
engaged’ – that is, an animal will persist with SEEKING behaviours for extended pe-
riods, whereas the other animal emotions appear to be relatively short-lived.  
In sum, the SEEKING E-state has as its stimuli a number of urges, signalling home-
ostatic imbalances which are detected and transmitted to the LHSS via a network of 
interoceptors (sensory receptors which transmit information within the body). The 
neurodynamic action of the LHSS, when activated, will cause sensory and psycho-
motor arousal and bring the animal into a purposeful forward motion, whilst the re-
lease of dopamine, epinephrine and norepinephrine will generate a feeling of antici-
pation which is associated with this activity. 
 
Panksepp’s account of SEEKING as an emotion is one of a set of commonly occur-
ring stimulus/response mechanisms observed in mammalian species which he as-
 
31 Brain neurochemistry is also altered. 
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cribes to the action of basic emotional mechanisms, collectively forming a neurologi-























Panksepp describes SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR and PANIC as the “major ‘Blue Rib-
bon, Grade A’ emotional systems of the mammalian brain.” (Panksepp p52).  
Of these systems, I have dedicated a good deal of space to the explanation of SEEK-
ING because it describes an important emotional process which would not be imme-
diately recognisable to most readers. It connects our physiological urges to the be-
haviours which satisfy those urges and I will demonstrate (Chapter 12) that its occur-
rence is associated with the passive acquisition of information, as opposed to the ac-
quisition of cues by classic conditioning. In these respects, SEEKING differs from 
Panksepp’s other basic emotions.  
 
FEAR and RAGE are emotions which are comparatively straightforward to charac-
terize as neural mechanisms and have causes and effects which are commonly ob-
served and understood. However, Panksepp’s inclusion of PANIC as a ‘blue ribbon’ 
emotion is less easy to accept. According to Panksepp’s account, PANIC is one of a 
cluster of later-evolving emotions, including maternal care and play, which find their 
origins in the neural circuitry and neurochemistry of early reptilian sexual behaviour. 
These later-evolving states drive various aspects of socialisation amongst mamma-
lian species. 
 
Panksepp devotes a substantial part of Affective Neuroscience to elaborating these 
emotional mechanisms and it is the very quantity of this information which presents 
a dilemma for the writer of a thesis such as this: I intend to argue that the primitive 
emotions which Panksepp describes are not peripheral to our everyday experience of 
emotion, but central to it. I also intend to argue that primitive emotions act - and can 
be understood as acting - in the absence of intentionality. My dilemma is this: if I 
simply assert that such neuroscientific explanations of emotion exist and share the 
general characteristics of E-states, I am open to the very reasonable objection that I 
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have not explained how, say, FEAR, RAGE and LUST are realised in separately ex-
plicable neural mechanisms which conform to those characteristics. However, if, in 
responding to this challenge, I embark upon a full explanation of the differences be-
tween E-states, I am committed to providing a precis of Panksepp’s lengthy account, 
which perforce must be one of neuroscience, being neither appropriate for this thesis 
nor necessarily of interest to philosophers.  
 
The approach I have determined upon therefore, will steer a course between these al-
ternatives. In the following pages, I intend to compress and tabulate Panksepp’s evi-
dence for the existence and action of the basic emotions in terms of their neural cir-
cuitries (neurodynamics), their neurochemical constituents and the somatovisceral 
and behavioural effects evoked, and I will present these components in the form of a 
particular E-state, supported by sufficient reference for the reader to explore the neu-
roscience more extensively if necessary. 
 
I am conscious that in providing this highly abridged version of Panksepp’s work, I 
am omitting many of the important details of his explanation, particularly in the field 
of neurochemistry. Here is Panksepp’s description of one of the effects of oxytocin:  
 
“at modest levels, brain oxytocin appears to help cement social bonds that may be 
the foundations for future reciprocities and ‘friendships’ while excessive activity 
may lead to social aloofness. One thing modern neuroscience has revealed is that 
the brain is full of apparent puzzles and paradoxes, and that logic is not as good a 
guide to knowledge in the natural sciences as careful observation!” (1998 p.231).  
 
Any close examination of Panksepp’s text will leave no doubt that brain chemistry 
can be complex and sometimes rationally perverse, but it is equally apparent from 
his account that emotional pathologies can be treated successfully or ameliorated by 
inducing alterations to brain chemistry by the selective employment of the neuro-
chemicals which Panksepp identifies as being associated with states of emotion; to 
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exemplify: if I suffer from chronic anxiety, it is possible by the administration of Di-
azepam to modify, not only my anxious state of mind, but also the things I tend to 
think about. 
 
In sum, while there is little doubt that any primitive emotion is associated with the 
complex but incompletely understood action of characteristic arrays of neurochemi-
cals which promote the functioning of certain neural pathways and inhibit the action 
of others, there is equally little doubt that such neurochemistries are central to the di-
rection and tone of our emotional activity. 
 
But this evidence alone is insufficient for understanding primitive emotions as pro-
cesses. Just as I have proposed that physiological urges are specific stimuli for 
SEEKING, hence completing my account of SEEKING as a primitive emotion, I 
will propose that each E-state is evoked by a certain class of stimulus, employing ev-
idence from cognitive and behavioural sciences. It is this combination of stimulating 
phenomena, together with their characteristic E-states, which explains the role of 
emotion as mediating the relationship between the animal and its environment.  
 
In this way, I hope to demonstrate that E-states act in a manner which would allow a 
primitive mammal to acquire and behave appropriately towards an array of external 













Table 9(i)                    FEAR 
Neural Pathway Neural Schematic 
“These are in the lateral and central 
zones of the amygdala, the anterior 
and medial hypothalamus and, most 
clearly (and at the lowest current lev-
els) within highly specific PAG areas 
of the midbrain. Of course this highly 
connected network interacts with 
many other emotional [   ] especially 
RAGE circuits, as well as the behav-
iourally nonspecific chemistries of 
the brain such as norepinephrine 
and serotonin.” (1998 p.208) 
 
Characteristic Neurochemistry E-state Schematic 
The action of neurochemicals which in-
hibit the transmission of fear signals are 
better understood than those which pro-
mote them. Panksepp identifies the 
presence of Benzodiazepine (BZ) recep-
tors along the FEAR pathway described 
above. These receptors promote GABA 
binding, hence inhibiting the transmis-
sion of FEAR impulses along the path-
way. However, it has been demonstrated 
that in the absence of these inhibitory 
neurochemicals, the FEAR system is not 
‘tonically’ (continuously) engaged. And 
the search for neurochemicals which 
arouse FEAR has produced a number of 
candidates such as kainic acid, CRF, α-
MSH, ACTH and CCK – all of which will 
generate specific FEAR-associated re-
sponses – has as yet produced no all-
purpose FEAR generating agent, of the 
type provided by Diazepam in reducing 
FEAR symptoms. (1998 p.217-219) 
 
 
Behavioural Manifestation Physiology 
Flight, ‘freezing’, elimination, startle, 
vigilance 
 
Rapid heartbeat, sweating, respiratory changes, gastro-






Table 9(ii)                     RAGE 
Neural Pathway Neural Schematic 
The core brain circuitry for the RAGE E-
state originates in the medial amygda-
loid areas and runs downward through 
the stria terminalis to certain locations 
in the periaqueductal gray (PAG). The 
system has an organisation in which 
aggressive ‘higher brain’ impulses 
evoked from the amygdala are critically 
dependent upon the involvement of 
lower brain functions for their effective-
ness, whereas the lower regions are 
able to instantiate RAGE states without 
the involvement of the amygdala. (1998 
pp.193-198) 
  
Characteristic Neurochemistry E-state Schematic 
The neurochemistries associated with 
RAGE are not well understood cur-
rently, although Substance P, a neuro-
peptide, is thought to be a regulator of 
states associated with RAGE-type 
states. Despite this limited understand-
ing of the states which promote RAGE, 
a wide variety of drugs are found to 
combat aggression by promoting the 
generation of neurochemicals such as 
oxytocin, oestrogen and progesterone, 
GABA, stimulating the opioid systems 
of the brain. All these neurochemicals 
are associated with non-aggressive 
emotional activity and hence compete 




Behavioural Manifestation Physiology 
RAGE-induced behaviours vary be-
tween species; in humans RAGE is 
characterised by a wish to lash out at 
an aggressor and to raise one’s voice 
but in cats the state it is more complex, 
consisting of body arching, piloerection, 
tail lashing, snarling, spitting and teeth 
baring.  
Physiological responses involved in RAGE in-
clude raised pulse and blood pressure, in-
creased temperature and a general state of sen-
sory arousal together with a decreased sensitiv-





Table 9(iii)                              CARE 
Neural Pathway Neural Schematic 
The neural pathways for maternal behav-
iour are located in the dorsal preoptic 
area (POA) and the ventral bed nucleus 
of the stria terminalis (VBN) situated 
above the location evoking male sexual-
ity. These cells control nurturing behav-
iour in both females, and to a lesser ex-
tent in males. Neural pathways emerge 
from the POA/VBN into the ventral teg-
mental area (VTA) which activates mater-
nal behaviour in the presence of oxyto-
cin. Pathways from the POA/VBN also 
extend into the septal area (S), the peri-
acqueductal gray and the habenula 
(HAB). (1998 pp.253-254) 
 
 
              Affective Neuroscience (p 254) 
 
Characteristic Neurochemistry E-state Schematic 
“The brain chemistry of female nurtur-
ance has been associated with the gen-
eration of oxytocin. However, oxytocin 
alone does not cause maternal behav-
iour. Early experiments confirmed that 
“the elimination of peripheral oxytocin 
did not eliminate subsequent maternal 
behaviour” “ (Panksepp p251)  
“To get a robust effect from oxytocin infu-
sions into the brain, females need to be 
primed with injections of oestrogen [  ] fi-
nally and quite perplexingly, oxytocin is 
only effective if animals have been habit-
uated to test chambers for a few hours 
but not if they have been habituated for a 
day or more. [  ] well established mater-
nal behaviour no longer requires brain 
oxytocin arousal.” (1998 p.252) 
 
 
Behavioural Manifestation Physiology 
Nest building/preparation; keeping the 






Table 9(iv)    PANIC (Separation Distress) 
Neural Pathway Neural Schematic 
The PANIC system originates 
close to the pain response 
system in the midbrain peri-
acqueductal gray (PAG) and 
may have evolved from that 
system. It extends from the 
PAG to the preoptic area via 
the bed nucleus of the stria 








mote distress vocalisation in 
young animals are CRF (Corti-
cotropin releasing factor) and 
a number of glutamate recep-
tor stimulants (particularly 
those acting on kainite and 




Behavioural Manifestation Physiology 
Distress vocalisation, lachri-
mation, panic attacks. lassi-
tude 
 
Appetite loss, depression, breathlessness. Long 
term separation causes an inability to interact 








Table 9(v)               LUST 
Neural Pathway Neural Schematic 
Two major brain locations are involved in 
the differential control of male and female 
sexual behaviours, the medial preoptic 
area (POA) and the ventromedial hypo-
thalamus (VMH). The POA is enlarged in 
males and promotes sexual competence, 
whereas the VMH is more influential in 
promoting female sexual receptivity. The 
POA is more central to the generation the 
sexual behaviour than in generating socio 
sexual activity. For this reason, sexually-
experienced male rats with lesions to the 
POA will seek access to receptive females 
but will not mate. The systems operate in 
part by activating the sensory input chan-




Characteristic Neurochemistry E-state Schematic 
Male: The medial preoptic area of male 
rats contains testosterone receptors, acti-
vating sexual activity at maturity. In other 
species DHT (dihydrotestosterone) recep-
tors are also active in arousal. (1998 pp. 
231-236) 
 
Female: hormonal changes associated 
with egg fertility cause gradual rises in 
oestrogen, succeeded by a rapid rise in 
progesterone which prepare the female 
brain for heightened sexual receptivity. 
(1998 pp.236-242)  
Behavioural Manifestation Physiology 
Male:  Approach, erection, copulation 
 
Female: Proceptive behaviours,: decrease 
in aggressiveness towards sexually 
aroused males. Active solicitation of male 
attention (proception): sensitization of fe-
male copulatory reflex ‘lordosis’ (1998 
p.239) 
 
Male: Urge to copulate associated with 
VMH arousal (causing SEEKING-type be-
haviour for mate). Genital excitation: 






Table 9(vi)             PLAY 
Neural Pathway Neural Schematic 
The PLAY system is incompletely under-
stood as a neural mechanism. The 
baseline form of play in mammals is 
‘rough and tumble’ play (RAT) which is 
initiated via somatosensory contact. In 
rats, it may be induced by dorsal con-
tact and in human infants by tickling. 
Panksepp observes that when this so-
matosensory information enters the 
thalamic projection areas specific moti-
vational effects are found: “At that 
level somatosensory information di-
verges into the specific thalamic projec-
tion areas of the ventrobasal nuclei that 
project discriminative information up to 
the parietal cortex and into nonspecific 
reticular nuclei [  ]that seem to elabo-
rate a ludic motivational state within 
the animal.” (1998 p.291) 
 
 
Characteristic Neurochemistry E-state Schematic 
Owing to the limited understanding of 
the PLAY system, it has been difficult to 
identify the neurochemistry of that sys-
tem definitively. A wide variety of neu-
rochemicals will inhibit play including 
oxytocin, CRF and nicotine agonists - as 
do high levels of opioids. Conversely, 
moderate doses of morphine promote 
playful activity. Many of the inhibitory 
effects observed may be caused by the 
neurochemical arousal of competing 
emotional circuits, which suppress play-
ful motivation. (1998 pp.293-294) 
 
 
Behavioural Manifestation Physiology 
Solicitations to play via physical contact 
followed by rough and tumble play. 
High frequency chirping (rats), laughter 
(humans) (1998 pp.287-289) 
 
Open-mouth displays are a common prelude to play in 
humans (laughter), chimpanzees and dogs, 50Khz 
chirping in rats 
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Notes regarding the PLAY E-state 
In my tabulation of characteristics of the PLAY E-state (p.144), I have specified two 
stimulus types - somatosensory contact and/or the presence of a young member of 
the same species. I do this because the neurology associated with PLAY is insuffi-
ciently characterised and in its absence Panksepp has employed the robustness of the 
stimulus-response relationship to infer the existence of a PLAY brain mode. To es-
tablish this relationship, Panksepp has studied and measured the incidence of ‘rough 
and tumble play’ in rats, normally commencing when the rat is twenty days old (see 
Chapter 14, Diagram 14b.). In this research, Panksepp has established a clear pattern 
of response to a particular class of stimulus. 
 
Panksepp’s attempts to trace the circuitry of the PLAY brain mode from the soma-
tosensory stimulus to the behavioural impulse fail due to the number and diversity of 
brain locations aroused in both the subcortex and the cortex. In order to simplify this 
process Panksepp has also compared the play behaviour of both normal and decorti-
cate rats; he notes: “even though decortication does not eliminate play, it seems 
clear that play has powerful effects on the cortex [ ] one of the adaptive functions of 
juvenile play may involve programming various cortical functions.” (1998 p.291). 
 
In sum, Panksepp has identified a play behaviour which is reliably aroused by a so-
matosensory stimulus and may be observed to vary reliably without cortical inter-
vention, and he has observed the frequency and content of PLAY behaviour as a 
function of subject age, social isolation and neurochemical state. He concludes that 
while such play functions are predictably aroused and entail routine behaviours, 
rough and tumble play is too complex to be explained as the product of reflexive 
brain functions, and indeed, even when subjected to detailed examination, the brain 
circuits engaged are presently too complex to isolate. He nonetheless infers that the 
robustness of the core stimulus-response relationship must be the result of the action 
of subcortical circuitry (an E-state brain mode) whilst postulating that this mode may 





Chapter 10 - Primitive Emotional Stimuli 
 
Introduction 
In describing E-state brain modes separately from their arousing stimuli or their be-
havioural and physiological effects, my aim has been to represent these mental phe-
nomena as mediating the relationship between an object of homeostatic value and the 
behaviours aroused as responses to that object. In this way, I have prepared the 
ground for the concept of classes of stimuli, having homeostatic value, each of which 
arouses a particular E-state. To exemplify: in my explanations of SEEKING and 
PLAY, I have already introduced two particular stimulus/E-state relationships: 
SEEKING is aroused by physiological urges, whereas PLAY is aroused by ‘same 
species’ somatosensory stimulation. 
 
The combination of stimulus and E-state constitute a primitive emotional system. If 
the arousing stimulus is unconditioned, then the entirety of the system is encom-
passed by the stimulus and its E-state, and it is this type of system that I will initially 
describe.  However, cognitive science provides a good deal of evidence to support a 
further claim that the emotional states aroused by certain classes of unconditioned 
stimuli promote the acquisition of neutral cues by a separately instantiated but con-
nected neural process, described as conditioning.  
 
In my investigation of the conditioning process, my aim will be to demonstrate that a 
very extensive range of homeostatically valuable cues may be acquired by a primi-
tive mammal during its lifetime, without resorting to the notion that the animal has 
intentionally acquired that information, or is aware that such a process is occurring.  
In order to produce this explanation, it will initially be necessary to review the find-








 10.1 Unconditioned Stimuli 
 
10.1.1 RAGE-Inducing Stimuli 
Moyer (1976) has identified seven classes of aggressive behaviour in mammals: 
  
1. Fear-induced aggression (the ‘cornered animal’) 
2. Maternal aggression (a mother protecting her offspring) 
3. Irritable aggression (local irritation not sufficient to induce flight) 
4. Sex-related aggression (in the presence of sexual stimuli) 
5. Territorial aggression (same-species) 
6. Predatory aggression (attacking/killing prey) 
7. Inter-male aggression (rutting) 
 
Panksepp’s view of these multiple expressions of mammalian aggression is that they 
can be simplified further into three classes of response: 
a. Classes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 evoke the basic emotion RAGE.  
b.  6 and 7 are instantiated as brain modes other than RAGE. Predatory 
aggression appears to derive from an adaptation of the consummatory 
behaviour which succeeds SEEKING, whereas the circuits which 
Panksepp attributes to intermale aggression seem to be more closely 
aligned to male sexual neurodynamics and neurochemistry. 
 
In the first five classes, the circumstances described are unconditioned stimuli induc-
ing RAGE-like behaviours in which the response is evoked spontaneously.  
 
I will provide an example of a RAGE-induced behaviour of this type; a colony of 
meerkats, when they attack members of a distant but adjoining territory, do so for 
motives which are resistant to explanation as the outcome of rational processes ac-
cessible to the species. To account for such a behaviour as the outcome of an inferen-
tial process would entail that members of the defending group were able to judge that 
the opposing group had committed some territorial incursion. This appraisal would 
entail a notion of a territorial boundary enclosing an area of land, which would, in 
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turn, be informed by some apprehension of the long-term necessity for the preserva-
tion of the limited sources of nutrients within that boundary for the wellbeing of the 
group. To argue, as Solomon has, that emotions are: “subjective engagements with 
the world” entailing “complex sets of aspirations, expectations, evaluations, needs, 
demands and desires” (2004 p.77), moves us no further forward in this attempt to 
understand how it comes about that one group of animals will defend a territory 
against an adjacent group of the same species. 
 
In sum, the RAGE-inducing stimuli which cause resistance to territorial incursions 
may have homeostatic value, but it is a value which does not appear to be manifested 
as the outcome of an inferential process. Panksepp believes that the original RAGE 
motivation was a reaction to physical constraint in which a highly aggressive (‘cor-
nered animal’) response could be successful32. He speculates that through a process 
of species adaptation, the RAGE behaviour33 has proved to be an effective response 
to a wide range of constraints. According to this account, each of the various classes 
of RAGE-inducing stimuli described by Moyer are detected by some inborn mecha-




32 Panksepp notes that newborn infants will exhibit RAGE behaviours if their arms are held down for 
a short period. 
33 I have previously described the effects of electrical brain stimulation (ESB) of the RAGE pathway in 
which electrical activation of RAGE circuits ‘downstream’ from the mechanisms of stimulus interpre-
tation would evoke a single RAGE physiology and behaviour. 
149 
 
10.1.2  FEAR-Inducing Stimuli  
 
Panksepp believes that there are inborn, fear-inducing stimuli native to each species. 
For example, humans have an inborn fear of dark places, approaching strangers, sud-
den movements and (less certainly) snakes and spiders, whereas rats fear well-illumi-
nated areas, open spaces and predator odours. These are what I shall term targeted 
stimuli. Targeted stimuli activate some inborn interpretive process which is able reli-
ably to identify some attribute of an HVO, triggering a FEAR-type behaviour.   
 
But I will advance the notion that there exists a second, general-purpose class of 
FEAR-arousing stimuli which I shall term blind stimuli; the term refers to a stimulus 
which causes the animal to respond in the absence of stimulus information. I provide 
a fuller explanation of each class below. 
 
I. Targeted  Stimuli 
 
In the case of a blind stimulus, the subject is able to respond without identifying the 
stimulus object34, whereas for a targeted stimulus, an animal must possess an inborn 
mental paradigm of some class of homeostatically valuable objects, which enables it 
directly to discriminate objects of that class, causing FEAR-associated behaviours. I 
provide two examples of this stimulus type: 
 
i) A vervet monkey will generate three call types in response to snakes, air-
borne raptors or cat-like species, each of which will cause other monkeys 
to adopt behaviours specific to the avoidance of that particular predator. 
 
ii) If rats are placed in an environment which has been treated in some way 
with predator odour (either cats or ferrets have a similar effect) they will 
display a FEAR response equivalent to that displayed for foot shock. Any 
detected level of odour will evoke high levels of aversive response.  
 




II.     Blind Stimuli 
 
Contact 
The senses, whilst being limited with regard to the nature and bandwidth of cues 
which they are able to detect, display responses which are a function of the raw in-
tensity of the sensory input within those limits. So that in the case of touch, the skin 
contains a number of contact-sensitive receptors dedicated variously to the detection 
of stroking, pressure, stretching or vibration, but the skin also contains a particular 
set of receptors (nociceptors) able to register intense pressure such as a blow or a bite 
or pricking – sensations we would describe as painful (Kandel, Schwartz, Jessell) 
(2000 pp.411-470) tending to induce FEAR or perhaps RAGE (as irritation). 
 
Taking the action of pressure upon the skin as registered by two receptor types35 we 
can predict that there will be some very slight pressure at which the organism will 
register contact and some higher level of pressure (such as a pinprick) at which noci-
ceptors are activated, causing the organism to act aversively. Early behavioural sci-
entists would designate these two phases as thresholds: the lower threshold would be 
the lowest intensity at which a sensory stimulus is detected and the higher threshold 
would activate aversive behaviours. But this is an incomplete account: between the 
initial registering of a contact and the aversive threshold, there may be an increasing 
tendency to react - and even beyond the aversive threshold, increasing intensity may 
cause a progressively robust response.  
 
The aversive responses I have described for skin contact apply also for sight and 
hearing: Both senses, whilst acting as conduits for light- and sound-encoded infor-
mation, also display a variable response to raw stimulus intensity, so that white noise 
and white light, being states carrying no information, have ‘initial detection’ and 
‘aversive’ thresholds corresponding to levels of intensity. 
 
35 Merkel disc receptors will register lower pressures whereas mechanical nociceptors will register 
sharp pricking pain 
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White Light and Noise 
 
I will describe the findings of experiments by Campbell (1957,1969) and Whishaw 
(1974) to illustrate the effects of white noise and white light upon rats. 
 
i) Noise 
Campbell carried out two sets of experiments; the first designed to determine the 
lowest threshold at which a rat was able to detect white noise transmitted within nar-
row bands of frequency, and the second was aimed at determining the level at which 
the sound induced an aversive drive, causing the rats to move from the noisy cham-





Whishaw studied rat’s aversion to light (1974). The study began by assessing the be-
haviour of groups of normal rats when given the choice between a well-lit chamber 
and a chamber in relative darkness. The group as a whole strongly favoured the 
poorly-lit chamber. Whishaw subsequently attempted to locate the source of this 
aversion by testing smaller groups of rats with brain lesions to the cortex. None of 
these lesions caused any significant change in the ‘J curve’ structure response to 
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light (below) indicating that the behaviour was rooted in some subcortical region. 
We could expect that if rats displayed no reaction to light intensity, they would 
spend 50% of their time in either chamber, whereas in the experiment, they spent 




Campbell (1969) had earlier performed a similar set of experiments in which light 
levels were varied between two chambers and the preferences of Sprague-Dawley 
rats for each chamber were assessed: 
 
• When both chambers were at minimal but highly differentiated illumination 
levels (e.g. 0.03 vs 0.46 foot candles - an intensity change of c.15) rats pre-
ferred (74%) the lower levels of illumination but the preference was rela-
tively low) 
• When light intensities were increased to high but minimally differentiated 
levels (e.g. 300 vs 450 foot candles, an intensity change of 1.5) preferences 





From these two experiments, we can detect a general relationship between behaviour 
and stimulus intensity: as intensity increases, the rats will display an increasing ten-





A common blind stimulus employed in conditioning experiments with rats is an elec-
tric shock delivered from the cage to the foot of the animal. Mackintosh has carried 
out a series of tests to determine the response of rats to increasing foot shock inten-
sity. He characterized the strength of response as the length of time rats spent immo-
bile (‘frozen’) after the shock was delivered.  
 
The chart below maps the rats’ response to current in terms of freezing time. It is 
clear from the data that foot shock is highly aversive, with a rapid increase in aver-
sive response between 0.1 and 0.5 mA but at this point the response levels out. I de-
scribe this effect as ‘response saturation’.  A similar effect has been noted by 
Rescorla for white noise. He has measured the response of rats to broad spectrum 
white noise levels of 107dB (generally well above the levels tested by Campbell (see 
chart above) and Rescorla discovered that rats will display aversive (FEAR-driven) 
behaviours at high noise intensities, generally corresponding to those exhibited for 
foot shock. 
 
The response curve shown as foot shock intensity increases has three phases (Dia-
gram 10d.): 
 
• at low levels of intensity, at some point, detection will occur 




• this increase is succeeded by a saturation level at which some maximum level 
of response is elicited. 
 
This ‘S’-type curve displayed in the response to electric shock intensity can be inter-
preted as the layered action of two receptors, the first has the function of detecting 
and registering sense stimuli at low or moderate intensity, within a range at which 
sensory content may be effectively processed, whereas the second is responsive to 
sensory overload. At these higher intensities, the animal will increasingly experience 
the emotion FEAR causing it to ‘freeze’ if no escape is offered or to flee if the op-
portunity presents itself36.  
 
Summarising the action of Blind Stimuli 
 
• A blind stimulus when detected by a sensory mechanism, will cause a re-
sponse, which is a function of its intensity, without carrying information.37 
• The response to a blind stimulus is automatic.  
 
36 As per Campbell and Whishaw’s experiments when the rat moves to a lower intensity environ-
ment. 
37 White light and white noise, if transmitted on a continuous basis (that is, not as some intermittent 
signal) will each activate its sense without conveying content. 
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• The response to increasing sensory stimulation is non-uniform: there are 
threshold levels of sensory stimulus necessary to attract attention as the lev-
els of these sensory stimuli are increased they will cause an increasing inten-
sity of FEAR response.  
• As the sensory stimulus continues to increase a saturation level of FEAR re-
sponse is observed where fear-induced behaviours cease to increase in inten-
sity. (See Diagram 10e.) 
 
Summary: Unconditioned Fear-Inducing Stimuli (Blind  and Targeted)  
 
I have proposed that there are two broad classes of unconditioned FEAR stimuli: 
 
Blind Stimuli:  
A blind stimulus is a raw sense-activating stimulus causing a response which is a 
function of the stimulus intensity. At high intensity, a FEAR response is gener-
ated, whereas at low intensities, the animal will attend to a blind stimulus without 
its arousing any emotion or response. I will propose that low intensity stimuli of 




The stimulating role of the senses can be understood separately from any func-
tion which those same senses might play in the interpretation of context. It is ho-
meostatically valuable for an animal to flee in response to a loud noise, or intense 
heat without the objects which are the source of these threats having been identi-
fied.  
 
Targeted Stimuli:   
In contrast to blind stimuli which leave the issue of the source of the sensory as-
sault unresolved, targeted stimuli can be treated as ‘resolved’. Targeted stimuli 
can only arise if the source HVO is present. To register such stimuli, the animal 
must have an inborn ability to identify a particular class of objects, automatically 
initiating a state of FEAR.  
 
By classifying unconditioned fear-inducing stimuli in this manner, a much clearer 
exposition of the processes entailed in cue acquisition by conditioning can be 
achieved. 
 
10.3 Unconditioned Stimuli for LUST, CARE, PANIC and PLAY 
 
Panksepp argues that the emotions CARE and PANIC are later-evolving basic emo-
tions, which find their origins in subcortical LUST and pain circuitries respectively. 
Mammals produce vulnerable offspring with limited survival skills and CARE 
serves to support these offspring until maturity. Panksepp observes that: 
 
 “the nurturance circuits in the mother’s brain and care-soliciting circuits in infants 
are closely intermeshed with those that control sexuality in limbic areas of the 
brain,” (1998 p.247). 
 
Compared to E-states such as RAGE and FEAR, the E-states LUST, CARE, PANIC 
and PLAY take a much narrower range of external objects for their stimuli – specifi-
cally, a fellow species member in a particular conformation. In the case of LUST it is 
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a mature and sexually receptive partner; for CARE, it is a relationship between a ma-
ture adult and an offspring; and mirroring this relationship, PANIC describes the re-
sponses of an offspring towards parent absence. PLAY behaviour occurs most fre-
quently between young animals at a particular stage of maturity and arises in re-
sponse to behavioural signals, usually entailing mock aggression. As animals pro-
gress beyond this phase of maturity, play behaviour diminishes. 
  
In the presence of an offspring, a parent – usually the mother – will adopt a charac-
teristic nurturing behaviour.  But the existence of a nurturing drive in primitive mam-
malian behaviour generates potential tensions between the urges associated with 
SEEKING in which the individual is motivated to attend to its own needs, as op-
posed to the demands of offspring for nurture and protection. In order to counteract 
the effects of other primitive emotional states in the parent, mammalian offspring 
generate signals - distress vocalizations - to attract the parent when they are failing to 
deliver the nurture required. PANIC-driven brain states and distress behaviours are 
instantiated in neural pathways which may be activated by electrical brain stimula-
tion. Panksepp speculates that these systems emerged from earlier emotional pro-
cesses:  
 
“the systems that mediate separation distress emerged, in part, from pre-existing 
pain circuits. Here we will call this neural system the PANIC circuit.” (1998 p.261).  
 
The primitive emotional hypothesis excludes the notion of a single maternal instinct 
which drives both nurturing and defensive behaviours in the presence of offspring. If 
a primitive emotion describes the entire state of the animal, there can be no state 
which encompasses both nurturing behaviours towards offspring and aggression to-
wards a potential predator. These states are motivated by CARE and RAGE sepa-
rately. The two offspring-associated behaviours are explicable as the outcome of mu-
tually supportive evolutionary processes: an evolutionary process which supported 
the nurture of vulnerable offspring without some defence against predators would 




10.4 Unconditioned Stimuli – Summary 
In my explanation of the particular types of unconditioned stimuli which arouse 
primitive emotions, it will be noted, first, that the types divide into two broad clas-
ses: 
• SEEKING, FEAR and RAGE in which a stimulus type is constituted of mul-
tiple stimulus tokens. 
• LUST together with CARE, PANIC and PLAY, which Panksepp claims to 
be later-evolving emotions. These emotions are activated by a much nar-
rower range of stimuli which regulate the behaviours of members of a spe-
cies towards one another. 
These emotions, together with their arousing stimuli are shown in Table 10(i). 
 
Table 10(i)      Stimulus Types and the E-states they arouse 
E-state Stimulus Types and Tokens  
SEEKING Internal Urges: 
Hunger, Thirst, Body Temperature, Reproductive 
FEAR Targeted Stimulus:  
Inborn species-specific threat detection mechanisms 
Blind Stimulus (raw sensory): 
E.g. Contact, Heat, Light, Noise, Sting, Electric shock 
RAGE Constraint: 
E.g. Physical restraint, Physical irritation, Sexual rejection, Territo-
rial incursion, Threat to offspring 
LUST Potential Mate 
CARE Offspring 
PANIC Parental absence 
PLAY Young member of same species 
 
Perhaps the most striking aspects of the unconditioned stimuli I have categorised are 
their scope and diversity. These stimuli allow a primitive mammal to evoke a set of 
behaviours in support of its wellbeing as a response to the detection of a more nu-
merous set of cues. Not only this - in responding to at least some of these cues, the 
animal will evoke a behaviour which is proportionate to the intensity of the stimulus 
presented. However, this by no means constitutes the entirety of the capacity of 
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primitive emotions to mediate stimulus and response: to complete the primitive emo-
tional model three more constituents will be proposed. 
 
i) In Chapter 11 I will describe the effects of conditioning - neurological pro-
cesses by which the subject is able to acquire new stimuli spontaneously in 
the presence of a primitive emotion. 
 
ii) The process of conditioning is not fully explained as an effect of primitive 
emotion. Behavioural psychologists who have studied conditioning argue that 
the objects to be conditioned are attended preferentially, i.e. that objects have 
attentional salience. In Chapter 12 it is proposed that when undergoing an E-
state, the subject may access separate attentional mechanisms which allow 
the characterization of novel objects, and a number of experiments are de-
scribed which illustrate the ability of mammalian species to detect and retain 
object information by attention. 
 
iii) In response to the range of stimuli which a primitive mammal is able to de-
tect, some mechanism is required by which emotions are prioritized in the 
presence of multiple stimuli. In Chapter 14, I will describe Panksepp’s model 
for the action of multiple emotions as mutually exciting or inhibiting and I 












Chapter 11 - Stimulus acquisition by Classical Conditioning 
11.1 Introduction 
Rats are routinely used in experiments to assess the effects of conditioning. In these 
experiments the animal will come to associate previously neutral objects with fear-
inducing stimuli. The experimental methodology employs some unconditioned stim-
ulus such as foot shock (US) causing rats to exhibit an unconditioned fear response 
(UR), such as ‘freezing’. In the conditioning process, neutral objects presented in the 
presence of the US may be acquired so that the rat, upon subsequently encountering 
the acquired object (CS) in the absence of the US, will exhibit a fear-induced behav-
iour as a conditioned response (CR).  This behaviour is sometimes explained by say-
ing that the animal has learned to associate the neutral object with the experience of 
FEAR. The precise mechanism by which this happens is not known; as Panksepp 
puts it: 
 
 “In classical conditioning of this type it is not certain whether the CS produces the 
CR directly or indirectly via the activation of the US or UR processes in the brain. 
Although the most likely connection is directly to the UR system, direct connections 
could also be made to US representations in the brain, while direct connections to 
the CR seem less likely” (1998 p.19)  
 
There is no strong evidence for the existence for the conditioning of neutral cues to 
conditioned stimuli which are presented in the absence of an unconditioned stimulus, 
an effect which is termed ‘secondary conditioning’.   
 
11.2 Le Doux and Phillips’ Experiments concerning the Nature of Explicit and 
Contextual Cues associated with FEAR 
 
In their 1992 paper Le Doux and Phillips attempted to characterise the neurology of 
the conditioned response in rats. Previous research had been successful in associating 
conditioned responses with activity in the amygdala and the hippocampus but the 
aim of this research was to assign (if possible) a role to each brain centre 
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The methodology used was straightforward. A control group of rats (n=4) were 
placed in an experimental chamber and conditioned to respond to a 20 second tone 
followed by a foot shock for two sessions on successive days. Following this initial 
conditioning they displayed the characteristic fearful response, assuming complete 
immobility or ‘freezing’ upon entering the experimental chamber in the absence of 
foot shock. This behaviour was described as being the response to a contextual stim-
ulus (the experimental chamber). It was followed by a second freezing period when 
the tone – described as an ‘explicit’ stimulus - was sounded. The length of time ‘fro-
zen’ was measured for both contextual and explicit cues in the absence of foot shock 
for four further sessions on successive days in order to assess the extinction of the 
characteristic fear-induced behaviour in the absence of shock reinforcement.  
 
Having established an optimised foot shock level for conditioning, the experimenters 
operated upon three groups of rats to produce amygdaloid lesions (n=8), hippocam-
pal lesions (n=25)  and neocortical lesions (n=11) 
 
Each group was tested under the same set of experimental conditions and the re-





• Chart a. shows the effects of conditioning on the control group. The rats take 
one session longer to condition to the contextual cue (Experimental Chamber 
CS1) than to the explicit cue (Tone CS2). And after withdrawal of the foot 
shock on day 3, extinction is more rapid for CS1. 
 
• Chart b. for rats with cortical lesions38 shows behaviour largely unchanged, 
suggesting that the cortical area removed proximate to the hippocampus 
played a minimal role in the conditioning process. 
 
• Chart c. Regions of the amygdala thought to be active in fear-related condi-
tioning were removed39  (i.e. lateral, basolateral and central nuclei), demon-
strating that animals with such lesions showed no conditioning response, ei-
ther to CS1 or CS2 
 
• Chart d. Hippocampal lesions transected the dorsal hippocampal formation, 
caused animals to respond normally to CS2 with a significantly suppressed 
response to CS1 followed by rapid extinction of CS1 following foot shock 
withdrawal. 
 
The researchers draw the following conclusions from this research: 
 
1. The amygdala is critical to the formation of both simple and complex 
conditioned aversive responses, receiving inputs from the thalamus, 
sensory processing areas of the neocortex, and the hippocampus. 
 
2. Regarding the action of the hippocampus, the researchers state: 
 
 
38 Included lesions to the sensorimotor region overlaying the dorsal hippocampus 
39 Plasticity of the lateral amygdala is thought to potentiate the ability of the CS to excite neurons in the central 
nucleus and hence to generate conditioned fear responses, supporting the view that this brain location is a pri-
mary catalyst for initiating cue acquisition. 
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 “For the most complex stimuli, particularly those for which spatial 
organisation is important, the hippocampus and the projection from 
the subiculum to the amygdala may be required. In this scheme, the 
hippocampus contributes to fear conditioning not as an associative 
structure, but much the same as other CS sensory processing chan-
nels (sensory thalamus and sensory cortex) that relay sensory infor-
mation to the amygdala.” (1992 p.283) 
 
The research provides good evidence for the existence of two types of cue, generat-
ing two modes of conditioning: 
 
1. The ‘explicit’ cue, that is, the effect of the 20 second 80dB tone prior to foot 
shock, has a temporal dimension, a single sensory modality and intensity typ-
ical of a low-level blind stimulus40. 
 
2. The ‘contextual’ cue (the EC), being continuously present throughout the ex-
periment, is not (as in the case of the tone) predictive of the occurrence of 
foot shock except in a diffuse sense. Contextual stimuli can be multi-modal 
and carry complex information, requiring spatial analysis and retention of 
spatial information. 
 
40 Le Doux investigates the neurological process of conditioning (1993) in which a tone is followed by 
a shock. Analysis of the brain functions activated in response to the tone indicates that sound enters 
the eighth cranial nerve and after synapsing in the cochlear nucleus, the information moves to the  
inferior collicus of the midbrain, then to the medial geniculate of the thalamus, and thence to the 
auditory cortex of the brain’s temporal area. Lesions to any area prior to the cortex will render the 
animal unable to generate a conditioned response because the animal is effectively rendered deaf. 
However if only the auditory cortex is removed, the conditioned response remains intact.  
 
In reviewing Le Doux’s work, Panksepp concludes that: “the highest levels of auditory processing are 
not necessary for conditioned fears to be exhibited to simple sounds. This implies that a conditional 
linkage to the FEAR system has emerged at some subcortical location (Panksepp p215). 
 
This does not mean that the auditory cortex is irrelevant for FEAR learning. Complex auditory condi-







1. There is a class of stimulus (US) which acts without conditioning to produce 
characteristic responses. 
 
2. A second class of stimulus is acquired by conditioning (CS). This class of 
stimulus is dependent upon nuclei of the amygdala for its instantiation. In 
conditioning two different types of sensory information – ‘explicit’ and ‘con-
textual’ – are acquired at different rates, with the contextual stimulus display-
ing the greater dependency upon the hippocampus for its retention and subse-
quent effectiveness as a CS.  
 
3. The conditioning impulse - which might be described as an instruction to 
those brain functions which specialise in the fixing and retention of a previ-
ously neutral cue to create a conditioned stimulus - requires the arousal of an 
E-state. 
 
4. There is evidence that sound and visual cues are detected and retained via 
specialised brain functions, each able to characterize and retain sensory infor-
mation by type. 
 
5. The acquisition of both contextual and explicit stimuli is not critically de-
pendent upon the action of higher cortical intervention for its effect 
 
In the processes described, two types of sensory information (sound, spatial infor-
mation) are found to trace different paths to the amygdala, which appears to play a 




This casts doubt upon a view of the conditioning process which requires that each 
CS will induce FEAR by activation of its corresponding US pathway41. Uncondi-
tioned stimuli as diverse as cat odour, white noise and foot shock are detected via 
different sensory pathways, yet each is able to induce CS acquisition by FEAR con-
ditioning, making it improbable that a conditioned stimulus is subsequently able to 
induce an E-state by means of the sensory circuits activated by the originating US. If 
this were the case, each sense would have to generate its own fear conditioning pro-
cess (e.g. noise, footshock, cat odour). And these by no means represent the full ex-
tent of fear-inducing US mechanisms available. It is more probable that the condi-
tioning process allows a previously neutral object to activate the FEAR E-state di-
rectly, tending to confirm the concept of an E-state functioning independently of its 
activating stimuli. 
 
LeDoux’s work supports the notion of two classes of ‘neutral’ stimulus: 
 
• Explicit stimuli are simple in content and modality, with a temporal dimen-
sion – that is, they can be presented synchronously with a US in order to rein-
force the relationship between the two stimuli. 
 
• Contextual stimuli tend to have complex presentations and may be continu-
ously at hand throughout the experimental procedure. In order to respond to 
these stimuli, the organism is likely to require the ability to process and retain 
complex, and perhaps multi-modal, sensory information. 
 
In contrasting the rates of acquisition of explicit and contextual cues Le Doux has 
demonstrated a variance in the speed of acquisition of otherwise affectively neutral 
cues. Since the unconditioned stimulus employed (i.e. electric foot shock) is com-
mon for both stimulus types, we may infer that some property of what I have de-
scribed as a ‘neutral’ stimulus plays a role in its acquisition. The property which 
 


































In the opening paragraph to his 1976 paper ‘Overshadowing and Stimulus Intensity’ 
Mackintosh states:  
 
“Pavlov [  ] used the term "overshadowing" to describe the observation that condi-
tioning to a relatively weak stimulus might be severely attenuated if it was always 
presented in conjunction with a more intense stimulus. The stronger or more salient 
component of a compound conditioned stimulus (CS) was said to overshadow condi-
tioning to the weaker or less salient component”. (1976 p.186) 
 
Mackintosh continues:  
 
“This finding has usually been attributed to some sort of competition between stim-
uli. According to theories of selective attention (Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971), 
conditioning requires that the subject attend to the [stimulus], and there is an in-
verse relationship between the probabilities or strengths of attention to different 
stimuli” (1976 p.186) 
 
In my account of the action of unconditioned stimuli it is not required that an organ-
ism has previously attended to a stimulus in order for the organism to respond to it. I 
have described two types of unconditioned FEAR stimuli, ‘blind’ and ‘targeted’. 
Blind stimuli such as white light, noise, or heat, cause a subject to respond to a stim-
ulus directly from sensation. Targeted stimuli, such as early facial detection in neo-
nates, rely upon an inborn ability to detect a particular stimulus conformation. These 
faculties, whilst requiring an adaptational investment in some dedicated interpreta-
tive mechanism, do not require that a subject has previously attended to and retained 
the stimulus for that stimulus to arouse an emotion. 
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Conversely, conditioning must entail that I select and retain information regarding 
some proximate object which will subsequently act as a stimulus in the conditioning 
process – a stimulus which was previously not emotionally arousing. What Mackin-
tosh is asserting therefore, is that in order to condition to such a cue, the subject must 
attend to that (affect-neutral) cue object, either before or after experiencing a fear-
inducing unconditioned stimulus. 
My aim now will be to elaborate Mackintosh’s notion of attention as the mental pro-
cess of discriminating and retaining information regarding the external world in the 
form of discrete entities – objects, which (as per the toad) might be detected in a 
form quite different to that employed by humans.  
As Mackintosh observes - the attentional process in mammals is selective; I will pro-
vide evidence that it is drawn to certain aspects of the external world, such as pat-
tern/form or movement, and it is this disparity of attraction to which Mackintosh at-
tributes the notion of object ‘salience’. This notion of salience is not consistent with 
the concept of a cue as ‘neutral’ prior to conditioning, playing no part in its acquisi-
tion. Rather Mackintosh is asserting that some property of a cue, by virtue of its par-
ticular ability to attract an animal’s attention, will determine how readily it is ac-
quired as a conditioned stimulus, or whether it is acquirable. 
There is experimental evidence to suggest that although attention and emotion may 
be treated as conceptually separate and – to a useful extent – neurologically discrete 
processes (Vuilleumier & Driver 2007, Raftopoulos 2014), there is also evidence in-
dicating that these processes interact. Their interaction may be summarised thus: at-
tention is a process by which the world is divided into the objects of perception, and 
emotion is the process by which those objects are assigned value and acted upon. My 
purpose going forward will be to investigate this interaction of emotional and atten-






12.2 Mammalian Attentional Processing 
The main experimental obstacle to establishing the extent to which mammals with-
out language are able to discriminate objects in their environment is verification. 
Without some confirmatory behaviour, it is difficult to determine whether, say, a rat 
can distinguish a nail from a blade of grass. Neither have value for the rat and hence 
neither will generate a behaviour. 
In recent years, a number of researchers have devised experiments to quantify the ex-
tent to which visual cues are processed and retained by attentional mechanisms.  
1. The Fixing of Patterned Visual Cues by Attention in Mammals 
In the early twenty-first century, two schools of thought emerged regarding 
the intricacy of detail which a rat is able to discriminate in characterizing and 
retaining the form of an object. Some researchers (Minini and Jeffreys 2006) 
maintained that there are ‘low level’ characteristics of a pattern or a shape 
such as brightness (of an object or some component of an object), contrast, 
size and area. These properties may be discriminated but will not allow a 
shape to be reliably identified. Conversely, another group argued that there 
are higher level properties which might reliably allow an object to be de-
tected in a retinal image such as local straight and curved boundaries, ori-
ented edges and corners, and oriented and non-oriented local contrast patterns 
(patterned fields) - plus image fragments. 
 
What scientists were attempting to verify is whether such high-level data can 
be extracted and processed reliably against the ‘noise’ of lower level visual 
information (e.g. the same object may be close or distant and hence present 
on a larger or smaller retinal area, or it may be more or less luminous). This 
ability to hold the basic elements of a shape against variable lower level pa-
rameters is referred to as ‘transportation-tolerant recognition’.  
 
To resolve this dispute, Zoccolan (2009) devised a complex apparatus which 
constrained the rat to view a screen at a fixed distance. In the experiments the 
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rats were rewarded if they were able to identify a target object (by head-
pointing) in a wide range of configurations. The object was displayed in a 
number of different orientations by rotation about its axis, and its size was 
varied systematically to determine whether the rat was still able to identify 
the object following these transformations.  Volumes of data obtained (500 
per rat per day) were high, allowing reliable statistical data to be obtained 
(Diagram 12a.). 
 
Zoccolan’s research confirmed the rats’ ability to tolerate variation in an ob-
ject’s appearance at different degrees of rotation and size 42. This faculty de-
rived from a ‘generalisation process’ which enabled the rat to pick out the 
similarity of the object perceived with some other object perceived previ-
ously, even though the two views were not identical. He concludes: 
“In fact, given the large number of tested conditions, it was unlikely that rats 
succeeded in the task by learning and memorizing the correct association be-




42 The reduced ability to discriminate the smallest objects was most probably caused by the rat’s rel-





Zoccolan’s work provides good evidence that rats can discriminate novel and 
complex visual patterns or shapes and are able to identify those shapes when 
they are presented in different orientations and at varying distances. This 
same attention to pattern has been found in infants. In a 1961 paper Fantz 
proposed that the early interest which infants show in form and in particular 
kinds of pattern play an important role in the development of behaviour by 
drawing attention towards those stimuli which have adaptive significance. 
But while pattern preference was established (with an increasing attention to 
fine detail with infant age), the variations of pattern used (gratings, bullseyes 
and checkerboards) were such that no overarching explanation of the rela-
tionship between the patterns used in different experiments could be found. 
 
In 1985 Banks and Ginsberg re-examined the findings of several of these 
studies, based upon responses to a variety of patterns, and found that if the 
phase and amplitude of the various patterns were mathematically encoded 
and reanalysed using a linear systems preference model, a clear correlation 
could be found between the age of a child and the complexity of pattern pre-
ferred.  
 
2. Attention to Movement 
 
The previous experiments offer confirmation that mammals will preferen-
tially attend to and retain patterned information in their surroundings. This is 
by no means the only attentional mechanism which mammals are able to de-
ploy; for example, Douglas (2006) has carried out experiments which con-
firm that both rats and humans are able to discriminate a coherent moving 




The neurobiological faculty for perceiving and interpreting objects in motion 
has been found to be particularly acute and complex in humans and other pri-
mates but Douglas et al., (2006) was interested in in the attentional salience 
of motion for mammalian species generally: 
 
 “It is [  ] an open question whether primates have unique cortical abilities 
(regarding motion perception) or whether such a functional organisation is a 
fundamental property of mammalian visual systems. If extrastriate analysis 
of global visual motion is common to mammals, this would have implications 
for its evolution and biological utility (2006 p.2842)” 
 
Douglas carried out a series of tests in which rats were found able to discrim-
inate between two screens populated with moving dots: on one screen the 
dots are moving more or less coherently in a particular direction (left or right) 
whereas on the second screen the dots were moving randomly. Differentiated 
on-screen movement patterns will not, of themselves, cause the rats to have 
any behaviour, rather rats are forced to choose between the two screens by 
swimming in a tank of water in which a hidden submerged platform is placed 
in front of the screen showing coherent as opposed to random motion. The 
rat, in order to avoid drowning, was required to detect and swim toward co-




Using this methodology, Douglas discovered that rats (and mice) are able 
successfully to discriminate coherent motion of dots (by swimming towards 
it) when dot coherency is as low as c.30% (humans are successful down to 
7%43). Subsequent investigation into the brain location activated during the 
experiments indicate that the anterolateral visual area (AL) of the rat’s brain 
serves the primary role in motion detection and a similar brain function has 
been discovered in cats.  
 
Douglas’s findings point strongly to the existence of general specialised mo-
tion detection systems in mammals and not only this, mammals seem to be 
able to detect coherent as opposed to random movement. But this ability is 
not predicated upon the notion that the object detected has any homeostatic 
value for the animal, rather it seems that any moving object will draw the ani-
mal’s attention preferentially.  
 
Having established that mammals are able to attend to and discriminate complex pat-
terns of form and movement against a noisy background, I shall now investigate the 
relationship between visual attention and emotion. 
 
12.3 SEEKING and Attention 
Tolman’s Maze Experiments 
Laboratory rats have been found to make use of visual cues and to employ visual 
cues preferentially (over olfactory and auditory cues and path integration) in spatial 
navigation 
The navigational process which I shall now describe entails that the subject is en-
gaged in purposeful forward movement – a behaviour which Panksepp associates 
with the basic emotion SEEKING. Panksepp observes that animals in a SEEKING 
state also display strong sensory arousal; he has further described rats in this state as 
 
43 Presumably not under threat of drowning. 
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‘eager’, ‘anticipatory’ or ‘curious’. The appearance of rats as ‘anticipatory’ or ‘ea-
ger’ relate to the behaviours which Panksepp observed when rats were pulling levers 
in order to self-stimulate the SEEKING emotional brain state, however the associa-
tion of curiosity with SEEKING has not thus far been explained. A good example of 
this relationship is observed in the ability of a rat to navigate a maze. 
 
This ability was extensively studied and documented by Tolman and others in the 
early twentieth century. He describes a series of simple and elegant experiments de-
signed to shed insight into this faculty in his 1948 paper “Cognitive Maps in Rats 
and Men”. 
In an experiment by Blodgett (1929), a six-unit alley maze baited with food in the 
‘goal’ box was tested with a control group of rats for seven days (Diagram 12c.).  
 
The rate at which the group was able to acquire knowledge of the maze was ex-
pressed in in the decline their error rate (i.e. choosing a false path) for each session 
(see solid line) in selecting the correct path to the bait box. Group II was placed for 
six days in the maze without food, but on the seventh day, food was placed in the 
bait box. After two days, the Group II animals were able to locate the bait box with 




As a final test, Group III animals were offered food after three days and again the er-
ror rate fell. Within one day the Group III animals were on the learning curve of 
Group I. 
 
Tolman describes a subsequent experiment with a 14 unit maze (Diagram 12d.) and 
found an even more remarkable result. Group HNR-R (Hunger No Reward/Reward) 
was placed for 10 days in the box without food but on the day 11 they found food in 
the bait box, and Group HNR (Hunger No Reward) were allowed to explore the 
maze but were never offered food. The rate at which any group was able to acquire 
information about the maze was expressed in the decline in their error rate (i.e. 
choosing a path which did not lead to food) for each session. The chart below 
demonstrates that Group HNR-R, on being offered food, appeared to acquire the 
route to the bait box very much more rapidly and with more accuracy than Group 




For Group HNR-R animals in an unbaited maze, it is not obvious what constitutes a 
‘wrong’ decision during the first ten sessions. Panksepp’s SEEKING theory offers 
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an explanation: a foraging rat in the SEEKING E-state has a strong impulse to move 
forwards44 and in this event, a dead end would frustrate the rat. If Panksepp is cor-
rect, successful movement to the furthest maze element would constitute the route 
through the maze offering the longest uninterrupted forward movement.  
Such exploration is accompanied by the progressive acquisition of a spatial map of 
the maze. We can imagine this spatial information as accumulating with each session 
so that when the Group HNR-R rats eventually discovered food in the bait box, their 
more extensive exploration of the maze, having enabled them to map the maze more 
thoroughly, served them well when the opportunity for food presented itself. They 
subsequently deployed this superior spatial information to enable them to locate the 
food in the goal box with greater accuracy than the rats who were in a baited maze 
from day 1 (Group HR).  
 
In sum, during the first ten days, the unrewarded rats spontaneously explore and map 
the maze in the absence of any goal and yet the evidence indicates that the rat is 
learning to negotiate the maze more efficiently than it would if food were on offer. 
  
We can draw several conclusions from the maze experiments: 
 
1. Rats possess the ability to construct neural maps of their environment. As 
Tolman puts it: “Although we admit that the rat is bombarded by stimuli, we 
hold that his nervous system is surprisingly selective as to which of these 
stimuli it will let in at any given time". (1948 p.2) 
 
2. The time required to map a maze is a function of the maze complexity. 
 
3. The presence of a reward object in the maze has no evident effect upon the 
rate at which the rat is able to map the maze. 
 
 
44 Panksepp notes that it is virtually impossible to induce a foraging rat to move in reverse 
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4. That in moving forwards through the maze with its senses aroused, the rat’s 
general behaviour is one we would associate with SEEKING-induced forag-
ing.  
 
Attending to Affect-Neutral Objects 
The manner by which rats acquire information in a maze without reward might not 
be indicative of a rat’s propensity to attend to and retain unfamiliar objects in gen-
eral, and I shall briefly describe an experiment by Gaskin et al. (2003) which demon-
strates that rats will preferentially attend to any unfamiliar object in their surround-
ings, irrespective of their homeostatic value. 
 
Gaskin describes a novel object recognition experiment to assess the role of the hip-
pocampus in object retention. The objects they employed, (a stainless steel cup and a 
black porcelain statuette) had no homeostatic value. They were used interchangeably 
so that one group of rats were familiarised with the two identical cups 45 for five ses-
sions of five minutes and the other with two statuettes. When the control rats were 
subsequently exposed to the novel object alongside the familiar object, they spent 
significantly more time exploring the novel object (i.e. c.65% of total exploration 
time). The attentive behaviour of the rats was associated with sensory arousal, and in 
acquainting themselves with the novel object, the rats would constantly move around 
it, or even climb over it in a manner characteristic of SEEKING behaviour.  
 
Exploration time is described as time spent directing the nose at a distance of < 2cm 
to the object and/or touching it with the nose. However, this was not the case for rats 
with hippocampal lesions, who spent pretty much the same time exploring both ob-
jects, suggesting that the hippocampus plays a role46 in retaining novel object infor-
mation47.  
 
45 Two similar cups were used so that the rats behaviour could subsequently be assessed when ex-
posed to two objects – one familiar and one unfamiliar. 
46 Though as Gaskin demonstrates, if the hippocampus is lesioned, the rat’s brain is able to access 
other neural systems and hence regain object recognition ability. 




Tolman’s observations are indicative of SEEKING behaviour. Rats move forward 
through the maze with senses aroused48 and will do so without any motivation other 
than a desire to forage. During this process, the rats acquire extensive spatial infor-
mation about the maze, and they will deploy this information efficiently to locate re-
ward objects which have been subsequently placed in the maze.  
 
This co-occurrence of SEEKING behaviour and the acquisition of spatial infor-
mation does not of itself demonstrate a relationship between the SEEKING and the 
acquisition of spatial information, even though it is supported by research which re-
ports a similar SEEKING-type behaviour exhibited in the preferential direction of at-
tention towards novel objects. It may well be that attentional processes allow the rat 
to discriminate and retain novel information in the absence of SEEKING or other 
primitive emotional states. For this reason, Panksepp’s claim that rats in a SEEKING 
state exhibit curiosity cannot be a claim that curiosity co-occurs exclusively with 
SEEKING. However, the evidence does tend to support a claim that SEEKING in-
tensifies the attentional process and in so doing accelerates information acquisition. 
 
What these experiments have demonstrated however, is that the SEEKING emo-
tional state is unusual: during the arousal of a SEEKING state, an object may be 
characterized and retained without its being conditioned. When the initially unfamil-
iar object is encountered subsequently, it will be decreasingly likely that the SEEK-
ING E-state is aroused, in contrast to the effects of conditioned stimuli in arousing 
other E-state types. In sum, the more an object is explored and retained, the less 
likely that object is to be associated with a SEEKING state.  
 
I will use the term passive for object information which is characterized and retained 
in this manner and I contrast this effect with objects which are retained in a process 
of conditioning. 
 




12.4 Attention and Non-SEEKING Emotions  
 
LeDoux has demonstrated that an unconditioned FEAR-inducing stimulus can cause 
a previously affect-neutral object to be acquired and retained in a single encounter, 
but rather than being held passively, the object so retained becomes a conditioned 
stimulus, arousing FEAR when encountered on subsequent sessions.  
I will illustrate this effect of FEAR: Tolman (1948), in his description of an experi-
ment carried out by Hudson, describes how a rat is given an electric shock via a 
small food bowl attached to a patterned screen. Immediately following the shock, the 
rat was seen to attend closely to the screen and to avoid it in subsequent sessions.  
 
However, when the experiment was altered so that the food bowl and patterned 
screen were removed instantly after the shock was administered, the rat did not sub-
sequently avoid the patterned screen. Tolman comments:  
 
“Learning what object to avoid may occur exclusively during the period after the 
shock. For if the object from which the shock was actually received is removed at the 
moment of the shock, a significant number of animals fail to learn to avoid it, some 
selecting other features in the environment for avoidance, and others avoiding noth-
ing." (1948 p.7) 
 
Tolman, in claiming that the rat has attended to and memorised the patterned screen 
only after receiving a shock, is expressing the view of many researchers who believe 
that FEAR causes an animal to attend to and retain neutral cues present at the time of 
a fear-inducing event - objects which had not been attended to previously. But it may 
also be the case that in attending to the screen, the animal is conditioning to the pat-







Attentional processes select and retain information received by the senses, employ-
ing specialised neural mechanisms. These mechanisms are so adapted that they are 
preferentially directed towards aspects of the animal’s surroundings which have vis-
ual, olfactory or auditory salience for that species. 
Panksepp’s research into the subcortical brain processes which instantiate basic emo-
tions provides no evidence of functions which will enable objects to be so discrimi-
nated and retained. 
According to these two accounts, attentional and primitive emotional processes are 
independent brain processes. But there is further evidence to indicate that an interac-
tion of these brain processes occurs: 
• Through SEEKING, attentional processes are catalysed, but the objects of 
attention are acquired and retained passively. An object so retained does not 
subsequently arouse the SEEKING emotion, i.e., it is not conditioned. 
• The arousal of non-SEEKING primitive emotions may cause conditioning. 
In this case, local objects are selected for conditioning by attentional sali-
ence: 
i. If an object has been previously attended and retained pas-
sively, through conditioning it is retained in a manner which 
will cause that object to evoke a primitive emotion in subse-
quent encounters. 
ii. If objects have not been passively retained, the arousal of a 
primitive emotion will cause them to be attended and condi-








Chapter 13:  Metastimuli and Homeostatic Imperatives 
Introduction 
An organism will respond to objects which have homeostatic value and it will re-
spond in a manner which tends to promote its survival and wellbeing. But homeo-
statically valuable objects do not fall into a single class, and I have proposed that 
adaptive processes have enabled organisms to develop progressively more sophisti-
cated mechanisms by means of which each class of homeostatically valuable objects 
is addressed by a behaviour appropriate for the exploitation of its value. 
In mammals, this evolutionary process has given rise to primitive emotional systems 
whereby clusters of valuable stimuli are able to activate an appropriate primitive 
emotional response. Some of these clusters do not represent any coherent whole - 
that is, by knowing how one token of a stimulus type activates a primitive emotion, 
we could not predict the existence of other stimulus tokens able to activate that same 
emotion. To exemplify: knowing that a threat to offspring would cause RAGE in a 
female does not predict that the same animal will display RAGE in response to a 
thwarted attempt to flee (i.e. a ‘cornered animal’ behaviour) (Diagram 13a.). How-
ever, both event types can be characterized as constraints upon other emotionally 




The explanation that a constraint upon the enactment of some behaviour motivated 
by a primitive emotional system will cause RAGE offers a more useful predictive 
tool for the occurrence of primitive ‘RAGE’ states than that of any single token of 
RAGE-evoking stimulus. In the same way, the association of SEEKING with urges, 
or the arousal of FEAR in response to threats offer better general predictors of these 
emotional states than any of the stimuli to which they respond singly.  
This might lead us to propose that the subject is able to reason, say, that a burning 
sensation is a threat to its wellbeing or that a territorial incursion represents a con-
straint upon its ability to exploit its territory. But in responding to a primitive emo-
tional stimulus, a primitive mammal acts without intention and hence without rea-
sons. Yet we cannot reduce the aetiology of an E-state to one of straightforward 
cause and effect: for example, a primitive RAGE response does not necessarily result 
if a potential competitor is encountered in neutral territory, nor will an animal avoid 
objects that it has not been conditioned to fear. 
As a first step in explaining the general relationship between complex arrays of 
primitive emotional stimuli and their evoked responses, I will introduce the concept 
of a metastimulus, an explanatory term which identifies some shared feature of a di-
verse group of stimuli able to trigger a particular primitive emotion.  
The Concept of a Metastimulus in Primitive Emotional Explanation 
In the schematic below, I illustrate the points at which metastimuli can be introduced 
as explanations for three types of primitive emotion: FEAR, RAGE and SEEKING. 
The schematic below (Diagram 13b.) is based upon the action of primitive emotional 





In the following paragraphs, I will outline the action and interaction of these emo-
tions and identify the concept of a metastimulus with respect to each emotion. 
FEAR 
I have described two broad stimulus classes which will cause the arousal of FEAR; 
the first is targeted, in which some inborn interpretative mechanism will cause the 
animal to experience FEAR directly, the second is blind in which a broad spectrum 
of sensory receptors, in response to sensory overload, will cause the animal to flee or 
freeze. Both these stimulus classes may be interpreted as threats to the animal, caus-
ing avoidance behaviours. The concept uniting targeted and blind stimuli therefore. 
is that both offer threats to the organism, hence threat is the metastimulus for FEAR. 
SEEKING 
The SEEKING state is triggered by one of an array of sensors (interoceptors) inter-
nal to the organism, which detect homeostatic imbalances and will cause the animal 
to forage for the objects necessary to correct such imbalances. The metastimulus for 




The metastimulus for RAGE is a constraint upon a homeostatically-driven behaviour 
so that, say, if an animal is constrained from flight, it will attack. According to this 
principle, a constraint upon SEEKING would cause the subject to evoke RAGE. 
However, Panksepp has argued from observation that this is not the case; rather ani-
mals display RAGE only after SEEKING brings them into the presence of urge-sat-
isfying objects, in which event, they switch to consummatory or predatory behav-
iours. Under these conditions, if, say, another animal competes for the subject’s prey 
or food, the subject will display RAGE in response to this more explicit constraint. 
Object Acquisition 
It will be useful to extend my account of the interaction of the three emotional pro-
cesses I have described to explain the acquisition of new stimulus objects. 
1. Passive Acquisition 
I have previously explained how, under the influence of SEEKING, attentional pro-
cesses are enhanced. When a SEEKING animal encounters a familiar object (i.e. pre-
viously attended and retained), it will display no behaviour; however, if the object is 
novel, the animal will display attentive behaviour, moving around the object with its 
senses aroused. In this way, it is able to characterize and retain the object passively. 
A second mode of passive acquisition, requiring less complex attentive processing, 
occurs in response to low level blind stimuli such as intermittent white lights or 
tones.  
2. Acquisition by Conditioning 
We can think of the attentional processes as accumulating a library of passively-ac-
quired object information for access by the conditioning process. When the pas-
sively-acquired object becomes associated with the arousal of an emotion (particu-






The Function of Metastimuli in Emotional Explanation 
On the face of it, the metastimuli I have described constitute nothing more than supe-
rior explanations for the effects of a group of stimuli than those which could be de-
vised by considering each stimulus singly. However, I will argue that more signifi-
cance can be ascribed to metastimuli than their function as superior descriptive 
terms. To pursue this end, I shall initially consider such explanations separately from 
the action of primitive emotion, so that any neurological mechanism for effecting a 
homeostatically beneficial outcome might be explained as a response to a metastimu-
lus.  
I have previously offered a general account of emotionally motivating stimuli as ob-
jects of homeostatic value and I have proposed that such objects may constitute both 
impediments to an animal’s survival and opportunities for the animal to flourish 
(Chapter 4, p.96). What I now propose is that the selection and exploitation of home-
ostatically valuable objects by any species may be represented as a set of motivating 
principles for promoting the wellbeing of the subject which I will term homeostatic 
imperatives. I will take as an example the homeostatic imperative requiring re-
sistance to constraint: if some homeostatically valuable activity is constrained, then 
an organism’s wellbeing is promoted by its opposing such a constraint and in doing 
so with all its physical resources engaged. In primitive mammalian species, this op-
position is manifested as RAGE.  
Rage, therefore constitutes a physiological and behavioural state in mammals, which 
in other species might manifest differently. In each species, the homeostatic impera-
tive that a constraint upon a valuable behaviour must be resisted, will be addressed 
by the most appropriate response given the biological resources available to that spe-
cies. For example, in response to the same homeostatic imperative, the sea hare will 
emit a purple ink when disturbed. 
In Table 13(i) I have provided an overview of the seven primitive emotions shown 
alongside the metastimuli which activate those emotions and the homeostatic imper-
atives which each metastimulus addresses. The early primitive emotions, SEEKING, 
RAGE, FEAR and LUST, mediate a certain type of engagement between the subject 
186 
 
and its environment. Set apart from these stimuli are the more recently evolved ‘so-
cial emotions’ CARE, and PLAY which, on Panksepp’s account, represent phyloge-
netic elaborations of LUST49 for mediating interactions between individuals within 
species groupings. In these interactions we can detect homeostatic imperatives driv-
ing nurture and play which were absent in earlier species. 







SEEKING Physiological Urge If Urge, Forage! 
 
RAGE Constraint upon some homeo-
statically-driven impulse 
If Constraint, Resist! 
FEAR Threat to Wellbeing/Survival If Threat, Avoid! 
LUST Potential Partner If Potential Partner, Mate! 
CARE Offspring If Offspring, Nurture! 
PANIC Parental absence If Isolated, Exhibit Distress! 
PLAY Young Member of Same Species If Young Adult, Play! 
 
Homeostatic imperatives are the neurobiological realisation of a set of motivating 
principles which apply to all animal species. Such motivating principles exert influ-
ence in the phylogenetic processes which shaped both primitive emotions in mam-
malian species and the reflexive stimulus-response behaviours which preceded them, 
and in Chapter 19 I shall develop this view by proposing that they determine the se-








49 LUST is the prototypical behaviour for interaction within a species group 
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Chapter 14:  Competing Primitive Emotions 
14.1 Introduction 
In an earlier discussion contrasting reflexive and primitive emotional models of be-
havioural motivation (Chapter 5), I proposed that there exists some theoretical 
boundary below which behaviours arise as ‘reflex’ responses to stimuli so that any 
intervening neural circuitry, though potentially complex, can be understood as gener-
ating an inflexible chain of causation between stimulus and response. 
Above this boundary, I have proposed that the neural entities intervening between 
stimulus and response have these features: 
1) They exist as a taxonomy of neural systems, each able to generate a 
behaviour type in response to an expanding array of stimuli. 
and  
2) When two or more of these neural systems are aroused simultane-
ously, some further process takes place by which a prioritization of 
behaviours is effected. 
For each of these features, intervening neural entities – E-state brain modes - func-
tion as systems for mediating between stimulus and response.  
In previous chapters I have argued that E-state brain modes arise in response to the 
detection of tokens of particular types of metastimulus and that each brain mode 
functions as a core component of the primitive emotional system. I have described 
how such brain modes respond, not only to a range of unconditioned stimulus classes 
but also, through conditioning, to promote the acquisition of new stimuli, which will 
extend the range of valuable stimuli to which the subject is able to respond. 
I will now investigate condition 2): that a prioritization of E-state brain modes will 
occur in response to the presentation of multiple stimuli, when each is associated 
with an action of a different E-state. 
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The concept of a primitive mammal postulates the existence of a period in the evolu-
tionary history of mammals50 when an animal was able to respond to homeostatic 
imperatives only by evoking the primitive emotions I have listed. But difficulties im-
mediately become apparent. For example, even if a mother is motivated to nurture 
offspring by CARE, then for CARE to be successful, there must exist a set of condi-
tions whereby, say, the nurturing impulse is subdued by an urge prompting the 
mother to feed herself. What remains to be explained is the mechanism by which a 
primitive mammal will adopt a certain behaviour in the presence of these competing 
stimuli. 
Cognitive science has generated some evidence of the action of multiple competing 
stimuli in inducing primitive emotional responses, but such evidence will not suffice 
to verify any proposal I might make for the interaction of primitive emotions in its 
entirety owing to aspects of primitive emotional systems which have been presented 
in my previous explanation: first, assuming that, as a minimum, there are seven of 
Panksepp’s basic emotions and that these may commonly occur in combinations of 
two or even three, there is insufficient experimental evidence to verify the outcome 
of every potential combination of primitive emotions.  
But even if such evidence existed, I have described how the intensity of an emotion 
can be a function of stimulus presentation: because of this, I will argue that the be-
haviour resulting from the interaction of emotions cannot be predicted solely as a 
function of the nature of the E-states aroused but must also take into account the in-
tensity to which those E-states are aroused.  
And as a further feature influencing the interaction of primitive emotions, I will 
demonstrate that it is not the case that E-states stand upon an equal motivational 
footing. Aversive emotions such as FEAR, even at relatively low intensities, will re-
liably suppress more pleasant emotions such as PLAY. 
These factors, taken together, make the behaviour of a primitive mammal in the pres-
ence of multiple stimuli a complex function of the interaction of brain modes. But 
this complexity obscures the underlying relationships between primitive emotions. 
 
50 I am not asserting that such a time or an animal existed. 
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To reach a better understanding of emotional interactions, my approach will be to 
use Panksepp’s schematic (Diagram 14a.) as a straw man in order to develop an al-
ternative ‘competitive’ hypothesis for the interaction of emotions, and then to test 
this hypothesis against experimental and neuroscientific evidence entailing the inter-
action of emotions. 
14.2 Challenging Panksepp’s Model for the Interaction of Emotions 
The diagram below is taken from one of Panksepp’s earlier papers on emotion 
(Panksepp,1982) and reproduced in Affective Neuroscience. It outlines the nature of 
interactions between four basic emotions and as far as I can ascertain, it is based 
upon no more than deduction from intuition and everyday observation. 
 
Panksepp’s model takes four basic emotions and represents the relationships between 
them as either inhibitory or excitatory. Initially, our intuition suggests that the rela-
tionships described reflect reality. Panksepp proposes that FEAR will excite RAGE 
and RAGE will inhibit FEAR, and that PANIC and RAGE share this same relation-
ship of excitation and inhibition. Again, Panksepp proposes that FEAR excites 
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PANIC and PANIC excites FEAR, a relationship which our observation of these 
emotions seems to support. 
But not all Panksepp’s deductions appear to be equally justified: it is not clear why 
FEAR should excite SEEKING or why SEEKING should inhibit FEAR. And in 
Panksepp’s depiction of the interaction of SEEKING and RAGE, it seems likely that 
an animal in a state of RAGE would not forage but it is less clear that SEEKING in-
hibits RAGE.  
Similarly, there are problems with Panksepp’s depiction of SEEKING and FEAR: 
imagine that an animal foraging for water (SEEKING) is confronted by a predator 
(FEAR). It is very probable that the animal will flee from the predator rather than 
continuing to search for water. On this account FEAR inhibits SEEKING rather than 
exciting it. But FEAR will not always prevail: an animal in a state of thirst may risk 
approaching a waterhole in the absence of predators (even if it associates predators 
with the waterhole) but will break off the SEEKING behaviour if predators ap-
proach, hence intensifying FEAR. 
In summary, Panksepp’s model of the interaction of emotions as mutually exciting or 
inhibiting does not fully account for the behavioural outcomes observed, which man-
ifest as discrete responses, characteristic of one of the stimuli presented. 
 
14.3  An Investigation of a Competitive Model of Primitive Emotions 
The explanation I am about to provide rests upon two premises: 
1) That primitive emotional behaviours are the products of E-states which arise 
in response to unconditioned and conditioned stimuli. 
2) That multiple E-states, when aroused, will separately compete for control of 
the behaviour of a primitive mammal. 
The theory of primitive emotions as E-states entails some characteristic behaviour as 
a constituent of that state, so that when multiple E-states arise, the behavioural out-
come must be characteristic of one of those E-states. To clarify: it cannot be some 
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behaviour which is not a constituent of an E-state, nor can it be some hybrid of more 
than one E-state behaviour.  
Therefore, if a number of E-states are aroused in response to multiple stimuli and 
only a single E-state behaviour may be evoked, and if intentional cognitions are ex-
cluded, some process must occur whereby a particular E-state behaviour is evoked 
whilst other E-states are suppressed.  
I will now propose a mechanism by which one E-state behaviour is suppressed 
whilst another is evoked: only one behaviour may be manifested in response to mul-
tiple stimuli, whereas emotions are elaborated as separate neural pathways with dis-
tinctive brain chemistries which I have termed ‘brain modes’, allowing multiple 
brain modes to co-occur and compete. In this competition I propose that two features 
of brain modes determine behavioural outcomes: the first is the intensity of the E-
state evoked and the second is its nature. 
1) Intensity: I have previously proposed that E-states have an intensity which is 
a function of the presentation of the unconditioned stimulus, or, in the case 
of a conditioned stimulus, will be some function of the intensity of an uncon-
ditioned stimulus with which the conditioned stimulus was originally paired. 
If E-states are aroused by stimuli which signify the presence of some homeo-
static imperative, it would seem probable that a process of evolutionary ad-
aptation, ceteris paribus, would favour behaviours constituent of higher in-
tensity E-states over lower intensity states. For this reason, I am proposing 
that the relationship between E-states is competitive with higher intensity 
states winning control of the behavioural ‘levers’ from states of lower inten-
sity.     
2) Nature: In comparing the competitive power of E-states, an equivalence be-
tween the homeostatic imperatives which motivate those states cannot be as-
sumed. Rather, I will argue from experimental evidence that in the competi-
tion between emotions, there exists a general bias against those emotional 
states which promote long-term physiological homeostasis, providing pleas-
ure or relief, such as CARE, PLAY, LUST and SEEKING, and in favour of 
states such as RAGE and FEAR which are directed toward those objects, 
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events and circumstances which tend to act directly against the animal’s ho-
meostatic goals and/or offer immediate threats to its survival. 
In the following paragraphs, I will offer behavioural research and neuroscientific evi-
dence for my hypothesis.  
FEAR and RAGE 
In his discussion of the characteristics of FEAR, Panksepp devotes a good deal of 
space to the differentiation of the respective neural anatomies and neurochemistries 
of FEAR and RAGE and I reproduce some of his description below: 
“there are distinct sites in the brain where electrical stimulation will provoke a full 
fear response in all mammalian species, and these are locations where the executive 
system for FEAR is concentrated [  ]Of course this highly interconnected network in-
teracts with many other emotional systems discussed in this book, especially RAGE 
circuits (which contribute to the balance between flight and fight.” (1998 p.207)  
and 
“It makes good evolutionary sense for FEAR and RAGE circuits to be intimately re-
lated, for one of the functions of anger is to provoke fear in competitors, and one of 
the functions of fear is to reduce the impact of angry behaviours from threatening 
competitors.” (1998 p.208) 
Our observation of other mammalian species when presented with multiple emo-
tional stimuli is that they evoke recognisable ‘single’ emotional behaviours. There 
are apparent exceptions to this rule: we note that cats and dogs will often ‘face off’ 
against one another rather than fighting, displaying behaviours characteristic of both 
FEAR and RAGE. In these confrontations behaviours seem to alternate, with each E-
state being intermittently in control until the balance finally shifts towards aggres-
sion or flight. The interplay of these two emotions, therefore, is not manifested as 
some new behaviour, nor as a hybrid behaviour characteristic of both, but rather as 
an alternation between behaviours characteristic of the two E-states. 
Panksepp has proposed that RAGE suppresses FEAR and that FEAR excites RAGE 
but such an assumption is not required to explain the behaviours observed. Confron-
tations of the type I have described above may be for territory or for dominance; they 
193 
 
occur more frequently between males and carry the risk of harm. Given these cir-
cumstances, if the opponents are roughly evenly-matched, then both FEAR and 
RAGE are equally excited and compete for behavioural control. 
We can imagine this as a sort of arm wrestling competition. If the two competitors 
are of equal strength, then the two arms will move from side to side as each oppo-
nent summons his strength in pursuit of a win. If there is a mismatch, then one oppo-
nent will win immediately and the arms will come down rapidly in one direction or 
another. 
Panksepp notes that FEAR and RAGE circuits constitute a highly interconnected 
network suggesting that the two emotions often act simultaneously. This level of in-
teraction is explained by the circumstance that the homeostatic imperatives causing 
FEAR and RAGE frequently originate in a single stimulus: so it will often be the 
case that 1) any constraint upon a drive to carry out some homeostatically valuable 
activity, e.g. sexual, territorial or nurturing will arise in the form of some creature 
which in itself poses 2) a risk to the survival of the subject. The prioritisation of fight 
or flight in these circumstances may have an existential outcome, making it im-
portant that each E-state possesses the ability, within a normal range of intensities, to 
prevail over the other. Under these circumstances the balance between these two be-
haviours would benefit from extensive neural interconnectivity. 
 PANIC and CARE 
The weight of Panksepp’s concept of PANIC lies some distance from the common 
understanding of the word. It finds its origin in the state of distress which is exhib-
ited when a young mammal is separated from its mother. In later infancy, for species 
which display cooperative behaviours, the same emotion arises when the animal is 
isolated from the group. In expanding his explanation, Panksepp claims that PANIC 
finds an expression in the form of loneliness, grief and social isolation. The 
PANIC/CARE relationship constitutes an exception to my claim that emotions are 
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competitive. For an infant, an absence of CARE, will cause PANIC, and the provi-
sion of CARE will relieve PANIC, supporting Panksepp’s claim that emotional in-
teractions entail excitation or inhibition rather than competition51.  
In the early stage of infancy, the stimulus for PANIC will be the absence of the carer 
and the stimulus for CARE will be a distress vocalisation by the young animal. For 
extended nurture to occur, both emotions are necessary, each complementing and 
supporting the other, so that separation causes an increased parental urge to nurture 
and the offspring to evoke distress behaviours. From this perspective, a correspond-
ence of emotional intensities exists, in which competent nurture and a satisfied off-
spring represent one extreme, and a failure to nurture and a distressed offspring rep-
resents the other. 
In the event that parent or offspring are separated, the length of separation will indi-
cate the intensity of the emotions CARE and PANIC and either of these emotions 
will act competitively in the presence of other emotions. 
 
FEAR and PLAY 
Panksepp noted that young rats placed in a chamber together would regularly solicit 
each other to play by making a characteristic dorsal contact, and in subsequent play 
behaviour they would attempt to ‘pin’ one another rather like wrestlers. The number 
of dorsal contacts and ‘pins’ per five minutes, reflect the amount of play occurring.  
In the experiment, two groups of young rats (one experimental and one control) were 
placed in separate play chambers for five minutes on four successive days and their 
play behaviour was measured. On the fifth day a tuft of cat fur was placed in one of 
the play chambers and for that group, play behaviour immediately ceased. The rats 
‘moved furtively’ and cautiously sniffed the fur and other parts of the play chamber 
in a behaviour characteristic of FEAR.  
 
 
51 For a more extensive description of this emotional symbiosis see Panksepp pp 260-274 
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Following this single exposure, the cat fur was removed and the chamber thoroughly 
cleaned but on subsequent days, play was strongly inhibited and even after five days, 
frequency of play was at 30% of the level of the control group. 
  
In understanding the rats’ behaviour, the experiment can be considered in four 
stages. In the first, the presence of another young rat acts as an unconditioned stimu-
lus, causing the rats to play; in the second stage, the smell of the fur induces FEAR 
which fully suppresses play behaviour, and in the third stage, all traces of the FEAR 
stimulus have been removed, but the young rats are now conditioned to behave fear-
fully as a response to being placed in the experimental chamber, suppressing play be-
haviour. In the final stage, play behaviour gradually re-establishes itself. (Diagram 
14b.) 
 
In sum, rats who are accustomed to playing in an experimental chamber and receive 
a one-time exposure to cat fur in that chamber are reluctant to play on the subsequent 
occasion. In later sessions however, play behaviour will slowly re-establish itself if 
the unconditioned stimulus is not repeated. Our own emotional experiences make 
this gradual re-establishment of play intuitively reasonable, yet it does not speak of a 
process in which PLAY is solely in control of the rat’s behaviour, but rather one of a 
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competition between PLAY and FEAR in which each intermittently exerts control 
over behaviour, so when the rats play intermittently but less frequently in subsequent 
sessions, the shortening interludes of inactivity indicate the regression of the FEAR-
conditioned behaviour in the absence of reinforcement. 
 
PLAY and SEEKING 
In 1981 Anne Humphreys and Dorothy Einon carried out a series of experiments at-
tempting to discover what factors would induce young rats to play, how the rats val-
ued play, and whether rats could learn when motivated by play. They make an inter-
esting observation at the commencement of the paper with regard to the findings of 
earlier researchers:  
“[Play] tends to be characterized by a number of largely negative properties, e.g. 
play has no goal, no immediate result, no overall structure and happens only when 
the animal has nothing more important to do.” (1981 p.259). 
Initially the researchers employed a ‘T-maze’ format in which a young rat was 
placed in one arm and food in the other. Even after 12 hours of food deprivation, the 
experimental subject, another young rat, showed a preference for play when offered 
a choice between food or play in the maze. Their subsequent analysis of this and sev-
eral other play-related learning behaviours in rats led Humphreys and Einon to con-
clude (1981)  
“Comparison of the social choice experiments with a food/no food experiment shows 
that the reinforcing value of social factors for a rat deprived of company is similar to 
that for a food-deprived rat. Rates of learning were similar for the two tasks. Rats 
will run [a maze] faster for social rather than for food reinforcement.” (1981 p.269). 
My previous discussion of SEEKING calls into question Humphrey and Einon’s as-
sociation of maze learning with goal preference. Rats will learn a maze without a re-
ward, motivated by its unfamiliarity and unlike Panksepp, Humphreys and Einon 
have not calibrated PLAY behaviours but rather the preference for play. They dis-
covered that a rat available for play was preferred to a rat who was not and that the 
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Of the two emotions FEAR and RAGE, FEAR is the most appropriate for experi-
mental purposes, being more straightforward to induce and control. The difficulty of 
reliably arousing and measuring the effects of RAGE means that it is rarely meas-
ured under experimental conditions and never, so far as can be ascertained, in com-
petition with other emotions. Our experience of mammalian behaviours indicates 
strongly, for example, that an animal in an extreme state of RAGE would not play or 
seek food. The only emotion which can impose itself under such circumstances is 
FEAR. But non-predatory encounters between and within species most frequently 
end in the flight of one combatant, indicating a rough equivalence, with FEAR usu-
ally determining the outcome.   
In a hierarchy of emotions, FEAR and RAGE therefore will tend to subdue states 
such as SEEKING, PLAY, LUST and CARE but once again, experimental measure-
ments comparing these more congenial states are rare. The Humphreys and Einon 
experiment suggests that the effects of low level homeostatic urges are suppressed by 
the impulse to play.  
If competition between emotions occurs, this competition is best explained as arising 
between the E-state brain modes. For such a competition to occur, even if one emo-
tion is dominant, and the other suppressed, providing both emotional stimuli are pre-
sent, the suppressed emotion retains its latency as a characteristic brain mode and a 
behavioural disposition. 
There is a single exception to this hypothesis which is found in the mutually support-
ive roles of CARE and PANIC, each of which evoke behaviours necessary to pro-
mote the survival of mammalian offspring prior to maturity. But again, we have no 
evidence to characterize the behaviours in these emotional states as outward-facing 
emotions: we do not know, for example, how a young animal, when separated from 
its parent and in a state of PANIC, will respond to external ‘non-CARE’ emotional 
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stimuli, or whether a parent when separated from its offspring is influenced in its re-
sponses to new stimuli by the state of CARE. 
In the absence of such evidence, the virtue of a competitive model derives from its 
simplicity. It does not require that emotions ‘interact’ as Panksepp proposes but only 
that they compete for precedence and that such competition is between E-states, hav-
ing as its outcome the adoption of the dominant E-state behaviour. This competition 
can take two forms: 
1) When one E-state brain mode is dominant, the dominant behaviour is evoked. 
2) When E-state brain modes are each of an intensity insufficient to suppress the 


















Chapter 15:  Primitive Emotions - Summary 
My aim has been to demonstrate the existence of a framework of subcortical mecha-
nisms - primitive emotions - which support the important life-sustaining, reproduc-
tive and social/nurturing functions we observe in mammalian species.  
Each primitive emotion evokes a characteristic behaviour (or behaviours) in response 
to the detection of one of two general stimulus types: 
1) Unconditioned stimulus directly inducing a primitive emotion which can be un-
derstood as consisting of these components: 
• An inborn mechanism able to detect a particular stimulus object, or class 
of stimuli, which will arouse a characteristic brain mode: 
• The brain mode, consisting of subcortical neural circuits and associated 
neurochemistries, causes: 
i. a behaviour which addresses the stimulus detected, or a 
disposition to evoke such a behaviour. 
ii. A physiology – both musculoskeletal and visceral – which 
supports that behaviour. 
2) Acquired stimulus in which a primitive emotion, when aroused by an uncondi-
tioned stimulus, may cause the subject to acquire, or act upon new, information 
about its environment spontaneously, either: 
• passively, in association with SEEKING, or  
• by classical conditioning in association with non-SEEKING emotions.  
Processes by which Stimuli are acquired 
SEEKING and the Passive Acquisition of Information by Attention 
Neuroscientific research into the brain processes which instantiate primitive 
emotional processes provide no evidence of a function which will enable a 
stimulus object to be discriminated. Conversely, research into attention indi-
cates an absence of functions which would enable acquired stimulus infor-
mation to be acted upon. However, these two processes appear to interact in a 
relationship by which an animal in a SEEKING state displays an enhanced 
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state of sensory arousal, catalysing those attentional processes which discrim-
inate and retain objects as passive cues. 
The Acquisition of Conditioned Stimuli 
A non-SEEKING emotion generated by an unconditioned stimulus may 
cause an associated passive cue to be conditioned, so that the primitive emo-
tion is aroused when that cue is subsequently detected in the absence of the 
unconditioned stimulus. From this account, it may be inferred that when a 
primitive emotion causes the subject to acquire information by conditioning, 
the process of conditioning is triggered by – and functions as a component of 
- the primitive emotional mechanism.  
Primitive Emotional Responses to Multiple Stimuli 
Simultaneous presentation of multiple stimuli – either conditioned or unconditioned 
– will arouse diverse primitive emotions, with each brain mode characteristic of an 
emotion acting as a proxy for its arousing stimulus, with each brain mode competing 
for control of the behaviour of the primitive mammal. The behavioural outcome of 
competing emotions will be a function of the nature and intensity of the emotions 
aroused – a competition biased in favour of emotions generated by constraining or 
life-threatening cues and against those emotions which promote the longer-term wel-
fare of the subject, such as PLAY or SEEKING. 
The Concept of a Homeostatic Imperative 
The manner in which each primitive emotion evokes a behaviour in the presence of 
particular unconditioned and conditioned stimuli constitutes one component of a 
more extensive relationship between the animal and its environment, in which the 
animal is able to detect and respond to objects of homeostatic value in order to pro-
mote its survival or wellbeing. For example, SEEKING can be understood as a re-
sponse to internal homeostatic imbalances; RAGE is a response to any constraint 
upon the subject’s pursuit of other homeostatically-motivated behaviours, whilst 
FEAR arises as a response to threats to its survival or wellbeing. I have called these 
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overarching stimulus classifications ‘metastimuli’ but such a description fails to ad-
dress the totality of the concept. Each metastimulus is not simply a description of a 
class of stimuli which cause characteristic behaviours; it derives its explanatory 
power from its correspondence with ancient phylogenetically established motiva-
tional principles for the achievement of homeostasis within the organism, which are 
realised for each species as a set of homeostatic imperatives.  
General Findings 
My stated purpose in developing a primitive emotional model of emotion was to de-
velop an account of emotionally-induced behaviours which could be clearly differen-
tiated from the sort of reflexive behaviours found in species such as the common 
toad, hence providing a lower boundary between behaviours occurring as reflexes 
and those which are the outcome of primitive emotion. 
In order to achieve this, I have offered an account of a primitive mammal, motivated 
solely by primitive emotional mechanisms in which brain modes intervene between 
stimulus and response to determine behaviour. 
In the primitive emotional hypothesis I have presented, the response of a primitive 
mammal to a single unconditioned stimulus may be reliably predicted, but its re-
sponse to conditioned stimuli will correspond to the history of the acquisition of 
those stimuli. In a natural environment, that history will be the outcome of accidental 
correlations between external objects, events or circumstances and the status of the 
animal at the time of an encounter52 - a history which will differ between individuals. 
It will also be dependent upon the number of emotion-inducing stimuli present, each 
of which may induce a separate competing emotional state.  
Unlike Ewert’s account of the behaviours of the toad, we could not know with cer-
tainty which objects would cause a primitive mammal to express fear or rage or how 
it would behave when confronted with multiple stimuli, even though the animal is 
acting without intention. On the basis of the explanation I have offered, the behav-
iours of a primitive mammal are not a reliable function of a single stimulus, or a 
 
52 Such as whether it is afraid, hungry or angry.   
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fixed array of stimuli; rather its behaviours are the product of a cluster of inherited 
and acquired stimuli able to arouse a primitive emotion. This unpredictability of re-
sponse is increased when multiple stimuli are present, in which case the nature and 
intensity of the competing brain modes aroused will determine behaviour.  
According to this account, the E-state brain mode and its associated conditioning 
processes mediate between stimulus and response in primitive emotional systems; 




















PART III – EMOTION AS A DUAL PROCESS 
Introduction 
Primitive emotional systems are aroused in mammals when conditioned or uncondi-
tioned stimuli are detected, causing subcortical circuits and neurochemistries charac-
teristic of an emotion to be activated. If all mammals are subject to primitive emo-
tions, then humans will experience primitive emotions in response to certain types of 
stimulus. 
Despite this, some of the emotions generally acknowledged by humans, such as 
guilt, or resentment are not explained as either the stimulus classes or the basic re-
sponses which characterize primitive emotional systems as I have described them. 
These emotions take as their cues a much broader scope of objects, events and cir-
cumstances and have as their outcomes a more complex set of responses to externali-
ties than those encompassed by primitive emotional theory - some so distant that our 
designation of both states as ‘emotions’ could be regarded as accidental. 
But even if we accept that some manifestations of emotion in humans differ from the 
primitive emotional states found in animals, there is potential common ground: in 
Chapter 3, I have described a Commonsense View of emotion in which, say, the ter-
minology I employ to describe my response to losing my job is also used to explain 
the behaviour of a rat in a footshock chamber; so, just as I say “I am afraid of losing 
my job”, I would say “That rat is afraid of the chamber.”  
The use of such terminology could be construed as implying an underlying corre-
spondence between primitive emotions and cognitive-evaluative emotional states. 
This introduces a dilemma: the commonsense terminology I have described assumes 
that there exists some aspect of both examples -being afraid - which is shared; yet in 
previous chapters I have presented these two accounts of emotion as independent in 
their functioning. In Part I, I have described how cognitive-evaluative theory postu-
lates that emotion is the outcome of an evaluation of some object, event or circum-
stance as having significance for the goals or wellbeing of the subject; in conse-
quence, cognitive-evaluative theory holds that my fear that I will lose my job is an 
intentional phenomenon, conforming to Nussbaum’s theory that my emotion is the 
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result of an evaluation that this circumstance constitutes a threat to my wellbeing. In 
Part II - and contrasting with this view - I have described primitive emotions as non-
intentional phenomena arising spontaneously and activated by a conditioned or un-
conditioned stimulus. According to this account, the rat in the footshock chamber ex-
hibits fear as an automatic response, having a characteristic neurophysiology. In 
short, these different accounts of emotion lead me to conclude that my fear of losing 
my job is not the fear of a rat in a footshock chamber. 
The dilemma may be summarised thus: I have presented two apparently independent 
accounts of emotion, yet neither of these accounts is able to explain the com-
monsense view that certain aspects of emotion - both cognitive-evaluative and primi-
tive - are shared by humans and other mammals. 
My intention going forward is to answer this question: can these three accounts of 
emotion be brought together into a single explanation in such a way that each is vin-
dicated? In pursuit of this goal, the framework for the theory I intend to advance is a 
‘dual process’ model. Dual process theories are used in psychological explanations 
of mental phenomena as diverse as memory (Jacoby 1991), reasoning (Frankish 
2009) and decision-making (Klaczynski 2004).  
The outline methodology I will adopt will be to explore a number of experiments 
carried out by psychologists and neuroscientists which describe an interaction be-
tween primitive and evaluative states of emotion, with the object of generating a new 
account of emotion which is constituted of primitive and evaluative states acting as 
mutually supportive elements of the human emotional process in a relationship typi-
cal of a dual process explanation. 
My approach will be to assemble and discuss the evidence for this explanation in 
stages: 
• Step1:  Chapter 16 will employ evidence from a set of experiments by Murphy 
and Zajonc and another from Hess. Both experiments support the view that brain 




• Step 2: Chapter 16 will examine further evidence from Murphy and Zajonc’s 
findings in which cognitive evaluations act to regulate primitive emotions. 
• Step 3: Chapter 17 will consider the neuroscientific evidence of Vuilleumier, 
Driver et al., in which measurements of the neurological states of attention and 
emotion are compared. From these measurements it is claimed that evaluative re-
sponses to affective images are associated with the automatic arousal of brain 
processes which bias the perception of the image in a manner analogous to that 
of attentional processes.  
• Step 4: In Chapter 18 This claim is argued to be consistent with the findings of 
Smith and Lazarus’s psychological studies in which certain patterns of appraisals 
are found to be strongly associated with the subjects’ reports of their emotional 
states. In explaining this connection, Lazarus claims that emotions are the result 
of a process whereby appraisals signal the presence in external contexts of issues 
of adaptive significance for the subject, resulting in the arousal of underlying 
stimulus/response reflexes, causing physiological changes and states of action 
preparedness. This account is argued to fail adequately to account for the connec-
tion between emotional appraisals and co-occurring physiological changes and 
action impulses - effects which are more completely explained as the action of 
primitive emotions.  
• Step 5: In chapter 19, based upon the foregoing accounts, an explanation for the 
interaction of primitive and cognitive-evaluative states is proposed in which pat-
terns of appraisal occurring in cognitive-evaluative states cause the arousal of 
primitive emotions and these, in turn, bias the appraisal process 
• Step 6: Chapter 20 will further develop this explanation, creating a model of 
emotion which conforms to the requirements of a class of psychological phenom-
ena known as ‘dual process’. This model describes the interaction of intentional 
cognitive-evaluative states with nonintentional primitive emotional states in 
which the feelings associated with cognitive evaluation are attributable to neuro-
dynamic and neurochemical brain conditions generated by an underlying primi-
tive emotional system – explaining their role in emotion as experienced. 
• Step 7: Chapter 21 explains the influence of primitive emotion upon cogni 
tive-evaluative processes as the effects of emotional feelings 
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Chapter 16: The Influence of Primitive Emotional States upon Cognitive Evalu-
ation 
16.1. Murphy and Zajonc’s Comparative Investigation of Conscious and Noncon-
scious Affect 
 
In a 1993 paper “Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective Priming with Optimal 
and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures” Sheila Murphy and Robert Zajonc (M&Z) de-
scribe a set of experiments designed to determine whether affect can arise noninten-
tionally in humans and if so, whether such manifestations of affect are able to influ-
ence cognitive evaluation. I will briefly outline the experimental design and proce-
dures below: 
 
• The researchers employed ‘affective primes’ - slides of ten male and ten female 
faces expressing happiness or anger which had been assessed by Ekman to in-
duce positively and negatively valenced affect states in humans. (examples be-
low from Lawrence 2015) 
 
• Each emotion-inducing slide was followed by an example from another set of 
slides consisting of 45 Chinese ideographs which acted as ‘target stimuli’. Chi-
nese ideographs were used because the images carried no affective content, being 
bland, novel and ambiguous. To ensure this, the ideographs were tested initially 
without primes and then in association with ‘irrelevant’ primes (polygonal 
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shapes) to ascertain that, both in themselves, and in association with other neutral 
objects such as polygonal shapes, the ideographs were neither inherently liked or 
disliked. 
 
• In each study, a group of subjects were exposed to slides of ideographs followed 
by either positive or negative affective primes, or displayed separately (i.e. with-
out primes) and were asked to what extent they ‘liked’ or ‘disliked’ the ideo-
graphs. 
 
• Two exposure times were employed:  
 
o Suboptimal - 4 milliseconds 
o Optimal – 2 seconds  
 
The primes (both optimal and suboptimal) were presented immediately prior to 
the target stimulus and students were prepared attentionally for the image by a 
warning image (a dot in the centre of the screen). The same session was repeated 
twice for each student. 
 
• Subjects were then asked how ‘liked’ the target images were on a scale of 1 – 5 
where 1 is strong disliking, 5 is a strong liking and 3 is neither liking nor dislik-
ing. 
 




Statistical analysis of the results led researchers to conclude that when the affective 
primes were presented suboptimally they caused the target ideographs to be liked or 
disliked to an extent which differed significantly from each other. Moreover, the lik-
ing or disliking of any ideograph differed significantly from the evaluations of the 
same ideographs when viewed in the absence of the suboptimal prime, or in combi-
nation with a suboptimally presented neutral stimulus (a polygon); in these latter ex-
periments the ideographs were neither disliked or liked. 
 
The results shown demonstrate a well-researched and replicable phenomenon (see 
also Murphy et al 1995) in which subjects who had been exposed to the affective 
prime suboptimally expressed liking or disliking for associated target stimuli which 
had previously been confirmed by two independent methodologies (polygon prime 
and no prime) to evoke no affective response. Since the exposure time of the subop-
timal prime had been too brief for the subjects to register consciously, their liking or 
disliking of the target stimuli could only be explained by the subliminal detection of 
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the affective stimulus which in turn, spontaneously triggered the action of noncon-
scious states, causing nominally neutral target stimuli to be evaluated as liked or dis-
liked. 
 
In contrast, when the affective prime was presented optimally, but immediately pre-
ceding, an ideograph, the influence of the affective prime failed to produce a signifi-




The results obtained point to important differences in expressions of affect towards 
target stimuli depending upon whether the associated affective primes were pre-
sented suboptimally or optimally: 
 
i. Affective primes, when viewed for very short exposures, cause signifi-
cant expressions of liking or disliking in the evaluation of images which, 
in the absence of affective priming, were evaluated as neutral. 
 
ii. This induced bias disappears as the exposure time of the affective prime 
is increased. 
 
I will treat these two effects separately because I will argue they illustrate different 
aspects of the interaction of cognitive-evaluative and primitive emotions. In (i), 
M&Z have designed an experiment in which a primitive affect system is aroused in 
the absence of evaluation by exposing the affective stimulus for a timespan which is 
too brief for the subject to register and process intentionally; whereas in (ii), as the 
affective stimulus is prolonged, I will argue that the subject is increasingly able to 
evaluate the affective and neutral stimuli independently, hence inhibiting the affec-




I will consider initially M&Z’s experiments using suboptimal primes in (i) above, 
these will be considered in two stages: first when the initial presentation of the 
suboptimal prime is immediately succeeded by the optimal presentation of a target 
stimulus; second, when the same target stimulus is presented in a subsequent session 
to the same subject but in the absence of an affective prime. 
 
16.2  M&Z Effect (i): Target Stimulus Evaluation is influenced by Suboptimal 
Prime 
 
The description below relates only to the ‘suboptimal’ affective prime experiments 
which are displayed in the left hand cluster of results displayed in Diagram 16a. 
 
• When the Chinese ideograph is presented immediately (1ms) following a 
suboptimal prime, the subsequent intentional evaluation reveals a liking or 
disliking of the ideograph which is consistent with affective character of the 
associated prime. The affective prime has been presented for only 4 millisec-
onds; this interval is too brief for the subject to attend to and evaluate the 
prime. Therefore, whatever liking or disliking is reported must be caused by 
some mechanism whereby the ideograph, which would separately be evalu-
ated as neutral, is influenced by the affective character of the preceding 
suboptimal prime - a process which cannot entail evaluation. M&Z describe 
this effect as one in which the affective character of the suboptimal stimulus 
‘diffuses’ into the cognitive evaluation of the target stimulus, causing liking 
or disliking of that stimulus. 
 
• The nature of the mechanism which biases the evaluation is clarified when 
the subject is shown a target stimulus which has previously been presented in 
association with a suboptimal prime. In these experiments, it was discovered 
that the target stimulus remained ‘liked’ or ‘disliked’. If the original cognitive 
bias had been caused by some neural conflation in the temporary aftermath of 
the suboptimal stimulus presentation, we should expect that upon later 
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presentation, the effect would disappear, whereas the experiment demon-
strates that the affective bias is retained. M&Z attribute this effect to the ac-
tion of conditioning. They appeal to the findings of LeDoux et al,. in which a 
stimulus induces an affective response more rapidly than can be explained by 
the brain’s ability to retrieve and assess that stimulus. “This neuroanatomical 
architecture thus allows us to like something without knowing what it is.”. 
(1993 p.737).  
 
LeDoux proposes (see Chapter 11, p.160) that when an unconditioned stimu-
lus (normally a fear-inducing stimulus) is presented in association with a neu-
tral cue, having no affective potential, then a spontaneous process will occur 
in which the neutral cue will assume the affective status of the unconditioned 
stimulus. In this state the neutral cue is conditioned. When the conditioned 
stimulus is subsequently presented, it acts as a proxy for the (now absent) un-
conditioned stimulus, causing aversion (Diagram 16b.). In LeDoux’s experi-
ments, it is proposed that the mechanism which most readily causes condi-
tioning is fear. In M&Z’s experiments, Chinese ideographs serve as neutral 







A Note Regarding The Persistence of Primitive Emotions in the Presence of Related 
Conscious States 
 
In Part I, I have reported the cognitive evaluative responses to the subliminally in-
duced affective states I have described above. Lazarus states that they “seem to dis-
appear or at least go underground with an ontogenetic shift to higher mental pro-
cesses” whilst Solomon is dismissive “Joe LeDoux and Jaak Panksepp, and Antonio 
Damasio, [sometimes present] an emotion [  ] as if it is more or less over and done 
in 120 milliseconds, the rest being mere aftermath of cerebral embellishment.” 
(2004 p.78) 
Contrasting with this view, Seamon et al. in their research into the action of sublimi-
nal affect upon a neutral stimulus, observe “When the judgment task was delayed for 
one hour or one week after the study stimuli were shown, only target selection by af-
fect [i.e. targets which had been presented in association with a suboptimal stimulus] 
remain greater than chance”. (1984 p.465). On this account, a liking or disliking of 
an initially neutral target stimulus which has been suboptimally conditioned is a per-
sistent phenomenon.  
 
These results demonstrate that we cannot assume that the action of primitive emotion 
on human evaluation is a fleeting phenomenon; and we cannot assume from Hess’s 
experiment (see below) that to have an effect upon evaluation in humans, the origins 
of an unconditioned stimulus must be obscure. With these particular examples, we 
can differentiate nonintentional states from cognitive evaluations just because the bi-
ases generated seem irrational, making them useful for experimentation by revealing 
the action of these underlying states. In doing so, these experiments provide rare ex-
amples of the unregulated effects of primitive emotions upon evaluation; they do not 






16.3  The action of Primitive Emotional Systems other than FEAR 
 
Murphy and Zajonc also speculate as to whether experimental stimuli could induce 
responses other than aversion or liking. One such example has been provided by 
E.H. Hess (1975) who described an experiment in which male subjects were pre-
sented with a pair of almost identical photos of a young woman, with the single dif-
ference that the pupils in one of the photos were artificially enlarged. Whilst subjects 
were unable to identify any specific differences between the photos, the ‘larger pu-
pil’ image was preferred to an extent which was statistically significant.    
 
Hess’s experiment may be explained as the action of a primitive emotion: the prefer-
ence observed is caused by an unconditioned stimulus, dilated pupils53, which is sex-
ually attractive to males, inducing the primitive emotion LUST, causing preference 




53 In Renaissance Italy, young women would put drops of belladonna extract in their eyes to induce 




16.4. Some Observations Regarding the Nature of Nonintentional Emotional 
States 
 
16.4.1 Primitive Emotions as Subdoxastic States 
In his 1978 paper Stephen Stich concludes from Hess’s experiment that there is 
plainly some unknown mechanism which gives rise to a preference for the larger pu-
pil size – a mechanism which I have attributed to the action of the primitive emotion 
LUST. The mechanism is able to detect and react to small discrepancies in the two 
images which remain hidden from the evaluative process.  
Because the experimental subjects were unable to identify the difference between the 
two images, the stated preference was claimed by Stich to “play a role in the proxi-
mate causal history of beliefs, but there is a strong intuitive inclination to deny that 
they are beliefs themselves.” (1978 p.503).  Stich termed these types of mental phe-
nomena ‘subdoxastic states’. These states support active belief-driven processes, 
which Stich describes as occurrent beliefs:  
“In this case, the state which serves to represent the information that one pupil is 
larger than another is analogous to quite unexceptional cases of belief. For we are 
ordinarily quite unaware of most of our beliefs, and the experience of having the be-
lief occurrently is provoked when our attention is directed to the content of the be-
lief.” (1978 p.506) 
It is only when prompted that we employ an inferential process to identify the mental 
states which support occurrent beliefs, and it is here that the distinction between be-
liefs and subdoxastic states may be examined. To exemplify: I will find when 
prompted that when I express a preference for ice in my whiskey, I can support this 
preference with the belief that ice will cool the whiskey. However, in Hess’s experi-
ment, the subject will be unable to employ an inferential process to access the origins 
of his stated preference for one image over the other when prompted.  
Stich points out that if we were to draw the subject’s attention to the effect of pupil 
size, he would become able to form an inferential basis for his belief, yet despite this, 
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we would generally be unwilling to treat the origin of the initial expression of prefer-
ence as a belief. Stich asks: 
 “What is it about the state in the Hess example that makes us reluctant to treat it as 
a belief? I think the answer is that this state [has] a sort of inferential isolation from 
the body of our accessible beliefs” (1978 p.506).  
Stich argues that our unwillingness to attribute the stated preference to the action of 
the unknown mechanism in the role of a belief stems from our inability to infer (in 
the absence of further explanation) that the preference has been caused by dilated pu-
pils. It might be claimed that in Hess’s experiment, such a chain of inference extends 
seamlessly down through the substrates which support our intentional inferential 
processes to the unknown mechanism which causes the preference. But whilst ac-
knowledging that some underlying mechanism exists, Stich argues that we are una-
ble to account for its function, nor are we able to explain the manner in which prefer-
ence is generated in the evaluative process. For these reasons, such mechanisms are 
inferentially isolated.  
16.4.2 Covert or Implicit Beliefs 
In claiming that certain stimuli, by arousing emotional states spontaneously, can in-
fluence intentional processes and particularly expressions of preference54, I wish im-
mediately to contrast this effect with the action of covert or implicit beliefs. Amelia 
Rorty, in her paper, Explaining Emotions, argues that in making certain evaluations, 
our motivating beliefs may be hidden from us: 
 
 “Constructing the causal history often involves reconstructing a rationale: the 
problem is to determine at what point in that history to apply some modified version 
of charity. Often it is accurately applied only quite far back in the person’s psycho-
logical history to explain the formation of pre-propositional but intentional habits of 
salience, organisation and interpretation. It is these which through later intervening 
beliefs and attitudes - many of them false and inappropriate – explain the conserva-
tion of emotions.”  (1978 p.140).  
 




What Rorty is describing is an important class of emotional evaluations, formed in-
tentionally and motivated by beliefs which, over time, have become forgotten by the 
experiencing subject or have been suppressed for other unacknowledged motives. 
The presence of such beliefs is generally signalled by systematic biases in our ap-
praisals which appear to others to be irrational, or to act against the perceived inter-
ests of the subject. Rorty proposes that such beliefs may be traced back through the 
psychoanalytic method of regression to some forgotten historical event in which 
such a belief would constitute a comprehensible, though not necessarily optimal, re-
sponse to a set of circumstances.  
To illustrate the type of bias she has in mind, Rorty imagines a case in which a male 
subject has an irrational dislike of women in authority. He reacts to instructions from 
women in such roles in a resentful manner which he would not adopt if those same 
instructions were given by a man. And in justifying his behaviour, he falsely empha-
sises aspects of the women’s demeanour and behaviour as causing his resentment. 
During the process of regression, the subject is found to have a rather distant rela-
tionship with his mother and a closer relationship with his uncle, who encouraged 
him to regard women in this way. 
In expressing an irrational preference, the subject is acting intentionally and may in-
vent plausible reasons for his feelings, but the underlying beliefs which cause these 
preferences, though initially inaccessible to him, are not Stich’s subdoxastic states. 
Such beliefs may, with support from a therapist, be traced via an inferential process 
to some underlying belief, based, perhaps, upon false premises. These beliefs are not 
– to use Stich’s term - ‘inferentially isolated’ in the manner of the affective biases in-
duced by conditioning in Murphy and Zajonc’s experiments, or the inborn neural 
mechanism of response to dilated pupils in Hess’s investigation. Both mechanisms 
remain to be fully explicated as neural phenomena and neither is accessible via an in-







The evidence from Murphy and Zajonc’s ‘suboptimal prime’ experiment allows me 
to take a first step towards my goal of bringing together cognitive evaluative and 
primitive emotional theories in a single explanation: it describes an interaction of 
states in which a primitive emotional state, when aroused by the subliminal detection 
of an affective stimulus, causes the subject to evaluate a stimulus - which, in the ab-
sence of the affective prime, would be evaluated as neutral – as liked or disliked. 
Moreover, whether the stimulus is liked or disliked corresponds to the affective na-
ture of the associated suboptimal prime. 
 
16.5 M&Z Effect 2: Target Stimulus is not Biased by Optimal Prime 
 
My account going forward relates only to M&Z’s ‘optimal’ affective prime experi-
ments which are displayed in the right-hand cluster of results displayed in Diagram 
16a. on p.209.  
 
In the second stage of M&Z’s experiment, the affective prime is presented for 2 sec-
onds followed by the target stimulus. In these experiments, affective biasing of the 
target stimulus is not observed55 - target stimuli are appraised as neutral. This finding 
is in conformance with Lazarus’s cognitive-evaluative explanation. But M&Z argue 
that this neutrality might be the effect of increasing the exposure of the affective 
stimulus, a process in which: 
 
 “the subsequent information contradicts or dilutes the primary affective reaction, 
[creating] the possibility that the two sources of influence could nullify each other, 
thus cancelling the priming effect.”  (1993 p.727) 
 
 
55 On the face of it, it could be argued that the affective influence is even slightly reversed (Diag. 16a 
RHS) but M&Z maintain that this reversal is statistically non-significant. 
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Murphy and Zajonc are postulating that as affective prime exposure is progressively 
increased, a separate cognitive evaluation of the prime is enabled which inhibits the 
influence of the prime upon the target stimulus56. More specifically, they propose 
that as prime exposure times increase, two mental processes are activated: first – and 
most rapidly - a raw expression of affect (which they term ‘A’)  “unencumbered by 
other more complex information” (1993 p.727); second - but in parallel with this 
process - they propose a delayed cognitive response ‘C’ in which: “the individual is 
capable of accessing not only the primitive and gross affective significance of the 
stimulus but is also able to glean additional affective input from a more extensive 
cognitive appraisal. At longer exposures then, the stimulus is likely to activate a 
more complex network of associations allowing for feature identification and recog-
nition.” The arousal of both these neural processes is charted by M&Z below. 
 
In order to illustrate the operation Effect 2, M&Z combine their experimental results 
with those from a separate study by Seamon et al., which measured affective and 
cognitive processes over a 0 – 48ms range of exposure times, they have constructed 
the chart to represent the interaction of processes ‘A’ and ‘C’ shown in Diagram 16d. 
 
 
56 Panksepp supports this view: “Cortical control of primitive behaviours and basic emotions has been 
achieved in several ways. One way was for the cortex to extend emotions in time by allowing organ-
isms to dwell on past and future events. Another pervasive solution was for the cortex to inhibit the 
actions of primitive instinctual systems situated in subcortical areas” (Panksepp p74) 
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These two processes interact. As the cognitive response becomes established over 
time, it may either be consistent or inconsistent with the initial raw affective re-
sponse, hence reinforcing (exciting) or nullifying (inhibiting) its initial effect. This 
constitutes a different claim to that made for Effect 1 (the claim that a cognitive eval-
uation can be influenced by a primitive emotion); it is a proposal that a cognitive 
evaluation of an affective stimulus, in association with a neutral stimulus, will tend 
to suppress the initial evaluative biasing of the neutral stimulus, which has ‘diffused’ 
from the subliminally-presented affective prime, as the prolonged evaluation time al-
lows the separate ‘neutral’ status of the ideograph to be progressively established. 
 
In these results (Diagram 16e), M&Z depict the interaction of cognitive and affective 
stimuli as a function of exposure: for example, C+ will continue to excite (i.e. rein-
force) A+ if the initial affective biasing is confirmed by the delayed cognitive evalu-
ation, whereas C- will inhibit (i.e. tend to nullify) A+ if the delayed cognitive evalua-
tion conflicts with the initial affective biasing. Similarly A-,C- conditions are rein-





16.6   Discussion 
 
• Inconsistent Affective Prime and Target Stimulus  
 
In Murphy and Zajonc’s optimal prime trials, the power of the affective prime to in-
duce an affective bias towards the neutral stimulus diminishes as the affective prime 
exposure time is increased. This process is attributed to the action of the cognitive 
evaluation, in which a developing apprehension of the separate nature of the affec-
tive prime causes a corresponding inhibition of its effect. When the affective prime is 
initially presented at very limited exposures, cognitive evaluation is overridden by 
the affective influence of the prime, but as affective prime exposure is extended, 
cognitive-evaluative processes progressively intervene to suppress the initial affec-
tive preference, as the separateness and neutrality of the target stimulus is gradually 
re-cognized. Diagram 16f. below provides a schematic of this process. 
 
 
The process described above will reach a conclusion when the affective prime has 
been exposed for a sufficient length to allow the subject to apprehend that the two 




M&Z do not investigate the separate evaluation of the optimal prime in their study. 
However, experiments by Vuilleumier et al. in the next chapter will demonstrate that 
the prime is evaluated as disliked, and that this evaluation is supported by neural pro-
cesses which are typical of primitive emotions.   
 
• Consistent Affective Prime and Target Stimulus 
Murphy and Zajonc’s research is concerned with affective and cognitive processes 
which induce opposing effects so that the initial affective reaction becomes nullified. 
Consider now the predicted A-/C- interaction, where delayed evaluation reinforces a 
suboptimal aversive response.  
Assume that at the periphery of my vision I glimpse a strange figure at the window, 
producing an early-onset FEAR response. This immediately causes me to turn my at-
tention to the window and I discover that indeed, there is a strange figure (Diagram 
16h). Unlike my evaluation of the Chinese ideograph, this evaluation confirms and 
supports the initial primitive emotional impulse, exciting and prolonging the physio-




16.7   Summary 
  
The evidence from Murphy and Zajonc’s experiments allows me to take two steps 
towards my goal of bringing together cognitive evaluative and primitive emotional 
theories in a single explanation: 
 
• M&Z’s suboptimal prime experiments describe the biasing effect of sponta-
neously-aroused nonintentional states, which I have identified as primitive 
emotions, upon cognitive-evaluative states. In the M&Z experiments the sub-
liminal detection of an unconditioned stimulus (either directly or by condi-
tioning) causes an associated, but  neutral, stimulus to be evaluated as liked 
or disliked, whereas in Hess’s example the covert action of an unconditioned 
stimulus activates an inherited interpretative mechanism, causing a prefer-





• In M&Z’s optimal prime experiments, as the exposure time of the affective 
stimulus is increased, further information with respect to the prime becomes 
available. If this new information is inconsistent with the primitive emotional 
biasing effect, that effect is inhibited, whereas if it is confirmed, the impulse 
is further excited. This progressive inhibition or excitation demonstrates the 
ability of cognitive evaluation to regulate the primitive emotional intensity. 
 
The interaction of cognitive-evaluative and primitive emotional states described 













Chapter 17: Vuilleumier and Driver’s Research into Attention and Emotion 
 
17.1 Introduction 
The evidence offered by Murphy and Zajonc has allowed me to characterize the in-
teraction of evaluative and primitive states as one in which evaluation may regulate 
primitive emotions, whilst primitive emotions, when aroused, will influence evalua-
tion. My goal now will be to complete my explanation of the interaction of evalua-
tive and emotional states by offering an account of a process by which a primitive 
emotion is aroused by evaluation, as outlined in Diagram 17a. below. In this and the 
following chapters I will investigate respectively, neuroscientific and psychological 
accounts of emotion which provide some insights into this relationship, and I will 
subsequently offer an explanation - drawn from this evidence and previous findings - 
concerning the interaction of primitive emotion and cognitive evaluation which is 
consistent with both the neuroscientific and psychological evidence. 
 
In this chapter I will open with a description of research into the neural processes by 
which the intention to carry out an attentional task causes the spontaneous arousal of 
specialized visual functions appropriate for that task. This model of attention is sub-
sequently compared with similar experiments in which the action and interaction of 
attentional and emotional processes are described, and similarities between the func-




17.2 Selective Attention and Modulation57 of Sensory Processing 
 
Over the past twenty years, advances in the number of technologies available for the 
measurement of brain activity58 have enabled an improved visualisation of the func-
tional components of brain structure and their locations. And more recent advances 
in these technologies have permitted a preliminary investigation into the causal rela-
tionships which exist between components of that structure.  
 
I will now outline some findings of research into attention which have been informed 
by this approach.  
 
Early psychological research into human attention indicated that for any individual, 
the extent of attention available to distribute between tasks at any particular time can 
be treated as finite; so that when, say, a subject is tasked to listen to two streams of 
audible information simultaneously, one of those streams is attenuated at a sensory 
level, allowing attention to be directed towards the preferred stream. (Triesman 
1964) 
 
Similar patterns of attenuation in response to attentional tasking have been identified 
for feature-selective responses in visual areas for colour versus motion (Corbetta et 
al,1990); words versus objects (Rees 1999); or faces (in the fusiform face area 
(FFA)) versus houses (in the Parahippocampal Place Area (PPA)) (Wojciulik et al). 
Each visual module, acting as an element of an integrated network, brings some new 
 
57 For clarification, I shall generally refer to ‘modulation’ as ‘regulation’. I do this because modula-
tion, whilst sharing the same sense as regulation (by which I indicate the regulation of the intensity 
of some mental process), is separately interpreted as a transition to some new musical key, or as an 
electronic process for mixing a signal with a sinusoid to produce a new signal. However, since 
Vuilleumier and Driver refer exclusively to modulation in their text when describing processes of at-
tenuation or excitation of some underlying state (that is, in the same sense that I would describe  
‘regulation’), I shall retain this use when discussing their work. 
58 Techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), 




function to the act of attending, which may be more or less required, given the nature 
of the task in hand. 
 
The source of attentional regulation has been identified as the product of distributed 
networks located in the superior and inferior circuits of the fronto-parietal cortex, 
(Corbetta and Shulman 2002) and in the medial regions of the frontal and parietal 
lobes. 
 
Vuilleumier and Driver (2007) have made a survey of research into the neurological 
processes which arise in emotional and attentional processes and in summarising, 
note:  
 
“Findings from both human and animal neuroscience provide abundant evidence 
that top down modulations of sensory processing play a key role in selective atten-
tion and perceptual awareness.” and that “these attentional modulations can have 
strong corresponding effects on perceptual judgments and awareness.” (2007 
p.839). 
 
What is being claimed here is that my intention to discriminate one object category 
rather than another will affect which autonomously-functioning visual modules are 
allocated to carry out the task, and that once selected, these modules will affect how 
we look for the objects specified in the attentional tasking. 
 
According to this account, an intention to perform an attentional task causes the 
spontaneous activation of visual modules appropriate for supporting that intention; 
so that, say, an intention to identify and select a certain type of face from a set of 
face and house images will bring into action a visual module favouring face selection 
and will attenuate the module supporting house selection. Therefore, whilst tasking 
is intentional and the functioning of visual modules is not, at some level, the atten-




The way I intend to perform a task therefore, - looking for one stimulus rather than 
another - will affect which attentional modules are brought to bear upon the task. But 
the mechanisms which instantiate such neural processes entail both feed back and 
feed forward circuits. So, when Vuilleumier and Driver describe the direction of at-
tention as a top down process, they are describing, not the entire attentional process, 
but rather the initiating tasking intention which motivates that process. However, the 
entire attentional process entails that while the initiating attentional tasking is inten-
tional, how we perceive the target object and other objects in our field of vision is, in 
turn, adjusted - hence influenced - by a reciprocal process of exchange of infor-
mation between the performance of the task in hand and the visual modules allocated 
to perform that task. 
 
This explanation of the mental processes which constitute attention is outlined in Di-
agram 17b. below.  
  
Vuilleumer and Driver have advanced a hypothesis for emotional states which is 
analogous to that of the attentional processes outlined above, and it is this research 




17.3 Emotion and Attention 
 
Much of the evidence provided in the following paragraphs will relate to the assess-
ment of mental causation by either visualisation using fMRI, a neuroimaging tech-
nique, or the by the use of electroencephalography (EEG) which tracks the inception, 
duration and intensity of a mental event measured as an electrical potential, called 
the event-related potential (ERP). 
 
When viewed by a human, an expressionless or ‘neutral’ face will evoke a certain 
amplitude of visual evoked potential in the fusiform face area, but when the same 
face is observed to have a fearful expression, the amplitude is increased (Eimer and 
Homes; Pizzigali et al.) and the amygdala is also activated. Similar effects have been 
measured in the fusiform body area (FBA) and amygdala for emotional versus neu-
tral body movements, and for the emotional prosody of voices relative to neutral 
prosody.   
 
From these results Vuilleumier and Driver observe: “One interpretation might be 
that emotional stimuli are simply more ‘attended’. But we argue [ ] that findings for 
emotional stimuli may typically reflect modulation imposed by different circuits to 
those typically involved in modulations due to selective task relevance (cf. the frontal 
and parietal results above)” and “different areas have been hypothesised to play a 
crucial role for emotional influences, such as limbic regions involved in affect and 
memory (e.g. the amygdala) instead of the parietal or frontal cortex.” (2007 p.845) 
 
What is being proposed above is that emotional neural pathways influence certain 
visual modules in the manner of the attentional processes already described. V&D 
advance and consider three possible explanations for this effect: 
 
a. That emotion is simply enhanced attention. 
b. That emotion ‘captures’ attention (i.e. the super-activated brain locus 
is entirely given over to emotion). 
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c. That emotion and attention act independently in influencing visual 
processing. 
 
Vuilleumier and Driver argue for option ‘c’ and produce several pieces of evidence 
in support of their claim. In assembling this evidence, they compared the responses 
of subjects with brain lesions or dysfunction with the responses of uninjured (nor-
mal) subjects. I shall briefly summarise their findings. 
 
From neuroimaging studies of normal subjects presented with affective images, it is 
initially demonstrated that modulation of the FFA (fusiform face area) is accompa-
nied by dense feedback connections between the amygdala and the cortical sensory 
areas, an effect which did not occur when the FFA was activated by attention alone. 
(Amaral et al. 2003).  
 
To confirm this separate mode of ‘amygdala’ activation, Vuilleumier and Driver 
(2004) observed patients who suffered amygdala dysfunction and found no differen-
tial responses in the pattern of fMRI responses for facial processing (FFA). That is, 
when fearful were compared to neutral faces, subjects exhibited a normal ‘attention 
only’ response for both images (Vuilleumier et al., 2004). This effect has been con-
firmed in ERP studies by Rotshtein, who measured the P159 component for fearful 
relative to neutral faces for patients with damage to the amygdala. 
 
To establish the counterpart of this effect, patients with brain lesions causing visual 
attention deficit or neglect/extinction, whilst having a normally functioning amyg-
dala, were studied. In fMRI studies this group, even in cases where subjects appeared 
unaware of unemotional face images, showed activation of the fusiform cortex in re-
sponse to emotional face images. (Driver & Vuilleumier 2001, Driver et al  2004).  
 
 
59 P1 is the measure of an electrical voltage measured on the scalp relating to visual stimuli, known 
as an event related potential or ERP. C1 is the first recorded potential peak at approximately 60ms. 




Vuilleumier and Driver further investigated amygdala response to fearful expres-
sions in normal subjects when attention was directed elsewhere. They concluded that 
emotional FFA arousal occurred independently of attention to that stimulus; but they 
note:  
“some other studies have suggested that, under sufficiently attention demanding con-
ditions, the amygdala response to fearful faces might be reduced.” (2007 p.848)  
 
The independence of emotional and attentional modulation is supported by other re-
search: Raftopoulos confirmed that the P1 for face processing as an attentional task 
occurs at 170-180ms after stimulus presentation, whereas for emotional faces, the 
earliest component of modulation for emotional face processing arises at 120ms after 
stimulus onset, indicating (as per the findings of Murphy and Zajonc) that emotional 




Unlike Murphy and Zajonc’s suboptimal prime experiment60, Vuilleumiier and 
Driver’s evidence indicates that even when the affective stimulus itself is available 
for cognitive evaluation, this evaluation is accompanied by enhanced neural activity 
in locations dedicated to visual processing, in association with the activation of the 
amygdala.  
 
These findings are consistent with the view that when the affective stimulus is ap-
praised, neural pathways are activated which cause primitive emotional arousal and 
stimulate visual processing centres at a greater intensity than would be observed for 
normal attentional purposes.  
 
The evidence which Vuilleumier and Driver provide demonstrates that when the af-
fective stimulus (Diagram 17d.) is presented optimally, brain circuits associated with 
 





FEAR processing are aroused in parallel with the intentional processes which occur 
in evaluating that stimulus. This observation provides an important confirmation: 
cognitive evaluation of an affective stimulus does not exclude the synchronous 
arousal of a primitive emotional response. 
 
17.5  Vuilleumier and Driver’s Proposed Analogy Between Attentional and Emo-
tional Modulation of Perception. 
 
What remains to be demonstrated is the nature (if any) of a relationship between 
primitive and evaluative states when aroused synchronously. V&D propose that: 
 
 “ just as attentional modulation of visual processing (due to task relevance) can 
have major consequences for perceptual awareness by providing top-down biases 
that affect sensory representations of currently task-driven information, emotional 
modulations may also analogously affect perception and awareness by imposing a 
distinct source of bias upon sensory representations, but now based upon signals of 
affective relevance.”[the emphases are mine] (2007 p.848)  




“For both parietal and sensory cortex, it seems likely that the effective reward sig-
nals would probably be conveyed to neurons in parietal or sensory areas by remote 
brain processes implicated in emotional and motivational processes such as OFC 
[orbitofrontal cortex], striatum and/or amygdala.” (2007 p.849) 
 
Vuilleumier and Driver conclude that basic perceptual processes may be substan-
tially influenced by higher-level processes concerned with affective status. Such 
higher-level processes are associated with the arousal of amygdala and lower-level 
fear-related neural processes. Neither of these conclusions are sufficient to support 
the claim that they concern evaluation - only that they represent some aspect of the 
affective status of the stimulus. 
 
Vuilleumier and Driver take the arousal of the amygdala as indicative of higher-level 
processing, but this need not be the case. I have presented evidence for the effects of 
perceptual biasing upon evaluation previously: Murphy and Zajonc have established 
that evaluation of a neutral stimulus may be biased by the subliminal arousal of 
primitive emotional states, and LeDoux’s work (see p 160) confirms that such primi-
tive fear states entail the arousal of the amygdala, indicating that the arousal of the 
amygdala is not exclusively a product of  the higher-level processing of an affective 
stimulus (Diagram 17e.). Therefore, the observation that the amygdala is activated, 
provides no warrant that it has been activated by higher-level processes (B). Nor has 
it been demonstrated that the higher-level processes relating to affective status are – 






From this perspective, V&D’s proposed analogy between attentional and emotional 
processes - in which the role of attentional task relevance is treated as equivalent to 
the function of emotional modulation in response to affective status in the biasing of 
visual perceptions - does not demonstrate (and perhaps, was not intended to demon-
strate) an equivalence between attentional tasking and emotional evaluation.  
 
But if Vuilleumier and Driver’s higher-level brain processes relating to the affective 
status of a stimulus are not concerned with evaluation, we might reasonably enquire 
what else they might be. In looking at the image presented in the diagram, my only 
thoughts – other than it is a face – are judgments (“this is an image I do not like and 
would prefer not to be seeing”). No other thoughts seem to be present. But, even if 
the evaluative options are limited, this does not confirm an assertion that the higher-
level processes were evaluations. 
 
Vuilleumier and Driver’s work has provided us with evidence for the co-occurrence 
of primitive and evaluative emotional states and confirms M&Z’s conclusion that 
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emotional states may cause perceptual biasing of intentional states concerned with 
evaluation; but their proposal that the affective relevance of a stimulus may cause the 
emotional modulation of perception and awareness has not been demonstrated.  
 
Whilst neither claim has been demonstrated by the evidence, nor is it disproved: 
Vuilleumier and Driver’s research does not indicate what higher-level processes are 
instantiated by the brain locations identified. Given the methodology employed, it is 
difficult to understand how emotional cognitions of affective relevance could relia-
bly be demonstrated by neuroscientific explanation61. The arousal of subcortical af-
fect mechanisms of the type identified by Panksepp have a systematicity and predict 
ability which invites confirmation by experimentation, but an experimental process 
in which human evaluative mental states of the scope and complexity described in 
Part I could be successfully identified as neurological processes is difficult to envis-
age. More likely, emotional cognitions would manifest neurologically as a range of 
complex and diverse neocortical functions of the sort found for any deliberative pro-
cess. 
 
If this is the case, the exploration of emotion as a neuroscientific phenomenon cannot 
currently provide further information with respect to the nature of emotion as experi-
enced.  To advance our understanding of the relationship between primitive and 
evaluative emotions, it will be necessary to shift the focus of this enquiry towards a 
review of psychological research into emotion. This research aims to identify the 
constituents of human evaluation which arouse emotions, and to provide explana-











Chapter 18: Psychological Explanations of Emotion as Appraisals 
18.1 Introduction 
In their opening description of the benefits of emotional appraisal theory, Craig 
Smith and Leslie Kirby outline the broad view taken by psychologists who support 
appraisal theories of emotion (1999 p.121). 
• “most contemporary emotions theorists view emotion as a coherent orga-
nized system that largely serves adaptive functions”. 
• “there is assumed to be a rhyme and a reason to emotion. Specifically, emo-
tions are posited to be evoked under conditions having adaptive significance 
to the individual and to physically prepare and motivate the individual to 
contend with the adaptational implications of the eliciting situation”. 
• “appraisal has been proposed as the mechanism that links one’s emotional 
reactions to the adaptational implications of one’s circumstances. On this 
view appraisal is an evaluative process that serves to ‘diagnose’ whether the 
situation confronting an individual has adaptational relevance, and if it does, 
to identify the nature of that relevance and produce a response to it”.  
Smith and Kirby propose that events and/or circumstances, when appraised as rele-
vant to the goals, needs and wellbeing of the subject, may arouse emotion. They as-
sert that appraisals of this type generate motivations and a state of physical prepared-
ness. Such preparedness may be the outcome of an intentional process (I may reason 
that some circumstance has important implications for myself and hence requires my 
action) but also may have ‘adaptive’ origins, ancient mechanisms which give rise to 
changes to a number of somatovisceral and motor subsystems which cause a disposi-
tion by the subject to act. 
My approach going forward will be to investigate appraisal theory in three stages: 
• I will review psychological research which investigates the correlation of 
emotion with patterns of appraisal drawn from causal attributions of events or 





• I will investigate psychological explanations for the co-occurrence of emo-
tionally-arousing appraisals and alterations to the subject’s somatovisceral 
and motor systems and I will argue that these explanations fail to explain ad-
equately the nature or the relationship between these two aspects of emotion. 
 
• I shall propose that psychological accounts of these phenomena are better ex-
plained as an interaction of evaluative and primitive emotional processes. 
18.2 Psychological Appraisal Theories 
Weiner (1986) argues that a connection can be demonstrated between inferences 
concerning the occurrence of emotion and the perceived causes of an event or cir-
cumstance when they relate to the self. Such inferences are causal attributions. Laza-
rus further proposes that such attributions cause emotions when the subject appraises 
the implications of an event as having relevance for his/her wellbeing.  
Psychologists (Scherer 2001, 2005, Smith, Lazarus et al 1993) who wish to investi-
gate the relationship between appraisals and emotion attempt to establish a correla-
tion between some features of the appraisal and the nature and intensity of emotion 
which subjects report as a response to that appraisal.  
Smith, Lazarus et al. describe some characteristics of appraisals which cause emo-
tions: “Relevant issues include, Do I care about what is happening? Is it good or bad 
for me? Can I do anything about it? Can I accept it? Will it get better or worse? We 
suggest that this latter type of evaluation provides the emotional “heat” in an en-
counter” (1993 p.917)  
Smith & Lazarus propose that different types of emotions arise initially in a two-
stage appraisal of causal attributions which they call the ‘molecular’ level: the first 
appraisal stage (confusingly) also has two components acting consecutively: first, 
appraisal of motivational relevance (does it concern my survival or wellbeing as it is 
expressed in my values and/or goals?); second, appraisal of motivational congruence 
(is this consistent or inconsistent with those needs, goals?) 
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The second stage of appraisal is also comprised of two components. The first con-
cerns the individual’s view of their resources when considered in terms of their abil-
ity to cope; that is, the extent to which the experiencing individual believes that he 
can exert control over the emotionally-arousing event, making it conform with 
his/her needs and goals (can I handle this?). The second component concerns the lo-
cus of the event (who or what is accountable/responsible?) This may have an exter-
nal locus (pertaining to a person or group), an internal locus (pertaining to the self) 
or it may be assessed as a chance happening, or the working through of some inani-
mate process - in which case, its emotional potential may be diminished.  
Following this ‘molecular’ two stage process of appraisal, Lazarus proposes the ex-
istence of an organising ‘molar’ stage, in which these appraisals are brought together 
into one of a number of core relational themes. So, for example, some potentially 
harmful circumstance (say, an angry dog) will be appraised to have motivational rel-
evance (it has implications for my wellbeing) but is also motivationally incongruent 
(it is potentially bad for my wellbeing); the accountability for this circumstance lies 
in something external to myself (the dog) and my coping potential is low or uncer-
tain (It’s big dog; I’m not sure I can deal with it). Such a circumstance i.e. “I am in 
danger and might not be able to handle it.” might further be interpreted as a threat, 
one of Smith and Lazarus’s core relational themes.  
18.3 Smith and Lazarus’s Investigation into the Relationship between Appraisal 
and Emotion 
18.3.1   Experimental Procedure 
In order to measure the occurrence and strength of an emotion as reported by an indi-
vidual in response to some situation, and its correlation with 1) causal attributions, or 
2) patterns of appraisal, made with respect to that situation, Lazarus, Smith et al. 
have carried out a number experimental studies.  
In one of these (Study 1), 136 male and female subjects were prompted to recall situ-
ations which would normally be associated with the arousal of either a positive or 
negative emotion. Some of the examples they were prompted to recall are - Positive: 
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“you found out you had received an important honour” or, “your parents had a mean-
ingful discussion with you about something you cared about.”  Negative: “you re-
ceived a low grade on an exam in a course that mattered to you.” or, “the person you 
were dating criticised you about something you cared about.”  
Subjects were asked to imagine these situations and to answer five questionnaires re-
garding them. Two of these related to causal attributions drawn from the subject’s 
view of this situation; another listed features of appraisals made, followed by a sepa-
rate questionnaire listing core relational themes which best summarise these apprais-
als; finally, the subjects were requested to identify the emotion experienced as a re-
sponse to the situation described. 
The experimental methodology is described below: 
• Subjects were first asked to make categorical attributions (Table 18(i)) with 




62 The lists of questions used in Study 1 are not presented in the research paper cited and have 
kindly been provided by Professor Smith. 
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• These initial causal attributions were extended by use of a second question-
naire ‘dimensional attributions’ (Table 18(ii) - a modified version of Rus-
sell’s Causal Dimensions Scale (1982) to assess causal locus, controllability, 
stability and intentionality and causal globality (nine-point scale) 
 
• In the second stage of the study Table 18(iii), subjects were asked to consider the 
appraisal components. (eleven- point scale). The first two express motivational rele-




• Subjects were then requested to assess their view of the situation as relating 
to one of the core relational themes in Table 18(iv) below: 
 
• Finally, subjects were asked to identify the emotion they would experience as it re-




18.3.2. Discussion of Results 
In evaluating the data provided, the researchers were attempting to compare the effi-
cacy of causal attributions (both categorical and dimensional attributions) as opposed 
to appraisal components and/or core relational themes in explaining the emotions 
which subjects reported. 
The statistical technique used to discover correlations between emotions and apprais-
als entailed multiple regression/correlation analyses of two or more independent var-
iables in which partial variances between classes were investigated. (Cohen and Co-
hen 1983) 
From this analysis the researchers concluded that appraisals and causal attributions 
of the situations described were correlated with the reported emotion but that the 
pairings between emotion and attributions are more effectively represented as corre-
lations between emotion and appraisals or as core relational themes measured sepa-
rately, or as both of these in combination (Table 18(v)) 
Table 18(v) 










Anger 66*** 30*** 42*** 53*** 
Guilt 55*** 28*** 27*** 48*** 
Fear-anxiety 40*** 23** 14*** 39*** 
Sadness 59*** 26*** 46*** 52*** 
Hope-challenge 50*** 20** 29*** 34*** 
Happiness 66*** 48*** 55*** 60*** 
     
Mean 56 29 36 48 
     
*p <.05  **p<.01  ***p < .001 






In commenting on these findings, S&L observe: 
 “ simply knowing that an agent caused a specific event, or that the event is likely to 
have certain consequences, is insufficient to define the event’s personal implications. 
To establish relevance for well-being, the event must be appraised in terms of addi-
tional issues such as whether they are consistent or inconsistent with one’s goals 
(i.e. reflect benefits or harms); whether one has the resources to contend with any 
harms; whether extenuating circumstances justify the causal agent’s role in produc-
ing those harms; what the event implies for the future; and so on. For emotion to re-
sult, the attribution about an event must be synthesised, and this synthesis must be 
evaluated for its implications for personal well-being.” (1993 p.927) 
According to this account, the causal attributions which occur in response to some 
situation are further mediated by appraisal into a pattern corresponding to some core 
relational theme which more effectively represents the emotional potency of that sit-
uation. 
Before subjecting these conclusions to further examination, it will be noted that the 
researchers have reservations: 
 
 “although the appraisal variables proved to be powerful and efficient promoters of 
emotion, the results indicate considerable room for improvement in the assessment 
or conceptualisation of the appraisal components.” (1993 p.927) 
 
An indication of the conceptualisation difficulties might be gained by considering 
how an appraisal that I am experiencing the emotion ‘guilt’ would differ from that of 
‘regret’. The pattern of appraisals assigned to guilt (motivationally relevant, motiva-
tionally incongruent, coping potential - minimal, locus -myself) might equally apply 
to regret, but the researchers make the extra distinction that guilt would result from 
an intentional act on my part, whereas regret need not – something which would not 
be picked up by the experimental questionnaires. And this might not be the only sub-
sidiary condition necessary to define the nature of an emotion as experienced. If we 
were to think of the appraisal process algorithmically, further extension to the 
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choices on offer might be necessary to discriminate the patterns of appraisal which 
differentiate say, shame from guilt.  
 
Moreover, subjects were asked to consider historical examples of emotionally potent 
events rather than current experiences, which allows that the accounts given and the 
emotions reported could have been made by subjects reconstructing their responses 
in accordance with implicit theories of emotion, rather than their being descriptions 
of the mental states which would be experienced if subjects were actually encounter-
ing the events described.   
 
In summarising, the researchers concede that “they (the experimental findings) do 
not definitively prove that appraisal is the causal antecedent of emotion.” (1993 
p.927) 
 
Despite the challenges described, Smith & Lazarus’s findings indicate a relationship 
between certain patterns of appraisals concerning events or circumstances of signifi-
cance for the self and reports of such events as emotional. Their research supports a 
hypothesis that appraisals occur in two phases, the first phase entailing appraisals of 
causal attributions of circumstances as they pertain to the self, and a second in which 
these attributions are synthesised into core relational themes, which are predictive of 
the type of emotion which subjects report as experiencing.  
 
18.4 Smith and Lazarus’s Explanation for the Co-occurrence Physiological 
Changes and Action Impulses with Appraisals in Emotional Events 
 
The evidence that particular patterns of appraisal relating to the self are associated 
with emotion does not, of itself, explain how this association comes about. In ad-
dressing this explanatory gap, Smith and Lazarus propose that core relational 
themes: 
“synthesise the pattern of evaluation outcomes across the appraisal components into 
the central meanings underlying the various emotions. That is, the themes represent 
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the patterns of answers to the appraisal questions that have special adaptive signifi-
cance [my emphasis]. Each emotion is hypothesized its own core relational theme, 
which represents a distinctive type of harm or benefit” (1993 p.918). 
 
In explaining the association of appraisals of adaptive significance with instances of 
emotion, Smith and Lazarus in their earlier paper, Emotion and Adaptation (1991), 
propose that emotional appraisals have evolved from reflexes in a process by which 
the rigid stimulus-response mechanisms which characterize reflexes have gradually 
loosened to allow more flexible responses to a broader range of stimulus types. 
 
This gradual decoupling of stimulus and response has resulted in a mental process by 
which: 
 
“because there is no simple mapping between objective stimulus properties and 
adaptive significance, the task of detecting significant events becomes quite formida-
ble, and to accomplish this the organism must be able to somehow classify what is 
being confronted into a relatively small number of categories, corresponding to the 
various kinds of harm and benefit it may face.” (1991 p.614).  
 
The way in which S&L propose that this diversity is to be simplified is that causal 
attributions drawn from the organism/environment relationship are further appraised 
as falling into one of a limited set of configurations which are supportive of - or det-
rimental to - the subject’s wellbeing. But S&L go on to state: 
 
 “However, the adaptive solution has not been merely to produce a cold cognitive 
process of detection and evaluation. Instead it comprises a complex psychobiologi-
cal reaction that fuses intelligence with motivational patterns, action impulses, and 
physiological changes that signify to both actor and observer that something of sig-




In expanding their account of the processes which drive this relationship, Smith and 
Lazarus compare the position of psychologists such as Ekman (1984), who argue 
that there is an innate affect program for each emotion which triggers pre-pro-
grammed action tendencies and physiological changes, with the views of psycholo-
gists (Izard 1984; Levenson 1988) who argue that emotions are socially defined phe-
nomena which vary between cultures.  
In considering these alternative views, Smith and Lazarus conclude: “By tracing its 
evolution to the sensorimotor reflex we have assumed a substantial biological influ-
ence on the emotion process. Yet by emphasising the loosening of reflexive ties be-
tween stimulus and reaction, and the importance of both cognitive activity and soci-
ocultural learning factors, we have left much room for the influence of personality in 
emotion, which in turn is partially a developmental experience.” (1991 p.622) 
S&L take the source of the physiological changes and behavioural impulses to be re-
flexes - presumably of the sort described by Ekman et al.- without characterising 
those reflexes - whilst presenting appraisals as comprised of both an intentional com-
ponent, in which causal attributes of external circumstances are appraised as having 
relevance for the self, and an innately determined element, enabling us to detect pat-
terns in these appraisals which correspond to some core relational theme. In humans, 
S&L predict that the range of circumstances we are able to detect as emotionally po-
tent will expand as we gradually master the sociocultural values which pertain to our 
particular circumstances.  
The relationship between these two aspects of emotion is described as one in which 
humans and other animals are continually engaged in appraisals of their environ-
ment, employing “a relatively small set of innately determined appraisal issues” 
(1991 p.622) so that “If a person appraises the conditions being confronted in a 
manner that corresponds to a particular core relational theme [  ] the pre-pro-
grammed emotion is automatically generated as a feature of our biological herit-
age” (1991 p.623) 
S&L are proposing that the products of intentional appraisal processes are screened 
by inborn appraisal mechanisms to identify the presence of core relational themes. 
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They assume that when such a theme is distinguished, it automatically generates a 
‘pre-programmed’ emotional state in which intelligence is fused with the motiva-
tional patterns, action impulses, and physiological alterations, characteristic of a re-
flex. 
But this description does not appear to have moved us a great deal forward in our 
task of understanding the nature of the relationship between appraisals and co-occur-
ring physiological changes in an emotional event. 
In order to address this relationship more fully, Smith and Lazarus further interpret 
the function of each core relational theme in terms of its characteristic emotion, its 
adaptive function and the key appraisal components involved. In Table 18(vi) below 
they provide some illustrative examples of emotions together with the adaptive func-
tion they provide and the appraisals which cause that emotion. 
Table 18(vi)                   (Smith and Lazarus 1991 p619) 
Adaptive functions and appraisal components by core relational theme 
Core Relational 
Theme 




Other Blame Anger Remove source of harm 





Self Blame Guilt Make reparation for harm 
to others – motivate so-






Anxiety Avoid potential harm Motivationally relevant 
Motivationally incongruent 
Low/uncertain (emotion fo-
cused coping potential 
Irrevocable loss Sadness Get help and support in the 
face of harm – disengage 





Low future expectancy 
Possibility of amelio-
ration/success 




High future expectancy 
 
I have difficulty in identifying the connection between the adaptive functions which 
Smith and Lazarus propose and the arousal of underlying neurobiological changes. 
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On the face of it, the explanation should reside in the adaptive function, and while I 
accept that some reflexive process might cause me to avoid harm, all the other adap-
tive functions described seem to involve intentional processes which are difficult to 
represent as stimuli for inborn neurobiological response mechanisms associated with 
reflexive behaviours. For example, S&L’s identification of appraisal issues charac-
teristic of sadness, does not explain how it comes about that the proposed adaptive 
functions “Getting support in the face of harm or, disengaging from a lost commit-
ment.”  may be interpreted in such a manner that they give rise to primitive reflexes, 
causing neurophysiological alterations, which signal to us that we are experiencing 
an emotion.   
Failing this, it might be that Smith and Lazarus are arguing that the appraisal compo-
nents generate the underlying neurophysiological changes. This would entail, say, 
that there are some low-level reflexive neurobiological changes associated with sad-
ness which would be activated by my appraising an external object as motivationally 
relevant, motivationally incongruent, my having a low (problem-focused) coping po-
tential and low future expectancy. Once again, it seems hard to understand, on the 
basis of the evidence provided, how such appraisal components could be related to, 
hence activate, neurobiological states associated with reflexive behaviours.  
In the absence of such explanations, I accept S&L’s account of emotion as the out-
come of a reduction by appraisal of a potentially unlimited number of causal attribu-
tions into a finite set of core relational themes, each of which is associated with the 
arousal of a characteristic emotion. I also accept that such appraisals appear, in some 
way, to be associated with the neurophysiological changes and action impulses ob-
served to co-occur with such emotions; but the explanatory gap between appraisal 
and the co-occurrence of physiological changes and action impulses remains.  
In sum, S&L fail to explain how it comes about that certain appraisals trigger physi-
ological changes which in turn invest those appraisals with adaptive, hence emo-
tional, significance, where others do not. To exemplify: S&L’s account does not ex-
plain why a raised heartbeat and trembling, when accompanying my appraisal of a 
dog as dangerous, signifies fear, whereas, say, the sudden sensation of being cold 
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and shivering carries no significance when co-occurring with the appraisal that I 
need to buy petrol. From this example we may infer that it is not just any goal-re-
lated appraisal which will cause an emotion and it is not just any physiological 
change which will invest that appraisal with emotional significance; it is only by 
means of some relationship between appraisals and associated neurophysiological 
changes that the subject is able to experience an emotional response to an external 
event or circumstance. 
I will now advance an account of emotion which addresses this explanatory gap. In 
the explanation I shall offer primitive emotions are aroused by the emotional ap-
praisal issues identified by Smith and Lazarus. And I shall argue that this relation-
ship has arisen because primitive emotions and emotional appraisals are responsive 






















Chapter 19: Emotion as the Interaction of Cognitive-Evaluative and Primitive 
Processes 
 
I will propose that cognitive-evaluative and primitive emotions interact in a process 
whereby appraisal processes, when they identify core relational themes, will trigger 
primitive emotions, while primitive emotions, when so aroused, generate feelings 
which influence the appraisal process. To do this, I modify Smith and Lazarus’s ac-
count by substituting primitive emotional systems (described in Part II) for the pre-
programmed biological mechanisms which Smith and Lazarus have identified as re-
flexive responses of the general type proposed by Ekman.  
 
The interactive process I will advocate is consistent with neuroscientific accounts of-
fered by Vuilleumier and Driver and the findings of Murphy and Zajonc. It describes 
a relationship between the action of neural processes in the limbic system, which I 
have ascribed to the performance of primitive emotions, and the intentional pro-
cesses of evaluation which occur predominantly in the neocortex. These neural cen-
tres cooperate in a ‘feed-back/feed-forward’ relationship in which evaluative states 
will arouse and modulate primitive states, and the primitive states so aroused will in-
fluence evaluative states. 
 
Earlier in this thesis I proposed  the existence of two processes for detecting and re-
sponding to objects of homeostatic value: the first and simplest is one in which a re-
flex evokes an invariant response to a valuable stimulus type without cognitive medi-
ation; in the second, primitive emotional mechanisms mediate between stimulus and 
response, allowing the organism to instantiate one of a set of behaviours as responses 
to a much greater range of  potential stimuli – in which stimuli are detected by both 
inborn mechanisms and by means of conditioning. This mediating process (which 
occurs in the absence of intentionality), distinguishes primitive emotions from re-
flexive mechanisms, which require no mediation. 
 
In their claim that appraisals allow the subject to identify complex events or circum-
stances as having significance for the subject’s wellbeing, I will now argue that 
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Smith and Lazarus have identified a third category of mental processes for the detec-
tion of value whereby a subject may experience emotion in virtue of its ability to ap-
praise events or circumstances in the external world.  
 
In Chapter 4 I proposed that all animal species possess, in some degree, the ability to 
detect and exploit external objects of homeostatic value; hence, for any animal, there 
exists a set of external objects which possess homeostatic value. In Chapter 13 I have 
proposed that, for any given species, the state of homeostasis is achieved by an ani-
mal’s conformance to a set of core motivating principles whereby a class of stimulat-
ing objects is addressed by a particular mode of response.  
 
In mammalian species, these core motivational principles are realised as primitive 
emotions in which categories of stimulus objects directly arouse characteristic brain 
modes, causing behaviours. 
 
I now intend to argue that the patterns of thought which Smith and Lazarus have 
identified  with emotionally-arousing appraisals stem from the same set of core moti-
vating principles which inform primitive emotions, and that appraisal has this ad-
vantage over primitive emotion: it allows the subject to discriminate an extended ar-
ray of external circumstances as valuable and to act upon them by intention. 
 
The adaptational forces which determine core motivating principles may be inferred 
from the observation of arbitrary conditions imposed by the environment upon any 
land-based organism capable of voluntary movement. For a species to persist, its 
members must reproduce; in order to reproduce, an animal must survive: survival re-
quires that the animal seeks nutrients and water. In searching, the animal may en-
counter threats, which it must avoid, and obstacles which it must overcome. None of 
these conditions is optional: natural selection will ensure, say, that an animal which 
does not avoid threats will perish; or that an animal which exerts its maximum physi-




According to this account, for any animal species, homeostasis is achieved by con-
formance to a set of homeostatic imperatives – behavioural strategies performed by 
the species in conformance with the core motivating principles: each strategy con-
sists of two components, so that when some class of stimulus - a metastimulus - is 
detected, it is addressed with a mode of response appropriate to that class of stimuli. 
e,g, Threat>Avoid!; Constraint>Resist!; Nutrient Deficiency >Seek/Consume Nutri-
ents!. In primitive mammalian species, homeostatic imperatives63 are realised as 
primitive emotions, in which species-specific configurations of stimulus detection 
mechanisms generate appropriate behavioural responses to metastimuli: e.g. Threat> 
FEAR!; Constraint>RAGE!; Urge>SEEKING! 
 
Evaluation constitutes an advance upon primitive emotional systems in satisfying the 
demands of a homeostatic imperative. For an event or circumstance to cause an emo-
tion, the evaluative process must detect patterns of appraisal drawn from causal at-
tributions with respect to that state of affairs as significant for its wellbeing. The in-
novation introduced by evaluative processes is this: when the appraisal of causal at-
tributions relating to external events or circumstances falls into a pattern correspond-
ing to a core relational theme, it acts in the role of a metastimulus, causing the 
arousal of a primitive emotion (Diagram 19a).  
 
 
63 Sets of homeostatic imperatives may vary between clades; for example, care of offspring and 
aversion to social isolation are psychological motivations which occur in mammals but not in am-
phibians, who respond to a more limited set of homeostatic imperatives.. 
252 
 
In sum, when a pattern of appraisal is detected as having the characteristics of a core 
relational theme, this pattern serves as a token of a generic type of stimulus - a 
metastimulus  –  arousing a characteristic primitive emotion. The primitive emotion 
so aroused causes the subject to experience the physiological and neurochemically-
induced experiential states associated with the primitive emotion as a constituent of 
the evaluative process.  
 
My proposal that core relational themes serve as metastimuli for the arousal of prim-
itive emotions requires a correspondence between core relational themes and 
metastimuli and I compare the taxonomies of each in Table 19(i) below: 
 
 
There are differences between these taxonomies which I shall now discuss: 
 
Other-Blame/Self-Blame vs Constraint.  In both cases which Smith and Lazarus as-
cribe to blame, my assignation of blame requires initially that some desire has been 
frustrated. In the case of other-blame, the locus of frustration lies elsewhere, whereas 
in self-blame it lies with myself. In self-blame, either some desired state of affairs 
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has failed to arise because of my inaction, or some state of affairs which is unfavour-
able for myself has arisen because of actions for which I am responsible. According 
to this account, both other-blame and self-blame may be expressed as examples of 
constraint. I will provide a more extensive account of the effects of constraint as 
‘self-blame’ below. 
 
In previous accounts I have described how external states of affairs such as territorial 
incursion or threats to offspring constitute constraints upon the subject’s ability to 
perform homeostatically valuable behaviours. But for humans, there exists an im-
portant sub-category of constraint in which the subject directs a primitive emotion 
towards him/herself  – a mode of attribution which is not observed to occur in other 
species - and for that reason may well be a distinctively human emotional experi-
ence.  
 
As an example of a self-directed emotion involving constraint, I will investigate re-
gret. To experience regret it is first necessary that I desire an event, and that some 
subsequent failure to act on my part has caused that event not to occur; for example: 
 
1. My mother and I had a standing disagreement which I hoped to resolve. 
2. My mother died suddenly and my desire to resolve our disagreement was 
frustrated.  
3. The frustration of my desire to reconcile with my mother was caused by 
my own inaction. 
 
Conclusion: My mother’s death has frustrated my desire to resolve our differences, 
This frustration has been caused by my own inaction, resulting in a feeling of self-
directed RAGE.  
 
The emotion regret is caused by the primitive emotion RAGE directed towards my-
self, arising from a frustration of my desire to reconcile with my mother. But regret 
might equally be coupled with a goal-associated emotion of a different type: I might 
regret my late arrival at an auction in which I intended to buy some desired object. 
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However, it cannot be argued that the emotions which arise in each example are 
solely those of regret. In order to experience self-anger at my failure to win the item 
at auction, I must also experience the anticipation associated with purchasing the 
item (SEEKING); whereas for me to experience self-anger at my failure to reconcile 
with my mother, my regret  in response to my failure to achieve my aim of reconcil-
ing with my mother requires first, that I have feelings of affection towards my 
mother (CARE). These primitive emotions are not separate from the occurrence of 
regret, but it is self-directed RAGE alone, aroused as a consequence of my inability 
to achieve some desired end, which constitute the necessary conditions for my use of 
the term regret to describe both occasions. 
 
Similar contextual patterns could be constructed for self-directed emotions such as 
shame and guilt. These terms pick out the common component of an emotion as a 
frustration of some goal, they need not describe the entirety of emotions experienced.  
 
Effortful Optimism vs Urge. In primitive emotional theory, SEEKING is triggered 
by some physiological urge acting as a stimulus, generating Panksepp’s state of ea-
ger anticipation, an experiential quality, expressed in an intentional form as Smith & 
Lazarus’s effortful optimism. Panksepp envisages a much broader role for SEEKING 
in human behaviour than that of a response to urges. He describes this role in The 
Archaeology of Mind (2012 pp. 95-103): “The SEEKING system impels the neocor-
tex to find ways of meeting our needs and goals.” (2012 p.103). In describing the 
core relational theme accompanying the emotion ‘hope/challenge’ as ‘effortful opti-
mism’, S&L are describing the quality of the mental state which characterizes the 
SEEKING behaviour, rather than describing the stimulus for effortful optimism, 
which is some need or goal towards which the effortful optimism is directed. 
 
Care, Lust, Play.  The situations described in Smith and Lazarus’s study were not 
designed to identify the core relational themes corresponding to these metastimuli. 
No situations were described which involved nurture. Nor were situations offered 
255 
 
which involved sexual themes. No play-associated situations were presented, alt-
hough these have been employed in the experiments of Schacter and Singer in which 
the playful actions of a stooge aroused a state of ‘euphoria’ in the experimental sub-
jects.  
 
Separation from Parent or Group. Maternal or social separation stimulate the 
arousal of PANIC. Panksepp describes the associated behaviours and sensations of 
‘distress vocalisation, lachrymation, and lassitude’. These would serve as instances 
of ‘loss/helplessness’ in Smith and Lazarus’s study, where ‘loss/helplessness’ deter-
mines the core relational theme for the emotion ‘sadness’. However, I will presently 
propose that separation distress would constitute only one instance of ‘sadness’ 
which embraces a more general failure of emotionally-driven activity. 
 
Happiness. Panksepp proposes that each primitive emotion is associated with its 
own ‘release sensation’ (Chapter 21). These various rewarding sensations signal the 
achievement of some homeostatically beneficial task. Their effects are experienced 
when the actions necessary to achieve our goals are either proceeding successfully, 
or are accomplished. But the success of a single emotionally-motivated behaviour, 
though accompanied by a pleasurable sensation, need not signify happiness.  
 
I have accepted, in common with cognitive-evaluative advocates, that emotionally-
motivated behaviours are directed towards the promotion of our wellbeing. This 
claim, which is not descriptive of any particular emotion, has an intentional expres-
sion (reflected in the Utilitarian view): the notion of some optimal state of an indi-
vidual’s affairs - happiness - towards which all actions are directed. According to 
this account, happiness is a measure of the collective effect of our actions, whether 
emotionally-motivated or otherwise, as they are judged to have succeeded in meeting 
our goals or supporting our wellbeing. This condition, success, also determines the 
core relational theme which is associated in S&L’s theory with the emotion ‘happi-
ness’. The appraisal of happiness therefore, is not necessarily associated with the 
achievement of any single emotionally-driven behaviour, but is proportionate to the 
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success of the entirety of our actions in promoting our wellbeing, or in fulfilling our 
goals. 
 
Sadness. When we fail to achieve our goals in the face of irresistible threats, insur-
mountable obstacles, or losses, then that which was either explicitly or implicitly 
beneficial or desirable for our wellbeing is no longer accessible to us. In these cir-
cumstances the appraisal of our powerlessness to achieve some desired goal in the 
face of a counteracting reality is characteristic of sadness - a state in which the primi-
tive emotion persists, whereas its futility is acknowledged.  
Discussion 
The failure of the separate taxonomies of metastimuli and core relational themes to 
agree fully is unsurprising, given that neither Panksepp, nor Smith and Lazarus had 
this aim in view. Despite this, where Smith and Lazarus have tested for emotionally-
potent themes, it is possible to reconcile the two approaches: where they have not, 
we can readily envisage additional studies which employ emotionally-arousing situa-
tions for  CARE (harm/benefit to a child), LUST (situations involving someone we 
find sexually attractive) or PANIC (such as the loss of a close relative).  
The two exceptions to this claim are happiness and sadness. I have argued that these 
states do not emerge from an appraisal of a single emotional event, but from a 
broader appraisal of the success or failure of the subject’s goal-directed actions. In 
cases where the success of any single emotional project occurs, the occasion is 
marked by a particular release sensation such as gratification (urge/desire fulfil-
ment), exultation (overcoming an obstacle), relief (threat release) – each representing 
a different manifestation of pleasurable sensation. In my explanation any of these 
sensations occurring singly signifies a step toward the achievement of happiness, ra-
ther than happiness itself. 
Summary 
The evaluative and  emotional states I have described conform generally to the re-
quirements of a class of mental phenomena which have been identified by psycholo-
gists as ‘dual process’ and my intention going forward will be, first, to explain the 
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features of mental states which characterize dual process models generally, and then 
to elaborate the interaction of the evaluative and primitive components as an expla-
































Chapter 20: The Dual Process Explanation of Emotion  
 
20.1 The Status of Dual Process Theories  
 
Before advancing more detailed proposals for the action of emotion as a dual process 
phenomenon, I will briefly outline the current status of dual process theories. 
 
In their joint paper Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the De-
bate, Jonathan Evans and Keith Stanovich claim that between 1999 and 2004, the 
number of such theories in the scientific literature had approximately doubled to 23 
(2011 p.228). Many of these researchers were working in separate fields and arrived 
at their theories independently.  
The notion that humans employ more than one mode of cognition is not a neurosci-
entific or psychological innovation. Most of us would accept that there is a distinc-
tion to be made between our intuitive and reflective mental processes, or that our ac-
tions can be classed as considered, habitual or impulsive, but researchers in this field 
claim to have evidence that many of these cognitions and behaviours are explained 
by the action of two separate modes of mental process and are sometimes able to as-
sign to each process its own brain locus. 
Evans and Stanovich provide three categories of distinguishing criteria for these pro-
cesses, which they term Type 1 and Type 2: 
 
• Defining Features: Evans (2010) believes that in order to reflect or form in-
ferences, we require the ability to hold information in a working memory - 
available for immediate access - from which we deploy beliefs or concepts 
which pertain to an event or circumstance under consideration, in a process 
of mental simulation. Such processes are described as Type 2. In contrast Ev-





• Correlates are properties which frequently but not invariably attach to each 
process type. 
 
• Old Mind/New Mind: Type 1 processes are often, but not invariably associ-
ated with earlier stages of brain evolution and can be found in all animal spe-
cies. Type 2 emotions are associated with more recent evolution in brain de-
velopment  
 
Table 20(i) below is reproduced from Evans and Stanovich’s paper (in which the fi-
nal inclusion of ‘Basic Emotions’ as opposed to ‘Complex Emotions’ is not ex-
plained) 
 
Earlier descriptions of these modes of cognition used the terms System 1 and System 
2, where System 1 described broadly nonconscious and intuitive mental function and 
System 2 was concerned with conscious and reflective processes. However, Evans 
and Stanovich employ the terms ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ processes’. I think this is bet-
ter; the view that the brain functions as two systems invites the notion of a single 
dual system theory which describes the operation of any psychological dual process 
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mechanism; but, as the evidence from research across a broad spectrum of dual pro-
cess phenomena accumulates, the difficulties encountered in explaining all these 
phenomena as the products of a single theory suggest that it is unlikely that this will 
prove to be the case64: the psychological literature supporting dual process theory in-
dicates a scenario in which there are multiple ‘autonomous’ Type 1 processes and a 
less diverse range of ‘reflective’ Type 2 processes, with the two process types exhib-
iting a range of interactive mechanisms.  
Even with these heavy qualifications, dual process theories are challenged. These 
challenges tend to fall into two classes: first, that there need be no discontinuity be-
tween the two types of processing – for example, Harman (1973) proposes that mind 
can be understood as integrating nonconscious and reflective elements without infer-
ential discontinuities such as those claimed by Stich; second, that mind is massively 
modular (Carruthers (2006), Mithen (1996)) and that our mental states can be under-
stood in terms of the combined or individual action of these modular elements. And 
depending upon how modularity is determined, these two objections may be brought 
together as a single objection – that interpreting the mind as a dual process mecha-
nism requires that we create a distinction between ‘lower level’ intuitive processes 
and ‘higher level’ reflective processes, which introduces a separate and unhelpful 
level of complexity into our considerations of mind without offering a theory of any 
explanatory or predictive value. 
My response to such objections is straightforward: I will not appeal to any evidence 
from dual process literature as support for my account of emotion as a dual process, 
which I offer as a sui generis explanation of the action and interaction of intentional 
and nonintentional states. In claiming that the model I propose conforms in structure 
to the two types of process characteristic of dual process theories generally, my pur-
pose is to provide confirmation that in characterizing my account as dual process, I 
am not advancing a theory of mind which is unique in its conformation, but rather I 
 
64 Richard Samuels offers a more detailed discussion of this issue (2009).    
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am offering my theory of emotion as an example of a class of mental processes des-
ignated as ‘dual process’ in which nonintentional and intentional affective functions 
are present. 
 
20.2. Emotion as a Dual Process 
 
Emotional Constituents serving as Elements of a Dual Process Mechanism 
 
The explanation of emotion which I have developed in Chapters 16 - 20 envisages an 
interaction of evaluative with primitive emotions. For any mental state to be emo-
tional, requires that a primitive emotion must be active, triggered either by a condi-
tioned or unconditioned stimulus, or as the outcome of an evaluation.  
Type 1 components have these constituents: 
• The states (E-states) which I have characterized as primitive emotions, to-
gether with processes by which homeostatically valuable objects are de-
tected.  
• The conditioning processes which are initiated by primitive emotions. 
• the processes by which E-state brain modes compete for control of the or-
ganism’s behaviour. 
• the processes by which patterns of appraisals65 drawn from causal attribu-
tions are detected as core relational themes. 
• the mechanisms by which primitive emotions – when aroused – influence 
‘Type 2’ states 
Type 2 mental states of emotion originate in causal attributions relating to the self 
and may take the form of appraisals, or judgments of a more rudimentary nature, re-
lating to such attributions.  
 
This outline of the interaction of emotional processes allows me to offer a schematic 
summary of emotion as a dual process (Diagram 20a.): 
 







The schematic I have presented is not representative of any single emotional condi-
tion; rather it displays the explanatory scope of emotion as a dual process in which 
valuable stimuli may be detected by appraisal and/or nonintentional processes.  
 
What remains to be explained in this model is the role of feelings in the experience 












Chapter 21: The Role of Feelings in the Dual Process Model of Emotion 
 
21.1  Cognitive-Evaluative Explanations of the Effects of Primitive Emotional 
Neurophysiologies upon Emotional Appraisals  
 
Philosophers who take a broadly cognitive-evaluative stance accept that bodily alter-
ations occur during emotion but argue that emotional feelings are generated by an 
evaluative process in which some state of affairs is appraised as having significance 
for the self.  In accepting that bodily alterations occur during an emotional experi-
ence, cognitive-evaluative advocates argue that those alterations play no role in the 
emotional process, which is inherently evaluative hence, intentional.  
 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I have described cognitive-evaluative accounts of emotion 
which adopt this view. These theories acknowledge the presence of emotion-associ-
ated feelings, but the sources, the nature and the effects of such feelings are subject 
to differing explanations. Nussbaum claims that appraisals assume the character of 
emotions when they have import for the values of the experiencing subject. When 
emotions occur, they occur as the outcome of an appraisal process, in which we ac-
cess networks of beliefs and values (which are potentially complex and diffuse) in a 
dynamic mental process, drawing us further into a web of emotional revelations 
which arise from the implications of the initial emotion-inducing event. It is these 
processes, particularly their urgency, and their assault upon – or reinforcement of – 
this network of values, which furnish the emotion with its characteristic affective 
quality, rather than the physiological changes which accompany the emotion. Nuss-
baum argues that these physiological accompaniments are incoherent, bearing no re-
lationship to the emotion as experienced, and she cites experimental evidence from 
Schachter and Singer, and Cannon, to support this view.  
 
I have reviewed this research and have concluded that neither of these experiments 
support Nussbaum’s claim, but nor do they support a counter-claim that the altera-
tions in physiological states which occur will vary consistently with the emotion 




Lazarus, drawing his conclusions from other experimental sources, takes the broad 
view of Nussbaum in claiming that evaluation triggers an emotional state by identi-
fying appraisal issues which have ‘adaptive significance’ for the experiencing indi-
vidual. The sorts of issues he identifies have significance for the wellbeing and sur-
vival of the subject and/or the ability of the subject to cope. But in his treatment of 
feelings, Lazarus differs from Nussbaum. He proposes a relationship whereby certain 
patterns of appraisal automatically trigger underlying somatic alterations and states 
of action preparedness. In making this proposal, Lazarus is allowing for some corre-
spondence between the appraisal issues identified and the neurophysiological altera-
tions occurring, without proposing a role for such phenomena. Rather, he argues that 
the co-occurring physiological changes signal to the subject that some object or state 
of affairs have significance for the subject; whereas our determination of its being 
good/bad for the subject, or being beyond the subject’s capacity to handle, arises 
separately, as the product of appraisal. According to this account, the physiological 
changes co-occurring with emotion are sensations which signal the importance of an 
appraisal for the wellbeing of the subject.  
 
Solomon argues that emotions are processes involving systems of judgments as op-
posed to the ‘single summary judgments’, which might be associated with proposi-
tional attitudes. He maintains that such processes are dynamic, having the quality of 
actions, but in developing his position on feelings he makes this statement: 
 
“Much of what makes up emotional experience, of course, are the complexes of our 
experiences of the world (including ourselves), shaped and colored by appraisals 
and judgments of the peculiarities of this or that particular emotional perspective. I 
used to think that this was all that was essential to emotional experience, and again, 
I treated the feelings of arousal and the like as experiential marginalia, of little im-
portance to the phenomenological experience that could only be understood via the 
cognitive complexes that shaped emotional experience as such. But what led me to 
an increasing concern about both the role of the body and the nature and role of 
bodily feelings in emotion was the suspicion that my judgment theory had been cut 
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too thin. [ ] I am now coming to appreciate that accounting for bodily feelings (not 
just sensations) in emotion is not a secondary concern and not independent of appre-
ciating the essential role of the body in emotional experience” (2004 p.85) 
 
In his argument for the introduction of bodily feelings into his account of emotion, 
Solomon maintains that the bodily experiences which characterize emotion consti-
tute the immediate expression of an emotion: 
 
“These are not mere incidentals, and understanding them will provide a concrete 
and phenomenologically rich account of emotional feelings in place of the fuzzy and 
ultimately content-free notion of ‘affect’” (2004 p.85).  
 
Solomon argues that the term ‘bodily states’ as described by James and Lange paints 
too restricted a picture of emotion as an experienced neurophysiological phenome-
non. To this somatovisceral account he adds the workings of the autonomic nervous 
system, “the whole range of bodily preparations and postures” (including changes in 
facial expression), and the release of hormones.  
 
Solomon accepts that a theory of emotion must account for the presence of these 
neurophysiological alterations. His view is consistent with point (1) raised in my 
summary of Chapter 3; like Solomon, I have proposed that cognitive-evaluative the-
ory does not account for certain aspects of the emotional experience - aspects which 
Solomon describes as judgments of the body. In explaining his use of this term, Solo-
mon distinguishes between knowledge which takes the form of ‘knowing that’, 
which he describes as broadly propositional, from ‘knowing how’ such as avoiding 
obstacles, building shelter or hiding food, which is observed in other animal species. 
To illustrate how Solomon frames his notion of judgments of the body, I shall use 
the example he provides: 
“Anger often involves feelings of discomfort but to be anger [  ] the emotion must be 
further directed by way of some sort of blame , which in turn involves feelings of ag-
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gression and hostility that may themselves be readily traced (as James did) to spe-
cific modes of arousal in the body (the tensing of muscles etc.,). So too, shame is, at 
least in part, a feeling of discomfort with other people, a feeling of rejection [  ]. 
Feelings are not just sensations, nor are they mysterious ‘affects’, but felt bodily en-
gagements with the world.” (2004 p.88) 
Solomon provides further examples of these judgments: comfort and discomfort, 
frustration, low-level anxiety, joy and panic. 
In offering this account, Solomon intends to expand his notion of ‘emotion as judg-
ments’ to explain the physiological and phenomenological aspects of the emotional 
experience, arguing that these effects constitute a different class of judgments which 
“may not be analysable in the mode of propositional analysis but neither are they 
simple manifestations of the biological substratum.” (2004 p.88).  
The physiological and neurological effects Solomon has described as judgments of 
the body are typical of primitive emotions. In keeping with Solomon’s description, 
primitive emotions are not simple manifestations of the biological substratum; I have 
previously described them as cognitive, but nonintentional, processes (Chapter 15). 
Primitive emotions are the products of adaptation whereby behaviours, arising spon-
taneously as responses to external objects and events, have been affirmed through an 
adaptive process as being supportive of the wellbeing or survival of the subject. 
Primitive emotions are found in all mammals and may be triggered by the detection 
of homeostatically valuable objects, or by the discrimination of value by means of a 
set of inborn appraisal issues as I have described in Chapters 13 and 19. They arise 
in the form of E-states, neurophysiological states, in which a characteristic brain 
mode - a neural pathway in the subcortex -  is activated, causing the release of partic-
ular brain neurochemicals (neurotransmitters), producing somatovisceral states (bod-
ily alterations) and motor arousal (behavioural dispositions). In advanced species, 
these states are largely regulated, but not replaced, by higher cortical processes in-
volving intentional appraisals.  
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Where my account differs from Solomon’s is that primitive emotions may be under-
stood as a set of separate, internally coherent, autonomous processes. As such, primi-
tive emotions may be aroused by appraisals and provide neurobiological confirma-
tion of the significance of an appraisal for the experiencing subject, but they are not 
bound up with those appraisals; they do not necessarily support the appraisal made 
and they may arise independently of appraisals.  
Murphy and Zajonc have provided an example of the way in which primitive emo-
tions influence appraisals as ‘judgments of the body’. An object (an ideograph) 
which in ordinary circumstances would not be appraised as having significance for a 
subject’s wellbeing, becomes disliked when associated with a subliminal fear-induc-
ing primitive emotional stimulus. The primitive emotion has influenced the subject’s 
evaluation of the object, causing what was previously regarded as bland and un-
threatening to be disliked. According to this account, appraisals are the products of 
an intentional process but the appraisal process, if it co-occurs with the arousal of a 
primitive emotion, may be influenced by that primitive emotion. 
This concept of the influence of neurophysiological states upon appraisals supports 
Solomon’s proposal that the neurological and physiological changes occurring dur-
ing an emotion act as ‘judgments of the body’ directed towards the emotional object. 
These effects find their origins, not in beliefs, but as spontaneous responses towards 
the object of emotion. The existence of such responses must entail this consequence; 
that such judgments, though nonintentional, play some role in the emotional process, 
acting separately from the appraisal processes described by cognitive-evaluative ad-
vocates, and it is this role I shall now describe. 
21.2 The Role of Primitive Emotions in Influencing Appraisals 
Murphy and Zajonc observed, from an analysis of their optimal and suboptimal ex-
periments, that from a very early stage in the visual observation of an emotionally 
exciting object, two distinct brain processes are active: the most rapidly-acting is a 
process whereby the affective content (in this case the fearful conformation of the 
face) is detected. Trailing this effect by about 20/30 milliseconds, the research of 
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neuroscientists such as Vuilleumier and Raftopoulos demonstrates that the emotion-
ally exciting image is progressively elaborated in a parallel process with access to a 
network of cognitive processes. This process derives from the subject’s initially at-
tending to the object, allowing the subject to progressively apprehend that what 
he/she is viewing is merely an image - and not a threat. fMRI studies of subjects who 
are viewing these images, indicate that although the subject reports that the image is 
neither liked nor disliked, associated subcortical neural circuitry, consistent with an 
expression of the primitive emotion FEAR remains active, and is present as long as 
the image persists. 
This recent neuroscientific research is important. It reveals that primitive emotion 
and attention are rapidly instantiated as two mental processes, the earliest of which is 
a spontaneous response to the emotionally exciting nature of the stimulating object, 
generating a range of neurophysiological effects, which (particularly in humans) may 
be regulated by later-emerging attention-based processes. These delayed attention-
based processes, which are described by Murphy and Zajonc as initiating the activa-
tion of complex networks of associations, allow (inter alia) feature identification and 
recognition, which regulate or suppress ‘the primitive and gross affective signifi-
cance’ of the stimulus. Nothing found in this research suggests that these regulating 
processes contain affective elements, only that they have the ability to control or sup-
press underlying affective impulses.  
These findings indicate that for any emotional event, two separate mental processes 
occur; the first is affective and nonintentional, whereas the second is evaluative and 
intentional. 
I will provide an example of the interaction of these processes. When I receive a tax 
demand, I make a calculation and find that the demand is incorrect. Based on this 
calculation, I decide to challenge the demand. When reflecting upon my reaction to 
this demand, I find that it has caused me to feel angry. Additionally, the demand has 
caused me to have thoughts about the broader implications of this potential financial 
loss, with the result that I feel anxious. In the dual process model I have proposed, 
when I describe myself as feeling angry or anxious, my acknowledgement of these 
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two emotional states does not arise as a consequence of my calculation that the de-
mand is incorrect. Rather, I am reporting the effects of underlying primitive emo-
tional states triggered by the tax demand in response to my identification of appraisal 
issues corresponding to two core relational themes: 1) that they constitute a potential 
constraint (upon my previously anticipated financial circumstances) and 2) a poten-
tial threat (that I will be unable to meet my obligations). These feelings are attributa-
ble to the effects of  primitive emotions in which appraisals are interpreted as core 
relational themes which, acting as metastimuli, will trigger primitive emotions, so 
that if I suffer a financial constraint, the primitive emotion aroused is RAGE, causing 
characteristic physiological and neurochemical alterations and behavioural impulses 
which I experience as feelings of anger; and similarly, if I am threatened, I experi-
ence a different set of physiological and neurochemical effects characteristic of the 
primitive emotion FEAR, causing me to report that I feel afraid.  
In the above example, the impulses generated by the primitive emotional states expe-
rienced are consistent with the rational course of actions I decide to take: that is, by 
deciding to challenge the demand I will avoid the threat of being unable to meet my 
obligations by resisting the tax claim - removing the potential constraint upon my fi-
nances.  
This consistency of primitive emotion and appraisal is not assured; the primitive 
emotion aroused in response to an appraisal may generate behavioural dispositions 
and attitudes towards the emotional object which are inconsistent with the appraisal 
outcome. To illustrate: imagine now that I receive the same tax claim with the same 
implications for my finances, but I am additionally aware that any challenge would 
lead to an investigation of my entire finances, which might reveal a genuine, and 
much greater, underpayment by myself. In consequence, I decide that any challenge 
to the tax demand carries too great a risk for my finances, and that the correct course 
would be to pay the unjustified tax demand in order to avoid an investigation. But by 
accepting the financial penalty, my appraisal of these circumstances, as now consti-
tuting the certainty of constraint, would persist and intensify, causing me to experi-
ence increasing feelings of RAGE. So, even though I have, by a process of appraisal, 
determined the path which constitutes the smallest risk and the lesser constraint upon 
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my finances, this judgment need not be decisive. The decision I ultimately take 
might pit my feelings of RAGE, which entail a disposition to resist the tax demand 
and hence to be free of all constraint, against my feelings of FEAR that such an ac-
tion could ruin me. In this example, the role of feelings in influencing the cognitive-
evaluative process is expressed as the effects of competition between underlying 
primitive emotional brain modes (Chapter 14). We cannot predict which brain mode 
would prevail; this would depend upon the intensity of each feeling. If the intensity 
of FEAR was greater than that of RAGE, then my decision to pay would be con-
sistent with my feelings, but if RAGE were to predominate, then my final decision 
would rest upon the outcome of a conflict between my appraisal that I should pay the 
unjustified tax demand and an underlying disposition to resist the constraint. 
In sum, my claim is that the feelings I experience during an emotional event are at-
tributable to the arousal of primitive emotions, either as a direct consequence of an 
appraisal having the conformation of a core relational theme, or as the result of the 
detection of a homeostatically valuable object. Such feelings constitute a separate at-
titude towards the object of emotion which is not necessarily consistent with the ini-
tial appraisal. 
 
21.3 The Cognitive-Evaluative Response to the Dual Process Account 
 
Nussbaum challenges this view, arguing that when the subject appraises a situation 
as threatening or promoting her wellbeing, any values and beliefs appertaining to this 
situation may also require re-evaluation, and that it is this inexorable process of re-
evaluation, being typical of appraisals which concern the self, which imbues the ex-
perience of emotions with a separate distinctive character, rather than the effects of 
co-occurring somatovisceral changes. She illustrates her argument with a description 
of the experience of grief. 
 
“When I grieve, I do not first of all coolly embrace the proposition ‘My wonderful 
mother is dead’ and then set about grieving. No, the real, complete, recognition of 
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that terrible event (as many times as I recognise it) is the upheaval. It is as I de-
scribed it: like driving a nail into the stomach. [ ]If I embrace the death image, if I 
take it into myself as the way things are, it is at that very moment, in that cognitive 
act itself that I am putting the world’s nail into my insides. That is not a preparation 
for upheaval, that is upheaval itself. That very act of assent is itself a tearing of my 
self sufficient condition. Knowing can be violent, given the truths that are there to be 
known.” (2001 p.195)  
 
I think Nussbaum’s description of grief is a powerful evocation of one of the most 
significant and complex emotional events in the human experience. She is arguing 
that the appraisal process itself, in virtue of its engagement with the profound impli-
cations of the death of a close and valuable family member constitute a necessary 
and sufficient account of the process of grieving, without requiring any support from 
the co-occurring physiological changes:  
 
“Reason here moves, embraces, refuses: it moves rapidly or slowly, surely or hesi-
tantly. I have imagined it entertaining the appearance of my mother’s death and 
then, so to speak, rushing towards it, opening itself to absorb it. So why would such 
a dynamic facility be unable to house, as well, the disorderly motions of grief? And 
this is not just an illusion: I am not infusing into thought kinetic properties that 
properly belong to arms and legs or imagining reason as accidentally colored by ki-
netic properties of the bloodstream.” (2001 p.194) 
 
Nussbaum’s claim that the kinaesthetic accompaniments of emotion bear no verifia-
ble relationship to the emotion which the subject acknowledges he/she is experienc-
ing, supports her assertion that such effects can play no role in the reasoning process 
itself. This account of the nature of feelings stands opposed to the dual process ac-
count I have offered, in which the feelings she is describing are caused by the arousal 
of primitive emotions. In a dual process account, each feeling entails a separate 
stance towards the emotional object, which may be either consistent or inconsistent 




21.4   A Comparison of the Treatment of Feelings in Dual Process and Cognitive 
Evaluative Accounts of Emotion 
 
I will now consider the force of Nussbaum’s arguments in the light of a dual process 
model of emotion. In beginning this review, I will take Nussbaum’s claim that other 
species experience emotions as intentional phenomena. I have previously discussed 
her treatment of LeDoux’s research in which she allows that a rat may experience 
fear only to the extent that it is able to have some subjective experience of fear (p. 
38). According to Nussbaum’s account, if we observe that a rat, having received a 
shock in an experimental chamber, freezes when reintroduced to that chamber, we 
can only describe this behaviour as caused by ‘fear’ if the rat carries out that behav-
iour as the result of some apprehension that the chamber is dangerous. If Nuss-
baum’s claim is correct, there may be a behaviour ‘freezing’ in rat A which is caused 
automatically by neural mechanisms of the sort LeDoux and Panksepp have de-
scribed. It may also be the case that there is an identical behaviour in rat B, which is 
able to apprehend that the chamber is dangerous and freezes in response to this 
threat; but what marks rat B’s condition as emotional is its ability to evaluate its situ-
ation as threatening, rather than the co-occurring changes in bodily states, or the ac-
tion of freezing itself. 
 
This invites a question I have raised previously in a more general form. If mamma-
lian species exhibit emotion-like behaviours, and Nussbaum argues that emotion 
arises only as an intentional phenomenon, how do we distinguish emotional from 
non-emotional behaviour in other mammals?  Elephants appear to demonstrate grief-
like behaviours when one of the herd dies. But it may be that these behaviours 
(which involve staying by and attempting to rouse the dead animal) rather than being 
manifestations of evaluation, are the product of inherited stimulus-response mecha-
nisms similar to those which generate freezing behaviours in rats.  
 
The dual process model directly addresses this question. For an event to be described 
as emotional, some primitive emotion must be active, either as an autonomously 
functioning primitive emotional response to a homeostatically valuable object, or as 
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the outcome of appraisal patterns which arouse a primitive emotion. It is this latter 
sort of engagement at its most intense which would cause Nussbaum, whenever she 
thinks of her mother’s death, to feel as if the world has driven a nail into her insides. 
 
This account in its simplest form would ascribe the human experience of grief to the 
effects of separation distress, typical of the primitive emotion PANIC. Such an ex-
planation would be refuted by Nussbaum. She argues that the experience of grief is 
not one of relative equanimity punctuated by moments of pain when she thinks of 
her absent mother: in grief, many of the benefits which flow from her relationship 
with her mother are re-evaluated, not as a voluntary process but with ‘urgency’, in a 
process which requires her constantly to return to the supremely painful thought of 
her mother’s death, from which these connected thoughts flow.  
 
I want to make a distinction here between Nussbaum’s conception of grief as an en-
tity, as opposed to its component parts. I take first the latter concept, in which Nuss-
baum evaluates the various consequences implicit in the termination of her relation-
ship with her mother. The death of a close relative will generally entail changes to 
the life of the experiencing individual, many of which are inferentially intercon-
nected66. Each change element is likely to involve appraisal issues which trigger un-
pleasant primitive emotions. In passing from one unpleasant thought to another it 
seems to Nussbaum as if her previously tranquil mental landscape has been entirely 
disrupted. The feelings which arise in this emotional journey are explicable as the ef-
fects of primitive emotions which are aroused in response to the successive apprais-
als made.  
 
I move now to Nussbaum’s concept of the dynamic character of the grieving process. 
In the process of grieving, she describes herself as being drawn into this painful pro-
cess of judgment. She claims that there are no elements necessary for grief that are 
 
66 To exemplify. My mother owned the house; I live in the house; I have brothers and sisters who 
also inherit; the house must be sold and its value shared; I will need to find a new home. 
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not elements of the process of judgment, fused with the concomitant mental up-
heaval that this process entails. According to this account, the presence or absence of 
this or that physiological state would not enable me to conclude that I am – or am not 
- grieving; only the process of judgment itself can describe the emotional experience 
of grieving and its attendant feelings. On the face of it, the necessary conditions 
which Nussbaum lays down for emotion, are not explained as the effect of primitive 
emotions. And her claim is difficult to disprove because it is a description of Nuss-
baum’s own experience of grief. I can only address such a claim by reference to my 
own experience of the deaths of my parents.  
 
The grieving process is an immersive experience, something into which one seems to 
enter suddenly, reside, and exit gradually, in a manner quite different to the transient 
fears and frustrations of our everyday lives. In grief, I discovered that many of the 
assumptions which had formed the core of my quotidian beliefs no longer applied. 
Most important amongst these was the assumption that I had a parent and that we 
held a mutual affection for each other. It was the ending of this relationship, together 
with the alteration to all the circumstances which attached to it, which I progres-
sively reappraised. And it is the reappraisal of each of these states of affairs, accom-
panied by the various and often intensely unpleasant feelings triggered by those reap-
praisals, which occupied the foremost place in my thoughts at the time. This expla-
nation accounts for the urgency of my thoughts, not as an experiential quality of the 
appraisal process, but as a rational response to my need to contemplate the conse-
quences of the absence of this relationship in the light of its previous centrality to my 
view of the world. These thoughts would, as Nussbaum proposes, tend to return con-
stantly to the death of the parent and the ending of a relationship which in its former 
complexity and richness, constituted its value for me. And whenever my thoughts re-
turn to the death, they would cause me to experience the most intense form of sepa-
ration distress, not simply as physiological alterations, but as a change in the neuro-
chemical balance of the brain associated with the arousal of underlying neural cir-




Recognising and re-evaluating complex relationships of this type requires an ability 
to comprehend a broad range of circumstances or events as valuable, generating feel-
ings towards those circumstances which will extend the reach of emotionally potent 
events and circumstances experienced by humans well beyond those of other animal 
species. This then, might constitute a claim regarding the human experience of emo-
tion: that our superior reasoning abilities allow us to feel the significance of objects, 
events and circumstances which are not apparent to other creatures. 
 
The dual process account of emotion requires only that for an emotion to occur, 
some primitive emotional state must be present, arising either as a response to the 
detection of homeostatic value, or by means of an evaluative process. In this respect 
Nussbaum’s claim that other animals may experience emotion as intentional states is 
not excluded, but intentionality is not required as a necessary condition for emo-
tion67. This allows us to apply a greater flexibility in our view of emotions as they 
are manifested by different species. If, say, grieving requires the ability to reappraise 
complex social relationships over time, we need not assume that animals such as 
rats, who do not appear to have the capacity to support extended inferential pro-
cesses, are capable of grief, whereas the grieving processes which Nussbaum de-
scribes in chimpanzees (2001 p.89) are verified if we accept that chimpanzees are ca-
pable of inferential thought processes not dissimilar to those found in humans.  
 
21.5 The Nature and Function of Feelings in a Dual Process Model 
 
i) Feelings as action preparedness 
 
In the dual process explanation of emotion, feelings are not merely attitudes of a pos-
itive or negative valency directed towards the objects of emotion. They cause the 
subject to adopt dispositions towards the emotional object such as ‘resist y’ or ‘avoid 
 
67 It should be noted here that primitive emotions may also be aroused automatically by uncondi-
tioned or conditioned stimuli. 
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z’ which may influence appraisal processes. Moreover, they generate impulses to-
wards the objects of emotion consistent with those dispositions such as: “strike out, 
attack, confront y”, or: “flee z”.  
Some of the intentional manifestations of emotion may be usurped by these im-
pulses: without primitive emotional intervention, it is not clear why, say, an expres-
sion of anger which comes from appraisal should be attended by the physical im-
pulses often exhibited. For example, if I were to tell you that “when x said I was ly-
ing, I wanted to punch him on the nose.” you would immediately comprehend why I 
had this impulse, without reference to any consideration of my wellbeing, or any-
thing but the most circuitous rationalisation as to why such an impulse could consti-
tute a response to an appraisal.  
This seems to be extending the boundaries of cognitive-evaluative theory to the point 
where it embraces an impulse, even though that impulse seems to have arisen in the 
absence of any intentional appraisal concerning my wellbeing. My expression of a 
desire to attack my accuser is better understood as a RAGE-generated impulse which 
constitutes an active element of the emotional event, based upon the detection of a 
metastimulus within my appraisal: that my opponent’s refusal to accept my state-
ment constitutes a constraint, both upon my intention to persuade him and upon my 
status with others with regard to my honesty68. The acknowledgement of the primi-
tive emotional source of this impulse allows a clearer distinction to be made between 
the appraisal and the impulses which accompany that appraisal. 
ii) Feelings as physiological alteration 
The somatic changes which we undergo in response to an emotion are perhaps the 
least revealing manifestations of emotion in humans, whilst being the most straight-
forward to measure. In response to fear, the body is prepared for flight; in anger, we 
are readied for physical aggression – as a minimum, both involve the preparation of 
 
68 So that if such an assertion was made publicly, my anger would be more intense. 
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the body for intense activity. Social solecisms69 will cause the subject to blush invol-
untarily, but in human behaviour generally, certain physiological alterations associ-
ated with emotion may be controlled or extended by experience. In early infancy, 
crying is a typical distress response to parental absence but as children mature, we 
observe that as they learn that crying attracts sympathetic attention, they will extend 
their repertoire of ‘cry-response’ events as a means of asserting their needs. There-
fore, while ‘somatic disturbances’ are generally indicative of emotional as opposed 
to non-emotional states, our history of complex social interaction suggests that 
through learning, their original functions may sometimes be extended, suppressed or 
overwritten in favour of a more general utility. 
 
iii) Feelings as psychological states  
 
More important - but less discussed - are the alterations in the experiential quality of 
mental states occurring during an emotional event. In a dual process model these 
changes can be attributed to alterations in the balance of the neurochemical constitu-
ents of the brain during the arousal of a primitive emotion, which in turn will affect 
my interpretation of the events around me. If, say, I have an accident in my car, I am 
conditioned to fear driving and will drive defensively for some days afterwards, be-
ing particularly concerned about the threats from other drivers or failures of attention 
in myself - an effect which is generally reported.  
 
The experiential quality of an emotion induced by changes in brain chemistry may 
ultimately be a more reliable indicator of a primitive emotion than its somatic coun-
terpart. We know what it is like to experience fear, which is different to the psycho-
logical qualities of anger, anticipation, or play, yet these qualities are so much a part 
of the emotional state as experienced that we may fail to mark the changes in mental 
stance which they express. 
 
 




21.6  Feelings Originating in Primitive Emotional ‘Release’ Mechanisms 
 
Primitive emotional release neurophysiologies present as emotional feelings but are 
distinguished from the sensations associated with the onset of a primitive emotional 
response by arising only when we are accomplishing, or have successfully accom-
plished, a homeostatically valuable task 70 
So, for example, when a threat to my job is lifted, I feel relief; and when I win an im-
portant competition or pass a difficult exam, I feel exultant; or again, my care for my 
child is attended by mutual feelings of affection. These pleasant feelings are the 
brain’s mechanisms for rewarding - and hence reinforcing –  some homeostatically 
valuable behaviour. They are not primitive emotions; rather, their occurrence is de-
pendent upon the arousal and successful performance of some primitive emotional 
function and in this respect, each can be understood as concomitant of a primitive 




70 .  “Although people use many different adjectives to describe the states of satisfaction they experi-
ence, most of our feelings of sensory pleasure arise from the various stimuli that signal the return of 




Emotional Feelings - Summary 
 
The dual process model of emotion assigns a role to the feelings which attend emo-
tional appraisals. If, as the result of a cognitive evaluation, some pattern of thoughts 
occurs which arouses an emotion, then that pattern of thoughts has attributes charac-
teristic of a class of stimuli – metastimuli - each corresponding to one of a number of 
drives embedded in mammalian species, which I have called homeostatic impera-
tives. When this occurs, a primitive emotion is triggered which can be understood as 
manifesting in our mental processes as feelings toward the emotional object, realised 
in the form of altered neurochemistries and physiologies, together with behavioural 
impulses. 
 
These effects, arising independently of mind, cause us to adopt an attitude toward the 
object of an emotion, independently of the evaluative processes which gave rise to it. 
This attitude is exhibited as both chemical states of the brain and physical alterations 
which support states of action preparedness towards the object of emotion. The col-
lective effects of such changes, as Solomon has proposed, act as ‘judgments of the 
body’, biasing the originating cognitive evaluation in a manner consistent with the 












Chapter 22: The Interaction of Feelings and Evaluations in the Dual Process 
Emotional Model 
Introduction 
Although cognitive-evaluative theory will provide an explanation for the origins of 
most emotional occurrences in humans, certain manifestations of emotion imply the 
existence of a separate non-evaluative emotional dimension. Goldie is concerned 
with the problem of recalcitrant emotions in which our emotional intuitions provide 
a separate perspective of the emotional object – what Goldie calls introspective 
knowledge – which sometimes conflicts with the evaluative judgment.  
Joel Marks cites cases in which we experience emotions unexpectedly, as a genuine 
revelation. From this he speculates that in some way our feelings lie dormant -unfelt 
– seeming to arise spontaneously, calling into question the notion of feelings as 
bound up in the evaluation itself. 
And separately, there is the problem of the expression of raw emotions, occurring 
more predominantly in infants, often observed in cases of fear, panic or rage, in 
which the subject, being unable to suppress the primitive emotional impulse, 
becomes possessed by it, irrespective of the consequences for its wellbeing. 
The dual process model, by offering separate accounts of primitive and cognitive-
evaluative emotion, both as independent but internally coherent processes and as 
interacting processes may enable us to explain the effects described. 
The dual process model of emotion allows that emotional events may be activated 
directly by the detection of homeostatically valuable objects, or indirectly via an 
evaluative process. This account does not exclude that the same stimulus may cause 
an alignment of primitive and cognitive-evaluative states, which I have described as 
‘consistent’. Neither does this exclude the possibility that the homeostatically valua-
ble stimulus detected differs from the stimulus which is detected by appraisal, caus-




This aspect of the dual process model allows the classification of emotional events 
into four broad categories, which I shall call ‘configurations’ each describing the 
emotional effects generated by particular combinations of intentional and noninten-











Interactive Mode of 
Primitive Emotional and Cogni-
tive Evaluative Emotion Types 
Configuration 1 Yes No P.E. Driven 
Configuration 2  Yes Yes Consistent 
Configuration 3 Yes Yes Inconsistent 
Configuration 4 No Yes C.E. Driven 
 
I will provide examples of each configuration type to illustrate the explanatory scope 







Murphy and Zajonc’s ‘suboptimal prime’ experiments describe a Configuration 1 
emotional state in which the presentation of a homeostatically valuable but sublimi-
nal stimulus causes biasing of evaluation.  
 
In Murphy and Zajonc’s example, a Chinese ideograph, though separately appraised 
‘neutral’ as regards affective content71, is appraised as disliked, when an immedi-
ately preceding affective stimulus is presented too briefly to be detected consciously 
(Diagram 22b.). However, the underlying primitive emotional system, with its ability 
to respond more rapidly to the affective stimulus, detects the suboptimal prime. The 
primitive emotion so generated biases the cognitive evaluation of the ideograph 
through conditioning, causing the ideograph to be disliked, whereas the cognitive 
evaluation, being unable to process the affective stimulus, is unable to detect and 




71 The ideograph, under normal circumstances, is evaluated as ‘affect neutral’ and hence does not 
qualify as a Type 2 affective stimulus. However, when subliminally associated with - and conditioned 
by - a Type 1 affective stimulus, it acts as a proxy for that stimulus, having homeostatic value. In this 




We frequently encounter stimuli which activate sympathetic cognitive-evaluative 
and primitive emotions. When this happens, each state excites and reinforces the 
other, so that I experience feelings which are validated by my evaluation of the cir-
cumstances (Diagram 22c.). We might think of this as the normative mode for the in-
teraction of intentional and non-intentional states of emotion. 
 
Example: 
A stranger with children enters my garden and begins to play on the swings and 
slide. 
 
• Primitive emotion: Territorial incursion> constraint, causing RAGE. 
• Cognitive-evaluative: I own the property and have a right to privacy. That 
right has been contravened, hence frustrated. (Core relational theme – Other 
Blame) 
 
In an encounter with the stranger, my insistence that the stranger must leave because 
she is trespassing will be supported by my aggressive demeanour and impulses, sig-







Configuration 3 emotions occur when the primitive emotion aroused conflicts with 
evaluation, generating an inconsistency of thoughts and feelings (Diagram 22d.).  
 
This accords with Goldie’s observation that in some cases of emotion our appraisals 
and feelings conflict. On the face of it, Goldie’s objection might be construed as a 
challenge to any claim that human emotional processes derive benefit from the inter-
play of intentional and autonomous mechanisms – that if our feelings disrupt the ra-
tional pursuit of our interests, then such conflicts constitute a failure of the dual pro-
cess mechanism. But this is to ignore the evolutionary process by which cognitive 
evaluations have come to exist in humans and other species. If our appraisals did no 
more than confirm our primitive emotional impulses, they would serve no obvious 
purpose. It is just because primitive emotions sometimes fail to offer optimal sur-
vival solutions that evaluative processes – in accessing a much more extensive array 
of environmental and social circumstances which affect our wellbeing may regulate 




A house is for sale that I have hoped to buy for some time. When I look over 
the house I find I am less inclined to make an offer than I expected72. The 
owner had a dog and I dislike dogs. 
The desirability of the house causes me to experience anticipatory feelings 
(SEEKING/Consummatory) but these are opposed by my feelings of aver-
sion towards dogs (FEAR). 
 
72 I took this example from a lifestyle website (www.kiplinger.com): “Buyers may be frightened, aller-
gic or distracted by pets, even if your animal is well-behaved. It's best if you can remove your dog 






Before the visit I expected the visit to confirm my desire for the house, how-
ever I find that I did not like the house as much as I expected.  My appraisal 
of the event has been altered by my fear of dogs, which conflicts with my de-




Configuration 4 describes a class of emotion for which no external primitive emo-
tional stimulus is present. The primitive content of such emotions finds its origins in 
our thoughts or in our appraisals of proposals which others make to us, either di-
rectly or through some intermediate process of communication. On such occasions, 
the arousal of primitive emotions relies entirely upon the identification of patterns of 
thought pertaining to the stimulus object. 
 
Example: 






The headmaster of St ….Primary School has advised us that your daughter 
was one of a small group of able students who were, at least for some les-
sons, offered courses which were normally only available to students who 
were in higher classes and he has proposed that we should continue with this 
practice. We have given the matter a good deal of thought and, on reflection, 
have decided that we must abandon this approach. This will mean that your 
daughter will, in effect, be required to repeat some of the work she has al-
ready done and for this we apologise. 
 
We have a number of reasons for taking this step. First, we believe that chil-
dren’s abilities should be recognised and catered for in the collective process 
of education. Secondly, we cannot find evidence that such methods contribute 
to the child’s progress in the longer term and finally (and - unfortunately - 
decisively) we do not believe we have the financial or staff resources to sup-




My first thought upon reading this letter is that this will impede the progress of my 
child, and this apprehension of constraint will be detected, causing the arousal of 
RAGE directed at the writer of the letter. As Panksepp writes: “human brains are 
evolutionarily prepared to externalize the causes of anger and to “blame” others.” 
(1998 p.189)  
 
An angry state will influence my beliefs regarding the motives of the writer - that the 
justifications offered are sophistries designed to obscure an underlying motive of in-
stitutional indolence. I have no basis for this judgment. It might well be that what the 
school is saying is correct. And I might be wrong in my choice of target. The indi-
vidual writing the letter need not be the decision maker. To summarise, although the 
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I have not fully explored the important effects of multiple emotional stimuli arising 
concurrently in Configuration 4-type emotional events, where such circumstances 
will most frequently occur (See my example in Chapter 21 p.268). It seems probable 
that as our powers of appraisal expand to encompass an increasing number of physi-
cal and abstract entities as important for our wellbeing, the likelihood of our evalua-
tions resulting in the arousal of multiple primitive emotions, must similarly expand, 
giving rise to an increasing complexity of emotional feeling. 
This view is reflected in Damasio’s account of emotion which I offer as the Appen-
dix to this thesis. In this explanation, the elements of complex decisions are simpli-
fied by the action of what Damasio terms ‘somatic markers’ which he attributes to 
the visceral and non-visceral sensations co-occurring with the evaluation. In being 
aroused by the evaluation of complex circumstances relating to ourselves, and hav-
ing visceral and non-visceral elements, somatic markers share the neurophysiological 




The dual process model of emotion envisages the existence of a core set of primitive 
emotions in all mammalian species which may be triggered by homeostatically valu-
able or conditioned stimuli, or by the revelation of value through appraisal. Accord-
ing to this account, all emotional states in mammals are supported by primitive emo-
tions, but the extent to which these primitive states dictate our actions is a function 
of the development of higher cortical processes in each species. These higher pro-
cesses allow the subject either to regulate or suppress the intensity of primitive emo-
tional feelings in a manner proportionate to the appraised level of threat or oppor-
tunity, and to adopt an alternative approach to some state of affairs other than that 
prompted by the primitive emotional impulse. 
The account I have presented might be challenged by philosophers such as Rorty 
who argue that our emotions have a much richer and more complex nature than I 
have described, playing a central role in fields of human activity as diverse as art, 
justice and religion. They might claim that such phenomena cannot be accommo-
dated by the interplay of appraisals and ancient emotional mechanisms.  
But the purpose of this thesis has not been to explain the role of emotion in these 
unique fields of human experience – a role which I accept. My intention has been to 
provide a model which would account for both the distinctive character of emotional 
appraisals and associated neurophysiological alterations.  
This model is complex: emotions may be aroused by stimuli which cause intentional 
or nonintentional responses. The range of objects, events or states of affairs to which 
we may respond emotionally is unlimited, and the primitive emotional states aroused 
may be simple or complex, each having a particular intensity and quality. In creating 
this explanation, I have attempted to identify the constituents of emotion and their 
modes of interaction, rather than the social and artistic edifices into which these con-
stituents may have been constructed. 
The dual process model assumes the existence of a shared set of primitive emotional 
processes in humans and other mammalian species. This assumption implies an 
equivalence between emotional states as experienced by humans and other species. 
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According to this account, the feelings of a primitive mammal abandoned by its par-
ent are no less intense than that of a human in the same circumstances, but the impli-
cations of that abandonment are more extensively appraised and hence felt by the hu-
man. 
In humans, the connection between appraisal and primitive emotion implies that our 
lives will tend to involve more frequent and more complex emotional events than 
would be encountered by other species, unless our everyday thoughts are directed 
primarily towards matters which have no relevance for ourselves. With this excep-



















Chapter 23: Summary 
 
Overview 
In the introduction to Part III, I referred to three accounts of emotion which I had de-
scribed previously: Cognitive-evaluative, Primitive, and what I have called the Com-
monsense View, and I set out to provide an answer to this question: can these three 
accounts of emotion be brought together into a single explanation in such a way that 
each is vindicated?  
 
The model of emotion advanced in Part III offers a potential solution to this ques-
tion. It describes an interaction of evaluative and primitive states in which certain 
patterns of appraisals identified during the evaluative process arouse primitive emo-
tions and regulate their intensity. When so aroused, those primitive emotions, will, in 
turn, influence the evaluation as feelings. The feelings aroused have a particular 
quality, allowing us to experience what it is like to be say, affectionate or afraid, sep-
arately from the appraisal of context. Our experience of these feelings allows us to 
attribute, from observation or inference, the presence of such emotional states to oth-
ers. This concept of emotion is the Commonsense View, which I have described in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The explanation I have provided has elements in common with the accounts of psy-
chologists such as Smith and Lazarus who claim that emotional appraisals are the 
product of an adaptive process whereby the rigid stimulus-response mechanisms 
characteristic of reflexes have been progressively overwritten, but not replaced, by 
appraisal processes, which permit a more extensive interpretation of the relevance of 
external circumstances and events as they bear upon our wellbeing.  
 
In explaining the physiological changes and states of action preparedness which co-
occur with emotional appraisals, Smith and Lazarus claim that when patterns of ap-
praisals are identified which trigger an emotion, certain appraisal issues have been 
identified which carry ‘adaptive significance’. In claiming adaptive significance, 
they postulate that the appraisal issues identified have attributes of stimuli which 
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have signified potential harms and benefits throughout our evolutionary history. 
When such patterns are identified, they claim that a convergence occurs between the 
appraisal and underlying reflexes. In this convergence, the reflexes aroused are ata-
visms – ancient responses to the issues detected by appraisal. These reflexes are 
evoked as states of action preparedness together with the neurophysiologies which 
would support such actions, and it is our experience of the arousal of these underly-
ing reflexive states, which causes us to describe the appraisal as emotional. (Chapter 
18) 
 
In addressing Smith and Lazarus’s claim that the physiological alterations and states 
of action preparedness associated with emotion are reflexes, I have argued that the 
evolutionary transition between a reflex and an evaluative state of emotion would 
have entailed an intermediate stage in which unconditioned and conditioned stimuli 
could be detected spontaneously and addressed by an appropriate behaviour, and I 
have proposed that the mechanisms which mediate this process are a set of subcorti-
cal brain modes corresponding to Panksepp’s ‘basic emotions’. (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) 
 
In the evolutionary process I describe, reflexes, as invariant neural mechanisms cou-
pling stimuli with response behaviours, were gradually replaced by these subcortical 
processes enabling multiple stimuli to be detected and addressed by a single re-
sponse.  Such processes, in mediating between stimulus and response, (hence meet-
ing my requirement for cognitive processes) are spontaneously aroused by the detec-
tion of particular stimuli. In acting in this way, their function may be described as 
nonintentional. I have proposed that it is these processes, which I have called primi-
tive emotions, rather than Smith and Lazarus’s reflexes, which generate the physio-
logical alterations and the states of action preparedness associated with emotion. 
 
Primitive emotions may be aroused directly by the spontaneous detection of stimuli. 
But additionally, as per Smith and Lazarus’s theory, when appraisal processes detect 
some pattern of events or states of affairs which carry beneficial or harmful implica-
tions for our wellbeing, that pattern of appraisal will conform to one of a number of 
core relational themes, each theme having features in common with categories of 
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stimuli, which I have termed ‘metastimuli’. Exciting objects, events or states of af-
fairs which have the characteristics of a core relational theme, acting as a token of a 
metastimulus, will excite corresponding primitive emotions, and the intensities of the 
primitive emotions so aroused become, in turn, subject to regulation by the appraisal.  
But, although a primitive emotion may be aroused and regulated by appraisal, it is 
the arousal of a primitive emotion through appraisal which marks an appraisal as 
emotional.  
 
Yet this is only part of the picture: primitive emotions play no intentional role in the 
evaluative process, but they nonetheless influence evaluation.  Primitive emotions, 
when aroused in response to appraisals, are experienced as feelings directed towards 
the objects of emotion, realised biologically as behavioural dispositions, neurochem-
ical brain states and altered physiologies.  
 
In proposing an interaction of primitive emotions and appraisals, I am not claiming 
that appraisals are intentional expressions of primitive emotional states: indeed, it is 
just because primitive emotions serve our wellbeing more effectively when regulated 
by appraisal processes, that these higher73 cortical responses to primitive emotions 
exist. Yet, appraisals, as regulators of primitive emotions, cannot stand apart from 
these phenomena. The ability of an appraisal to regulate the intensity of a primitive 
emotion requires that the appraisal is responsive to the effects of the co-occurring 
primitive emotional condition; in responding, the appraisal is influenced by the neu-
rophysiological alterations and behavioural dispositions towards the object of emo-
tion, which are characteristic of the primitive emotion.  
 
The effects of primitive emotional influences upon human thought processes are ex-
tensive, but to understand them fully, it is necessary to explain how primitive emo-
tions present in the human psyche. A primitive emotion has a characteristic neuro-
physiology consisting of a subcortical brain state and distinctive neurochemistry 
 
73  I am using this term ‘higher’ here as it is often applied in psychological and neuroscientific de-
scriptions, referring only to some differentiated process for the control of primitive emotion. 
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which cause behavioural dispositions and alterations to our visceral and musculo-
skeletal condition. In this way, primitive emotions directly engage the subject with 
external events and states of affairs by providing a physical intimation of their signif-
icance for the self. This separate disposition towards the emotional object may be 
regulated - but not extinguished - by co-occurring appraisal processes. It is the com-
bined effects of these neurophysiological changes which allow us to experience what 
it is like to be, say, threatened, constrained, isolated, loving, or anticipating. This ex-
perience draws its power from the coherence of the primitive emotional disposition 
toward the object – a disposition which would be expressed as a behaviour in the ab-




In Part I of the thesis, I have described the cognitive-evaluative view of emotion 
which holds that for an emotion to occur, the subject must have some apprehension 
of the implications of an object or state of affairs for its wellbeing, and I have argued 
that this account is inconsistent with experimental evidence that certain manifesta-
tions of emotion in human and other mammalian species appear to arise spontane-
ously (Chapter 2). In accounting for this separate mode of emotional arousal, which I 
have described as nonintentional, I have postulated the existence of primitive emo-
tional mechanisms, which are taken from Panksepp’s description of basic emotional 
processes. 
 
In Part II of this thesis I have assembled the evidence for primitive emotional sys-
tems as a neurological architecture (Chapters 8-13). In constructing this account of 
primitive emotion, my aim has been to demonstrate that primitive emotions generate 
characteristic neurophysiologies and behaviours, functioning in the absence of evalu-
ation. Solely by means of primitive emotional mechanisms, a primitive mammal 
would be able to carry out survival tasks such as detecting threats, responding to 
physiological urges and isolation, acquiring new stimuli, reproducing, nurturing, 
playing and – importantly - resisting external constraints upon its propensity to per-
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form these behaviours. And in establishing the organism’s response to multiple stim-
uli, I have set out a process whereby primitive emotional brain modes compete for 
control of behaviour (Chapter 14).  
 
In Part III, I have provided evidence from psychological and neuroscientific research 
for the interaction of cognitive-evaluative and primitive emotional states. 
 
Experiments into the effects of subliminally-presented affective stimuli provide evi-
dence of the action of primitive emotion in biasing evaluative states (Chapter 16). 
They demonstrate that an object which would normally be evaluated as having no af-
fective content may be liked or disliked when associated with subliminally-detected 
affective images of corresponding valencies. The biasing of a normally neutral cue 
by the affective character of the subliminally detected affective stimulus 
 is argued to support the view that a primitive emotion may influence evaluation. 
 
But the ability of primitive emotional processes to influence evaluation is only one 
component of this relationship. I have also presented evidence for the regulation of 
primitive emotion by evaluation. To demonstrate this effect, I have described a set of 
experiments in which affective images, when exposed for a sufficient time to be ap-
praised, reveal the role of evaluation in regulating primitive emotional states. In 
these experiments, prolonged affective stimulus exposure allows the subject to regu-
late the underlying primitive emotion in response to evaluation, either suppressing 
the primitive emotional response, or pitching its intensity at the most effective level 
(Chapter 16).  
 
Solomon challenges the notion that the type of spontaneously-aroused emotional 
phenomena I have described play a role in the mental processes of evaluation, assert-
ing that they constitute: “a brief, preconscious, precognitive, more or less automatic 
excitation of an affect program (2004 p.78). According to this account, Solomon ac-
cepts that spontaneous ‘non-evaluative’ effects may exist but he argues that they are 
short-lived preludes to emotions, which he claims are subjective engagements with 
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the world. In addressing Solomon’s objection, I have presented neuroscientific evi-
dence which demonstrates that neurological activity consistent with the arousal of 
primitive emotions co-occurs with emotional evaluation, which accompanies but 
does not replace primitive emotions (Chapter 17). And Seamon et al., have con-
firmed that the biasing effects of subliminal affective images upon neutral images 
persist for hours or even weeks after the experiment has taken place. 
 
Taken collectively, these experiments are important in demonstrating the sustained 
effects of primitive emotions in influencing evaluative processes, and the role of 
evaluation in regulating primitive emotional processes. However, such processes 
cannot explain the observation that appraisals are often associated with the arousal of 
feelings in the absence of primitive emotional stimuli: some mechanism for the 
arousal of primitive emotion by evaluation remains to be identified. 
 
In addressing this question, in Chapter 18 I have described Smith and Lazarus’s psy-
chological experiments in which subjects were asked to evaluate various descriptions 
of situations, representing states of affairs with potentially affective contents. In ana-
lysing their findings, the researchers concluded that the causal attributions relating to 
each situation were synthesised by the subjects into patterns of appraisals pertaining 
to their wellbeing, and that these patterns could be significantly correlated with the 
identification by the subjects of particular emotional responses to the situations de-
scribed.  
 
In distinguishing the patterns of appraisals which evoke emotions from those which 
do not, the researchers propose the existence of a process whereby the subject is able 
to identify - from patterns of appraisals - a relatively small number of emotionally 
arousing issues, which they describe as core relational themes. The researchers pro-
pose that these themes detect harms and benefits which arouse ancient reflexive re-
sponses to the general conformation of the appraisal issues detected.  
 
Whilst accepting that emotion is partially explained as a response to the identifica-
tion of core relational themes, I have argued that the researchers do not adequately 
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characterize the relationship between an appraisal and the neurophysiological 
changes observed to co-occur with that appraisal; more specifically, that they fail to 
describe the manner by which appraisal is able to trigger the neurophysiologies and 
action impulses they ascribe to reflexes.  
 
In addressing this deficiency, the explanation I have advanced - based upon the ac-
tion of primitive emotions - more fully describes the interaction of emotional ap-
praisals and accompanying neurophysiological changes. I have argued that although 
the primitive and evaluative components of emotion differ fundamentally - both as 
neurological mechanisms and in terms of the mental acts which they are able to sup-
port - each subserves a shared set of motivating principles for mediating the relation-
ship between the subject and its environment in order to achieve some balanced state 
of the organism or the persistence of its species. This state, often described as pro-
moting the organism’s ‘survival’ or ‘wellbeing’, is more completely described as ho-
meostasis (Chapter 4). For this reason, I have called the common motivations per-
taining to both intentional cognitions and primitive emotional mechanisms homeo-
static imperatives. (Chapter 19) 
 
A homeostatic imperative is the biological realisation of one of a set of core motivat-
ing principles which animal species are disposed to enact when certain broad classes 
of stimulus -which I have termed metastimuli - are detected. A metastimulus might 
occur as, say, a threat, or a constraint - either of which will trigger a characteristic 
primitive emotion in mammalian species. (Chapter 13)  
 
The organism’s survival chances are improved as mechanisms evolve to augment the 
detection of cues which fall under any class of metastimulus, thus extending the 
scope of contexts which are identifiable as having significance for its wellbeing. In 
mammals, this evolutionary process is manifested as evaluations - intentional pro-
cesses which allow mammals to detect the presence of issues in external events or 




I have proposed that the patterns of appraisal which psychologists have identified as 
core relational themes draw their significance from the same homeostatic impera-
tives and classes of metastimulus as primitive emotions (Chapter 19). This associa-
tion is not accidental: appraisals address the same core motivating principles as prim-
itive emotions but allow the subject to identify a much greater range of external cir-
cumstances as important for its wellbeing. 
 
My explanation of emotion in mammals as the outcome of two processes - appraisals 
and primitive emotions - shares characteristics of psychological explanations of men-
tal phenomena as diverse as memory, reasoning, rule-learning and decision-making 
which fall under the general classification of ‘dual process’ theories (Chapter 20). 
Psychologists have proposed that each of these faculties may be explained as the ac-
tion of two distinct mental functions: the first (Type 1) being nonconscious and intui-
tive, in which information is processed rapidly and automatically; and the second 
(Type 2) is generally described as conscious and involves intentional processes re-
quiring mental simulation and inference, typically entailing the retention of infor-
mation in a working memory.   
For mammalian species, primitive emotions may be characterised as Type 1 pro-
cesses, arising and functioning spontaneously in response to the detection of stimuli, 
whereas appraisal processes possess both intentional and inferential attributes char-
acteristic of Type 2 processes. The balance in dependence upon primitive as opposed 
to evaluative processes will vary between species. Less advanced mammals, such as 
rats, will acquire new stimuli principally through conditioning, whereas humans are 
able to respond to a much broader range of emotional stimuli, by appraisal and con-
ditioning, making the probability of multi-stimulus encounters greater in humans 
than in other mammals.  
In the evaluation of complex external events or states of affairs, appraisal issues may 
be identified corresponding to more than one core relational theme, causing the 
arousal of multiple primitive emotional brain modes, each of which will compete for 
control of behaviour (Chapter 14). These competing brain modes will cause the 
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arousal of complex feelings – expressed as behavioural dispositions and their sup-
porting neurophysiologies - directed towards the object of appraisal (Chapter 21). 
The notion that the neurophysiological states which accompany emotions play any 
role in emotions is challenged by cognitive-evaluative advocates who claim first, that 
the bodily changes which co-occur with an emotion are incoherent, bearing no rela-
tionship to the emotion which the subject believes he/she is experiencing. I have ex-
amined the evidence for this claim and found that it neither supports nor disproves 
the cognitive-evaluative view. But even if the claim were to be disproved, and syn-
chronously-occurring bodily changes were found to be characteristic of the emotion 
expressed, this would not, of itself, indicate a role for bodily changes in an emotion 
if it is understood as the outcome of evaluation. For this reason, cognitive-evaluative 
advocates argue that that the feelings which arise during the emotion are the products 
of the appraisal itself, rather than the effects of bodily changes.  
The role which I have proposed for bodily changes is that they comprise a compo-
nent of a primitive emotion, instantiated as a complex state of the organism in which 
a brain mode having both neurodynamic and neurochemical characteristics will give 
rise to a behavioural disposition and the physiological states necessary to support 
that behaviour. The state described can be understood as a separate nonintentional 
response of the organism directed towards the emotional object - what Solomon has 
described as a ‘judgment of the body’ (Chapter 21). 
I have provided evidence that the intensity of primitive emotional states may be reg-
ulated by evaluative processes, and in regulating the primitive emotion, the processes 
which have caused an appraisal of the emotional object, must be sensitive to the 
primitive emotional state which is separately directed towards that object, which may 
conform or conflict with the initial appraisal. In this way the appraisal is influenced 
by the primitive emotion (Chapter 22).  
By this account, the feelings which arise during emotion are the effects of the primi-
tive emotional neurophysiologies and behavioural dispositions as they present in the 
evaluative process. This separate ‘primitive’ impression allows us to comprehend the 
objects of value as physical or abstract entities through evaluation, whilst at the same 
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time feeling, not only the importance of those objects, but some quality attaching to 
that importance. It is as if the object of our thoughts becomes illuminated from a sep-
arate source, permitting us to view aspects of that object which our rational processes 
have not revealed to us. And this perspective, whether it supports or opposes our ini-
tial appraisal of an object, seems no less authentic to us than the appraisal itself. 
 
The Implications of a Dual Process Model of Emotion 
 
Advocates of the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion claim that while physiologi-
cal changes accompany emotions, it is not the effects of such changes which cause 
appraisals to have the character of an emotion; rather, they assert that the experiential 
quality of emotion, which is argued to be distinct from that of everyday cognitions, 
is bound up in the appraisal process itself. But the need to account for the character-
istic turbulence of emotional thought causes the proponents of appraisal theories to 
distance themselves from more formal theories relating to beliefs, desires and inten-
tions, claiming variously that emotions cause upheavals of thought (Nussbaum) or 
are judgments which should not be something deliberative, articulate or fully con-
scious [rather, they are] a way of cognitively grappling with the world (Solomon) or 
a way of interpreting one’s plight (Lazarus). But these descriptions, in distinguishing 
emotional appraisals from more conventional theories of mind do not satisfactorily 
explain why there should be a corner of our thought processes – the thoughts relating 
to external matters concerning ourselves – to which this treatment must be applied. 
 
The dual process model directly addresses this problem. It requires nothing more 
from appraisal processes than that they originate in beliefs. Such beliefs may be ex-
plicit, implicit, or concealed as Rorty has described. According to this account, when 
we make appraisals of external events and states of affairs, certain patterns relating 
to matters concerning our wellbeing will trigger physiological changes and behav-
ioural impulses. In making such appraisals, we identify core relational themes which 
carry significance for our wellbeing. These appraisal issues, having the conformation 
of metastimuli trigger primitive emotions, entailing characteristic neurochemical and 
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neurophysiological changes and behavioural dispositions, which may - or may not - 
align with an appraisal.  
 
By separating the intentional and nonintentional aspects of emotion in this way, im-
portant aspects of emotional experience: the irrational impulses; the alterations in 
physiology and states of mind; and the sense that we are in some way involved in 
emotionally exciting states of affairs - all these things are explained by the action of 
primitive emotions.  
 
The model I have proposed offers a way forward for psychologists and neuroscien-
tists in the study of emotion. Psychologists such as Smith and Lazarus have proposed 
that certain patterns of appraisal will cause emotions but concede that the conditions 
they have described as generating emotional cognitions require further investigation 
and refinement. I have argued that the patterns of appraisal which Smith and Lazarus 
describe conform to the same categories of metastimuli which trigger primitive emo-
tions. Such an interpretation indicates that a review and re-framing of their research 
based upon the similarities between core relational themes and metastimuli might 
provide even greater correlation between emotion and the appraisal issues identified. 
Benefitting from such a project, philosophers may develop a model of emotional ap-
praisal which may be accommodated more readily within existing theories of mind.  
 
Again, from Panksepp’s text, it is clear that the neuroscience underpinning emotional 
mechanisms is by no means complete. We know that emotions are accompanied by 
changes to the neurochemical balance of the brain and that these effects are daunt-
ingly complex. We also know that there are extensive connections between the sub-
cortical circuits which instantiate primitive emotions and mental processes in the ne-
ocortex which interpret and regulate these effects; but we have yet to identify neural 
mechanisms in which appraisal issues are detected as core relational themes having 
the conformation of metastimuli, which in turn will trigger a primitive emotion.  
 
And it is by no means certain that Panksepp has detected all the primitive emotions. 
In humans, for example, we observe disgust responses which may upon investigation 
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be found to reflect the strong long-term aversive reactions which mammals display 
when exposed to poisons or bad food. Again, the distress responses to maternal sepa-
ration could be argued to be adapted in advanced mammalian species such as pri-
mates and cetaceans, so that separation distress has become a primitive emotion 
which has expanded to encompass the individual and its social group.  
 
The model of emotion I have described, if accepted, makes the explication of all 
these matters more relevant to a general understanding of the emotional process, be-
cause to explain how such mechanisms function is to explain how the behavioural 
impulses, neurochemistries and physiological alterations associated with primitive 
emotional states influence appraisals. And by examining the appraisal process, we 
are able to predict not only the arousal of a particular primitive emotion, but also 
feelings and dispositions of the subject towards the emotional object as arising sepa-
rately from the appraisal. 
 
In the preceding paragraphs I have cited aspects of my theory for which there is an 
absence of confirmatory evidence and I accept that in acquiring such evidence, the 
theory might be confirmed, refuted or perhaps modified. But I maintain that a theory 
which has the potential to explain a wide range of emotional experience, whilst being 
readily refutable, is preferable to a theory which is so constructed that its explanatory 
















The effects of feelings - both consistent and inconsistent with an evaluation - are 
argued by Damasio to provide an indispensable role in complex decision making. He 
provides evidence for a hybridized system in which we apply ‘somatic markers’ to 
the evaluative processes which accompany complex decisions, particularly when the 
matters to be decided involve situations which have implications for ourselves or our 
interests. In so doing, the judgments concerning elements of the decision-making 
process which may be inferred rationally are accepted, whilst those elements which 
evoke strong affective responses are treated as emotionally rather than rationally 
potent. When this happens Damasio proposes that somatic markers act in this way:  
 
“before you reason toward the solution of a problem something quite important 
happens: when the bad outcome connected with a given response option comes into 
mind, however fleetingly, you experience an unpleasant gut feeling. Because the 
feeling is about the body, I give the phenomenon its technical term ‘somatic’ state [  
] and because it ‘marks’ an image, I called it a marker. [  ] I include both visceral 
and nonvisceral sensation when I refer to somatic markers.” (1994 p.172) 
 
In this way, somatic markers act to promote or disqualify some of the constituent 
elements of complex decisions which seem insoluble by normal inferential 
processes, hence simplifying the decision-making process. I will provide an 
example: I receive a more lucrative job offer which requires me to relocate. In 
making this decision, I take into consideration, inter alia: 
 
• relative house prices and costs; removal costs 
• my wife’s ability to get an equally good job 
• whether I will enjoy the new job as much as my existing one  
• whether the new location has as much to offer socially 
• my wife’s attitude towards leaving her existing job  
• the relative quality of local schools 
• our travel costs to and from work 
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• the attitude of my children upon learning that they must leave their school 
and friends.  
 
Such decisions, even if we are in full possession of all the facts and the various 
opinions relating to the present and proposed scenarios, cannot be arrived at by 
exclusively rational processes. Ultimately, the outcome of the decision will rest - at 
least in part - upon my feelings about these things: Are my worries about the slightly 
poorer schools outweighed by the feelings I associate with a potential improvement 
in wealth and status? How attached are the children to their schools and friends? 
How concerned does my wife seem about leaving her job? Will she blame me if it 
goes wrong and how heavily would that weigh upon our relationship? These are 
matters which must be settled emotionally, even as I embark upon a more rational 
consideration of the financial and practical aspects of the decision. My feelings 
might indicate that the children’s dismay is transient but my wife’s attachment to her 
current job will cause her to resent me if I pursue this course. And the final decision 
might weigh a paramount emotional consideration against a financial one; such as a 
demonstrable improvement in our financial circumstances in the light of my wife’s 
settled feelings against the change. 
 
In support of this argument, Damasio cites cases where brain damage has caused 
interruption to those pathways in the brain which allow evaluative processes to be 
influenced by the neural states which generate the underlying sensations he 
describes. This effect is most noticeable when the decisions taken relate to the 
subject’s private affairs, or his relations with others, often with unfavourable, and 
sometimes disastrous, results. (1994 pp.33-51). 
 
In support of this account, Damasio cites an example of a patient in which damage to 
the prefrontal area of the cortex meant that his evaluative processes operated without 
the support of these visceral and non-visceral sensations: 
 
“I was discussing with the same patient when his next visit to the laboratory should 
take place. I suggested two alternative dates, both in the coming month and a few 
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days apart from each other. The patient pulled out his appointment book and began 
consulting the calendar. The behaviour that ensued, which was witnessed by several 
investigators, was remarkable. For the better part of half an hour, the patient enu-
merated reasons for and against each of the two dates: previous engagements, prox-
imity to other engagements, possible meteorological conditions, virtually anything 
that he could reasonably think about concerning a simple date. [  ] he was now walk-
ing us through a tiresome cost-benefit analysis, an endless outlining and fruitless 
comparison of options and possible consequences. It took enormous discipline to lis-
ten to all of this [  ] but we finally did tell him, quietly, that he should come on the 
second of the alternative dates. His response was equally prompt and calm. He 
simply said: “That’s fine.” Back went the appointment book in his pocket and then 
he was off.”  (1994 p.193). 
 
The role which Damasio attributes to the intervention of feelings in life-altering 
human decisions has profound implications for any concept of mind. It implies that 
our reasoning processes, if they are based solely upon inferences from facts, will 
tend to fail us at the moments in our lives when they are most required. At these 
moments, it is our feelings, when taken into consideration with the feelings of others 
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